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According to architectural historian Charles Jencks, modernism "died in St. Louis,
Missouri, on July 15*, 1972, at 3:32 p.m. (or thereabouts),"' when the Pruitt-Igoe housing
project, a symbol of the rationality of modern architecture, was destroyed. That structure had
received fulsome accolades in 1951, when the plans were revealed, for its innovative design,
which accentuated functionality and rationality. It was hoped that the purism of the style and
the hospital-like, concrete-slab atmosphere would inspire its inhabitants to rational and virtuous
behavior, but instead this and many other like-minded Utopian architectural endeavors of the
modem period became breeding grounds for the inner-city dmg business. The buildings had to
be razed because of vandalism wrought by the inhabitants themselves out of their despair, which
was not ameliorated by their inadequate, soulless concrete abodes. Since that time, claims
Jencks, we have inhabited a postmodern world, a world as nebulous and inchoate as its moniker.
Having been bom in 1974, 1 began life in a postmodem reality (according to Jencks, at
any rate), but my exposure to the term is actually quite recent. I recall first hearing the word in
college and experiencing a sensation of dismissiveness. "Isn't modemity the most recent period
of history?" I wondered. "How can we be beyond the present?" I attributed the term to be
simply the tool of someone who wanted to sound profound by saying something self-
contradictory and decided not to give the notion any credence.
In college, I began to explore some areas of interest, which, at the time, I had no idea
might be related to each other in any meaningful way. The first of these was history. I entered
college as a history major with intent to pursue a law degree, but early on in my academic career
I became soured on that profession. After a period of stmggling and trying to reestablish a
direction for my life, I decided to study theology in my postgraduate work, but since I still
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greatly enjoyed my history classes, I continued in the history major, with an emphasis on
European history. My second area of interest was in Christian theology, which was initially a
broad interest in all aspects of Christianity, but in time my main concern in that field came to lie
with practical theology�that is, how the Christian life should be worked out in the lives of
Christians. Though I found systematic theology to be interesting and provocative, to me it was
also ultimately reductionist because of its separation from the text of scripture and too abstract its
all-inclusive systematization. I think this judgment sprang from engagement with my third
interest, which was cultural analysis. As long as I can remember, it has been central for me to
know my place in whatever larger structures in which I find myself�whether in my family, my
school, a musical group, my church. The Church, or the larger society. Therefore, it has been
important to me to observe how these various entities operate, what the value systems are of
each, and what sorts of competing loyalties might arise. I began to read books about the culture,
especially those that portrayed worldviews with which I was unfamiliar, such as Culture Wars
by James Davison Hunter, and Hollywood vs. America^ by Michael Medved. Such books
prompted me to deep concern about the direction of the larger culture and its attitude toward
Christians.
When I came to seminary, it was with a fairly harsh appraisal of postmodernism and its
deleterious effects on society�rampant relativism, the new "tolerance," bankruptcy of morals,
denial of absolute truth, political correctness, and the like. However, because of my interest in
the larger patterns of the culture, it was something I wanted to understand better. This I was able
to do because of my background in history, as postmodernism defines itself in contradistinction
to the ethos and heritage of the Enlightenment. One cannot understand postmodernism without
an appreciation for its historical situation and the historical impetuses which brought about its
rise. As I began to understand more of postmodernism and its critique, I began to see
correlations between the postmodern appraisal of the Enlightenment Project and what I
considered to be a Christian evaluation of the same. Thus, it became important for me to
deteiTnine a practical theology for living in a postmodern world�that is, what attitude should a
Christian have toward the cultural realities brought about by postmodernism?
The Church has historically not been comfortable with a nuanced portrayal of anything;
either a person or idea is an unmitigated evil or a pure representation of the divine. But this
accords neither with the facts of our world in which good and evil are often mixed, nor with
Scripture, which declares that "we have this treasure in jars of clay" (2Co. 4:7) and that on earth
"we see but a poor reflection" (ICo. 13:12). I believe that Christians can find value in the ideas
of postmodernism, but, conversely, thoughtless, reflexive acceptance can lead to disastrous
consequences in the life of the Christian. The question, then, is how to walk the line that divides




Quoted in Stuart Sim, ed., The Routledge Critical Dictionary- ofPostmodern Thought (New York:
Routledge, 1999), 290.
' James Davison Hunter, Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America (New York: HarperCollins, 1991).
^ Michael Medved, Hollywood vs. America (New York: HarperCollins, 1992).
IIntroduction
An Unholy Alliance?
It has often been noted lately that Western society is in the midst of a profound
transformation, that the culture is reconstructing itself around a new set of beliefs, attitudes,
behaviors, and priorities. There is a sense that this transition is not simply a transient
phenomenon, nor is it an addendum to the status quo, but a radical departure from its
predecessors. On the whole, it is the young who display this new way of being, but they are not
merely the latest manifestation of the familiar generation gap, now in new garb. No, they are the
harbingers of things to come, the heralds who scout in front and sound the signal call that warns
of the new territory ahead.
Their call is translated by the media into statistics and distilled blurbs that report items of
change with regard to religious practices, participation in democracy, faith in government, sexual
and drug-related behavior, respect for authority, confidence in educational institutions, belief in
God, and attitudes toward marriage. Fundamentalist and evangelical leaders then often translate
the statistics and blurbs of the media into apocalyptic (or sometimes apoplectic) pronouncements
of despair and woe, and the church is galvanized against the new evil manifested in the latest
cultural expressions of worldliness.
Postmodernism, as this movement has come to be known, has reached to all parts of the
earth, crossing the oceans in waves of globalized capitalism, international Hollywood
blockbusters, and the ubiquitous Internet. As the cultures westernize, they invariably
"postmodemize," and we are now closer than ever before in human history to a one-world
culture.
2To give a summary of postmodernism is, in a word, impossible. Not only is it
multifaceted, variegated, and subtle, but some expressions of it even resist the idea of definitions
in the first place, as naive pretensions to objectivity that brutalize the independence of the word
being defined. Thus, the word itself remains elusive and non-committal to any uniform
characterization.
A second difficulty arises as a result of our proximity. As David F. Wells has noted,
modemity and postmodemity are too fresh, too many-sided, and too complicated to have
produced a clear consensus on what has happened. When one enters this world of
cultural analysis, one is entering a murky swamp in which little is settled and much is
unexamined or unexplained.'
hi other words, we lack sufficient perspective on modemity and postmodemity to describe them
accurately. Such an endeavor is necessarily doomed to incompletion and inexactitude, as we
wander among the trees and thus try to map the forest.
A third problem stems from the character of postmodemism itself. To a degree equal that
of any other philosophy ever produced before, it is not primarily intellectual but experiential. It
must be felt to be really understood at all. One must enter into its world and appreciate its
concems before one can perceive the arguments it produces, not the other way around. That is
not to say that one must be a convert, a full-fledged postmodem, before one can comprehend
postmodemism�like a contemporary incamation of gnosticism in which the secret knowledge
of a community is imparted to the initiate�^but rather, that an attack on postmodernism from
outside its sympathies fails to take into account the subtlety and sophistication of a postmodern
way of being and thinking.
So, given the difficulties, why should we try to contend with postmodernism at all,
especially since so many of the articulators of postmodernism are so opposed to the church and
even to the very idea of tmth? Is it not better to insulate ourselves and our children from their
3negative influence, ensuring that the values of the Bible are perpetuated in our progeny? Such a
view, in my estimation, fails on several counts. First, it undermines the Great Commission,
given to the church by Jesus, to go and make disciples (Mt. 28: 19-20). This going is not only a
geographical going, but an intellectual one as well. There is no philosophy, no ideology, no
academic system, no population that should be denied the shining light of the gospel. The love
of Christ compels us to reach beyond barriers, whether physical or intellectual, to provide the
good news to all people in all places. But the gospel is always enculturated; though the heart of
the message is the same, the point of contact and the presentation may differ markedly,
depending on the context. We are not allowed to present the gospel only on our terms, in ways
with which we identify best and are most comfortable to us; we are obligated to understand our
audience and to give good news in ways that are intelligible to them. Therefore, the church has
an obligation to wrestle with postmodemism, to value postmodems, and to craft a presentation of
the gospel that communicates God's love to them.
Second, an isolationist approach is counter to the examples given us in Scripture by Jesus
and Paul. Jesus took his message of the kingdom beyond his homogenous group, breaking
barriers of race, class, gender, and party affiliation in order to display God's gracious inclusion
of all humanity. Similarly, Paul not only took the gospel to Gentiles, he entered into their
intellectual world so that they would have a chance to understand it. One of the best examples
given us is in Paul's interaction with the people of Athens in Acts 17, where Paul "reasoned... in
the marketplace day by day with those who happened to be there" (v. 17 NFV)�this included
Epicureans and Stoics, representatives of the preeminent philosophic schools of his day. His
apologetic sought to frame the gospel in a way that would resonate with what the Athenians
understood, yet without taking away its difficult edge. We will come back to this passage again
4in chapter four to look at it in more detail, but it is sufficient to note here that Paul engages his
conversationalists on their intellectual turf.
Third, the impetus of a protectionist approach, namely, the desire to shelter oneself or
one's progeny from unsavory influences, in the end, is simply specious because the method will
not accomplish the objective. To deny the force of postmodernism in our culture is to play the
ostrich in u illful ignorance of the societal realities that affect our world. Furthermore, it is
inevitable that if we do not craft a Christian response to the secular postmodernism that holds
sway among the populace, then later generations will become exposed to postmodernism not on
our terms but on those of secular postmodernism. We will have failed to equip them to interpret
their world in a Christian way, and we will have left them naked with no means to protect their
faith.
So we are obligated by the message and example of Scripture and compelled by the
dictates of reason to interact with postmodemism rather than withdraw. If you ask, "How is this
to be done?" then you have discovered the purpose for this thesis. For this is a momentous
challenge. At first blush, it would appear that Christianity and postmodemism would have
nothing to say to each other, that the only kind of "dialogue" that we could enter would be an
exercise in talking past each other. Where can we find any point of agreement? What do we
hold in common? Following are simply a few of the difficulties that emerge in such a
conversation.
Jean-Frangois Lyotard, one of the few postmodern philosophers that accepts, let alone
deals with, the term postmodem, defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives.""
His claim is that much suffering can be traced back to clashes between competing ideologies, or
metanarratives�stories of a culture that explain its place in the cosmos, as well as others' places.
5These grand stories, in providing a matrix against which all phenomena may be catalogued and
placed to fit within the greater scheme, in turn, produce a sense of understanding and belonging
for those who adhere to it. The unfortunate result, according to postmodern theorists, is that
when the metanarratives of two competing groups enter into conflict, the result is always
violence, for each group tries to place the other under its own grand narratival system, which
invariably serves to elevate the culture to which it belongs and to denigrate those who fall
outside. One example is the metanarrative of modernism that envisioned unfettered human
progress, which is to say, progress as defined by those with modern sympathies of rationalism,
objectification, and systematization. Unless a culture acceded to the value of these ideals, it was
rejected as uncivilized, barbaric, and savage. Consequently, conquest, colonialism, and coerced
conversions were justified as "the white man's burden" to civilize the world. Christianity is
itself a metanarrative with an explanation for all phenomena of life and an inviolable divine goal,
so it is therefore rejected a priori by postmodems, who discern therein a desire to subjugate the
world through "evangelism," i.e., pressure to abandon one's views in favor of adopting the views
of the privileged, elevated group, in this case, Christianity.
Another point of conflict arises around the foundational issue of tmth. Friedrich
Nietzsche put forth this account of tmth:
What, then, is tmth? A mobile army of metaphors, metonyms, and
anthropomorphisms�in short, a sum of human relations, which have been enhanced,
transposed, and embellished poetically and rhetorically, and which after long use seem
firm, canonical, and obligatory to a people: tmths are illusions about which one has
forgotten that this is what they are.^
Though Nietzsche wrote before the period generally agreed to comprise postmodernism, his
philosophy anticipated that of the postmodernists in many significant respects, and more than
one postmodem thinker has claimed to owe him a considerable debt; therefore, many consider
6him the first postmodem philosopher."* With regard to this expression of what tmth is, Nietzsche
is at his most postmodem. Essentially, he points to the ungroundedness of what we call truth.
We each have only our own sensations and personal experiences�which may or may not have
any connection with the sensations and experiences of others�upon which to constmct a notion
of tmth. h is only social convention that allows us to call anything "tme," according to
postmodemists, because none of us has the ability to transcend our own limitations and to take a
peek at reality "as it really is." Thus, Richard Rorty can claim that "tmth... [is] 'what it is better
for us to believe,' rather than. . . 'the accurate representation of reality.'"^ Ultimately, for
postmodemists, our grounding for tmth comes from what counts as tmth in our worldview,
which is socially constmcted; therefore, truth itself is socially constracted. This is problematic
for Christians who believe in an omnipotent, omnipresent God, who has revealed Tmth both in
His spoken word and in His incamated Word, who Himself claimed to be the Way, the Tmth,
and the Life. What can it mean in a postmodem setting to say that Christianity is tme?
Another area of contention accompanies this concern with tmth, and that is the meaning
of a text. Postmodem theory largely grew out of the discipline of literary analysis, particularly
the discipline of stmcturalism, which was based on the study of semiology (or semiotics), or the
functioning of signs. Many of the most prominent postmodern thinkers, such as Michel
Foucault, Jacques Derrida, Roland Barthes, and Jacques Lacan, were originally stmcturalists,
who gradually produced a new approach to textual interpretation that eventually undermined the
whole system of stmcturalism. Ferdinand de Saussure invented the study of semiotics, and
according to his linguistic system, a word is composed of a material component�such as a verbal
noise, a physical movement, or a visual pattem (e.g., on a page)�called the signifier, and a mental
component�^the concept or idea represented by the signifier�called the signified. The union that
7takes place in an individual's mind between these two constitutes a sign. Poststructuralist theorists,
Derrida in particular, have concentrated on the tenuous relationship between the signifier and the
signified, emphasizing instead the role of difference between words as the producer of meaning.
This difference is an unstable, indefinable entity that makes the presence of the full meaning of a
word impossible to the author or the reader alike. Thus, Derrida dismantles not only Saussurian
linguistics but all ofWestem thought; he claims instead that all claims to language as a neutral
vehicle for the transmission of truth are merely attempts to grab power. Christians, however, have a
vested interest in the meaning of a text, at least the meaning of the biblical text. If the text of the
Bible does not transmit meaning, then of what value is it to the Christian who wishes to abide by its
teachings?
In addition to the problems of metanarrative, truth, and meaning, we find further potential
for antipathy between Christianity and postmodemism under the mbric of authority.
Postmodemism largely follows an ethos of autonomy, which it inherited from its modem
predecessor, home out of a distmst of authorities, who are maligned as restrictive, obstmctive, and
discouraging of creativity and innovation. In postmodemity, authorities are perpetuators of a status
quo that legitimates their positions of power and influence, so the system and the beneficiaries of
that system feed off each other in a continual quid pro quo. Nietzsche considered human history to
be no more than "the story of petty malice, of violendy imposed interpretations, of vicious
intentions, of high-sounding stories masking the lowest ofmotives."^
Foucault has followed him in this stream and has waded even deeper. Foucault' s oeuvre
consists primarily of a series of historical investigations into various particular "discursive
formations," or categories into which people have been classified. His first such study was Madness
and Civilization, which examined the taxonomy and treatment of the insane. By probing the ever-
8adjusting concept of reason, he was able to discern what counted as madness, or unreason, in
Westem history from the Middle Ages to the present.^ He demonstrated that even though we think
ourselves nowadays to have a more enlightened policy toward the mentally ill, it is only
superficially so compared to the "great confinemenf during the Age of Reason, whereas the Middle
Ages were a period of relative freedom.^
In his second major work. The Birth of the Clinic, he analyzed both the discursive practices
that distinguish health and disease and the quarantining of the sick in institutions known as
hospitals. His next archeological analysis in this vein. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison, explored the transformation of the bmtal treatment of criminals under feudal regimes to the
more effective forms of social control in contemporary culture. His last great project, unfinished at
his death, was what was intended to be a six-volume History ofSexuality, though only the first three
were completed. In the first volume, he considered the modem "sciences of sex," such as
psychoanalysis and biology, delimiting them as nothing more than the continuation of the will to
power through knowledge (these two ideas were nearly identical for Foucault). The second and
third volumes did httle to advance the argument of the first, but they did give evidence to Foucault' s
case, opposing the view that there is anything inherently natural about any expression of sexuality,
by investigating the shift from classical man-boy sexual behavior to the Christian concems of
marriage and heterosexuality.^
Despite the similarities between these works, both in method and in interest, one must resist
the temptation of classifying Foucault' s thinking, as his production spans traditional disciplinary
bounds. "Foucault' s thought is quintessentially postmodem, blurring boundaries between
disciplines, theory, and practice, and dismpting fundamental Westem tmths."'^ He described his
work as a "history of the present," meaning that his various historical investigations were each
9motivated by what he found to be the insupportable stances of those in power in his contemporary
world." Thus, in his analyses of insanity, health, confinement, and sexuahty, Foucault rejected the
definitions and controls of the powerful, which had served to squelch the voices of the marginalized,
in a protest against their authority to wield that power. For Foucault, authority is always self-
interested authority.
Such a vehement anti-authority bias is unnerving for Christians because the whole Christian
endeavor is one of submitting to the Lordship of Christ by acceding to the dictates of Scripture.
Furthermore, a church community, part of whose job is to establish mutual accountability in areas of
doctrine and behavior, has been integral to the structure of Christianity from the very beginning, hi
addition to the local communities, leadership positions within the church also materialized early,
such as the apostles, pastors, elders, and deacons. Authority has been an essential component of
Christian life from its inception; thus, a movement that seeks to supplant all authority raises special
problems for the church. Nietzsche noticed this problem as acute for the church. '"Sins' become
indispensable in any society organized by priests: they are the real handles of power. The priest
lives on sins, it is essential for him that people 'sin.' Supreme principle: 'God forgives those who
repent'�in plain language: those who submit to the priest."'"
So, with such a seemingly unbridgeable gulf between Christianity and these expressions of
postmodemism, the question grows even more urgent, How is any rapprochement to be attempted?
What in the world can the church say to postmodemism or vice versa? It may be tempting at this
point to throw up our hands and despair of ever finding any point of entry where a conversation
might take place. Perhaps we should just accept the consequences that accompany exiting the
marketplace of ideas and hope for the best. Or maybe we should hike up the ideological hill beyond
10
the bounds of postmodernism and lob rhetorical grenades at the citizens below us on the chance that
somehow some of them will want to join us.
Of course, I believe that such measures are unnecessary and, indeed, injurious to the cause
of Christ. The evangelical church has barely begun to provide a thoughtful response to
postmodemism, but this response is vital if the church is to be relevant to its cultural context.
My contention here is that the church does indeed have a message for the postmodem culture that
does not consist in simply hurling deprecatory salvos, yet which also preserves the integrity of the
church. That is, I believe in a via media, that both avoids unconscious capitulation to the
deficiencies of postmodemism and moves beyond wholesale denunciation of postmodernism,
and which addresses fully each of the impasses enumerated above.
Following, then, is my method for effecting this dialogue. In the first five chapters, I set
out in the beginning of each to probe into the collective phenomena of postmodemism and to
gain a handle thereby on what it is that is happening in postmodernism, to discover�to whatever
extent this is possible�what postmodemism is. This part of each chapter is an attempt at a
portrait of "postmodem America" and an evaluation of the resultant outcomes and implications
of postmodemism' s presence. Each of these chapters closes with one or more suggestions for
how the church can either leam from or appropriate various aspects of postmodern thinking
raised in the first part of the chapter. This Christian internalization of listening to the
postmodem world sketches a broad picture of what a postmodem Christianity might look like,
especially in contrast to the modem models to which we have become accustomed. Involved in
this endeavor is an evaluation of the way we have come to understand these tasks in the modern
era, in light of the postmodem critique and the requirements of Scripture.
11
Starting in the more philosophical, theoretical realm, I examine in chapter one the
intellectual roots of postmodemism and its strained (yet existent) relationship with its estranged
parent, modernism. Then, I progressively move into the more concrete manifestations of those
philosophies, such as the postmodem ethos, postmodem spirituality, postmodern ethics, and
postmodem pop culture. Chapter six closes the thesis with a cautionary note on possible
m/5appropriations of postmodemism.
We began by noting that pollsters ask people specific questions, extracting tidbits about
their lives. This is followed by media sensationalization and.promulgation, which is in turn
taken up by religious leaders to make whatever points they wish based on such statistics. For
most of us, this composes the totality of our understanding of postmodemism. Rather than be
content with a version of a version of a version, however, I believe that it is incumbent upon the
Christian community to examine the roots of these phenomena and to judge them on their own
merits against the testimony of Scripture. This is an attempt to do just such a thing, and
subsequently to expose to the evangelical church to a new world, a new way of being a faithful
witness to the love of God in this place at this time.
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Broadly speaking, postmodemity is the period of time that follows the modem era, just as
post-Elizabethan England deals with England since the time of Elizabeth, and a postscript comes at
the end of a book. Of course, this only begs the question, "What is the modem era?" This is
especially confusing if we understand modem in its everyday usage, which means "contemporary,
current, up-to-date." How could anything ever be post-modexnl It is vital to note that in
discussions ofmodemity and postmodemity, modem is used in a rather specific way to refer to a
way of thinking and being that�for better or worse�is on its way out the door.'
These labels, then, are distributed according to whichever style of thinking is revealed by
any particular phenomenon. The Empire State Building is symmetrical, functional, organized,
rational, and ambitious, a perfect example of modem architecture. MTV is chaotic, emotion-
oriented, visually stimulating, and experiential, an exemplar of postmodem impulses. But the
labels are applied to far more than simply buildings and TV channels. All conceivable forms of art
are in view, including of course the visual and performing arts, as well as cinema, television,
architecture, and literature. To these we may also add every kind of academic pursuit�all types of
science, history, education, social science, philosophy, etc.�as well as any aspect of daily life�
such as bureaucracy, technology, transportation, entertainment, family stmcture, religious practices,
and so on. Each of these may be labeled either modem or postmodem, depending on the way in
which it manifests itself in any particular instance. Some cultural expressions are considered to be
inherently modem or postmodem; that is, no matter what form they take, they are unable to escape
their category because of the inextricable way in which they are bound to it. It would be hard, for
example, to conceive of a postmodem bureaucracy because of its hierarchical stmcture and
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mechanistic, routinized methods and procedures; some say that all television is postmodem because
of the ephemerality and disjunction of its various offerings. We will now tum to a closer
investigation ofmodemity and postmodemity and the relationship between the two, as a means of
wrapping our minds around them.
I. The Modern Age
To explicate modernism here in any definite way is indeed a daunting task. It is, after all,
a thoroughgoing worldview, and one whose presence is not yet absent from our culture, the lack
of distance which makes it hard for us to approach it with sufficient perspective, as we have
already noted. However, to achieve an understanding of the revolution of postmodemity, some
point of reference must be laid; to comprehend the radicalism of postmodernism requires some
level of familiarity with the roots from which it springs and against which it revolts.
Broadly speaking, the seed of the modern era was planted in the medieval period, as the
Church had become the oppressor of human freedom. This seed of discontent sprouted
incipiently in the Renaissance and further in the Reformation, as the importance of humanity and
of the individual became key themes in Westem culture. The religious wars of the 1600s
between the Catholics and Protestants concluded with no winner, and a divided Christianity
resulted after scores of bloody conflicts, undermining the viability of ever again synthesizing
Christianity with political powers.
hito this picture stepped Rene Descartes (1596-1650), who is often considered the
originating figure ofmodemity�many historians mark the year of his death as a convenient date
for the beginning of that period. It is no understatement to say that his epistemological stamp is
present over all subsequent developments in science, medicine, technology, and philosophy.
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Cartesianism is at the basis of European history and European philosophical and scientific
thinking throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and even after the romantic
reaction of the early nineteenth century its influence is still felt in all fields of
thought. . .Cartesianism was long in possession of the modem mind, and the effects of its
tenancy are only today wearing thin.""
Rene Descartes, in surveying his world, noticed that there were separate spheres of
knowledge, each with its own foundation. Some things rested on divine revelation, others on
tradition, but mathematics was a sphere of knowledge all to its own. "Of these," he wrote, "I
delighted most of all in mathematics because of the certainty and the evidence of its reasonings. . .
I was astonished by the fact that no one had built anything more noble upon its foundations,
given that they were so solid and firm."'' Mathematics was a system that, when followed
rigorously without error, would yield only exact, correct answers. His goal for humankind was for
all knowledge eventually to become unified upon the solid foundation of mathematics, so that all
knowledge would be indisputable and infallible. Of course, he knew that some assumptions
would need to remain conjectural, at least until the tmth could be discovered indisputably, but he
wanted to be able to draw a line between that which is certainly known and that which is simply
hypothetical. Thus, he became the first person to ask how we know what we know and whether our
manner of knowing things is legitimate.
Descartes' method for achieving this aim was to wrest the quest for knowledge away from
its theological entanglements and to claim that quest solely for the realm of philosophy: "I have
always thought that two issues�namely, God and the soul�are chief among those that ought to be
demonstrated with the aid of philosophy rather than theology."^ Previously, tradition had played a
large part in solving philosophical questions�Aquinas, for example, had appealed not only to
Scripture but also to the Church Fathers and to Aristotle for support of his arguments in the Summa
Theologica�^but Descartes' new rationalism created a different system, one which rejected prior
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tradition and found its authority in the autonomous, rational self, a transition that reached its zenith
in Immanuel Kant and has continued unabated, hi fact, the individual has become so highly
regarded today as the sole arbiter of truth that the heritage of Cartesian thought has been to equate
the appeal to authority with a sign of an absence of solid reason. Alasdaire Maclntyre comments,
"This concept of authority as excluding reason is. . . itself a peculiarly, even if not exclusively,
modem concept, fashioned in a culture to which the notion of authority is alien and repugnant, so
that appeals to authority appear irrational."^
Upon the dissemination of Descartes' ideas, it was immediately clear that a radically new
agenda had been launched, hi 1642, only five years after the publication of his sketchy Discourse
on Method and only one year after the completion of the larger, more detailed Meditations on First
Philosophy, the teaching of Cartesian philosophy was banned at the University of Utrecht because
"the professors feared [it] would isolate their students from tradition [and that] they would no
longer be able to read philosophical literature or understand concepts of the other sciences."^ It was
manifest that Cartesianism was not only a new answer to old questions but an entirely different way
of doing and teaching philosophy.
Though he denied any hostility toward the church and even believed that he had done a
great service to Christianity by unequivocally proving, apart from revelation, God's existence,
Descartes, by beginning the path of suspicion and pitting the individual against the tradition of the
community, actually undermined the authority of religion. He legitimated the search for knowledge
apart from the context of the Bible and initiated the separation of the secular realm from the
spiritual. From that point on, philosophy and science, removed further and further from the context
of Scriptural Christianity, increasingly became perceived as the only valid loci for the quest for
tmth.
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At precisely the same time that Descartes was questioning the authority of the Church to
serve as a ground for knowledge, there emerged a new way of knowing things, namely science.
As new knowledge came pouring in to the westem world in a manner unparalleled up to that point
in human history, the modem spirit started to seek human emancipation from myths, superstitions,
and enthrallment with mysterious powers and forces of nature by means of the progressive
operations of a critical reason.'' As Stanley Grenz succinctly states, "The modem human can
appropriately be characterized as Descartes 's autonomous, rational substance encountering
1 8Newton 's mechanistic world."
Though the Scientific Revolution had already begun with the astronomical work of
Copernicus in the 1500s, it was Francis Bacon (1561-1626) who systematized the world of
science with his Scientific Method, the basic stmcture of which is still used in scientific
endeavors today. Bacon criticized the premodern view that nearly all tmth had been discovered
and needed only to be explained and organized; he saw a world that contained untapped potential
and hidden troves of knowledge. Consequently, he offered a new vision of hope and progress for
human society, based on the advances through science. He became one of the first thinkers to
encourage innovation and change as a desirable presence in society, challenging others to believe
in their own abilities rather than in the traditions of the past.
No longer content with the Bible or the tradition of the Church as sources for guidance and
grounds for ethics, and increasingly reliant on science for the acquisition of knowledge, the
philosophers of the Enlightenment sought a stable ground for ethics in human existence, the
embodiment of so-called "natural religion." After powerfully proving that morality could not rest
on reason, Hume tried to build on the foundation laid by Diderot's attempt to base morality on the
desires and passions. Though Hume successfully produced a more sophisticated argument than
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Diderot's, it was ultimately an insufficient solution to the problem, as Hume applied an already
present�though unacknowledged�normative standard to judge what passions would and would
not count as acceptable for serving as a grounds for moral decisions (in the case of competing
passions). Furthermore, he was unable to answer why, if moral rules were to be kept only because
they served our long-term interests (as he had claimed), we should not be justified in violating them
if in any particular situation we should perceive that they would not serve our long-term and/or
compelling short-term interests.^ While he did not firmly ground a system of ethics, as he had
hoped, Hume did succeed in enforcing the separation between reason and religion by asserting the
authority of the individual over and against the authority of religion, society, tradition, or
community.
The chasm widened further with the philosophy of hnmanuel Kant. Whereas Descartes had
simply claimed that human reason was useful for grounding our epistemology, Kant effectively
argued that no other grounding was even possible. Having established the validity of knowledge in
the domain ofmathematics through the analysis of a priori synthetic judgments, and that of physics
through the analysis of the categories of understanding, he set out to show that metaphysical
knowledge was to be ruled out completely. "When we apply reason to the objective synthesis of
appearances, where reason thinks to make its principle of unconditioned unity valid with much
plausibility. . . it soon finds itself involved in such contradictions that it is compelled to relinquish
its demands in regard to cosmology."' � "Reason falls of itself and even unavoidably" into these
contradictions, or antinomies." According to Kant there are four such antinomies, four sets of
theses and antitheses, each of which can be arrived at with equal necessity. The antinomies lay at
the heart of Kantian epistemology
"
because, in order to accept their non-resolution, we must
renounce the validity ofmetaphysical reasoning�it is reasoning beyond the scope of our
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experience. Hence, according to Kant, metaphysics performs a regulatory function in regard to our
epistemology. We have no way of knowing that what we observe here in the phenomenal realm is
transferable to the noumenal realm; therefore, the latter is inaccessible to our pure reason. The
widespread acceptance of such a structure rendered the languages of science and of religion
completely incommensurable.'^ hi response to his dissatisfaction with Humean ethics, built on
human desires, Kant set out to ground his ethics on the basis of the "practical reason," but this too
has been found to be highly problematic, mostly for the reasons that Hume pointed out originally in
his arguments concerning why ethics could not be grounded on reason.'"* Hume, realizing the
instability of an ethics grounded on reason, argued for one based on the passions, while Kant, aware
of the inadequacy of the passions as an ethical foundation, advanced a reason-grounded ethics.
Though neither thinker saw the deficiencies of his own system, they each effectively undermined
the attempts of the other.
When the leading thinkers ofmodemity dethroned the authority of previous scholars, they
operatively positioned themselves in their place; the modem hubris was to conceive ofmodemity as
the apex of human achievement, not only up to that time but of all times�^past, present, and future.
Jean Le Rond d'Alembert, a principle editor of the Encyclopedic, provides a splendid summary of
the Enlightenment attitude in his introduction entitled, "The Human Mind Emerged from
Barbarism," which he penned for the first volume of that work. In his description of "the illustrious
Descartes," d'Alembert notes that
what has especially immortalized the name of this great man was his application of algebra
to geometry, one of the most far-reaching and fehcitous ideas which the human mind ever
had, and which will always be the key to the most profound research, not only in sublime
geometry but also in all the physico-mathematical sciences.'^
Similar sentiments are expressed conceming Francis Bacon, Isaac Newton, and John Locke.
Conceming the latter, d'Alembert exults:
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We can say the he created metaphysics almost as Newton had created physics. He
understood that abstractions and ridiculous questions that had until then been debated, and
even comprised the very essence of philosophy, had to be especially forbidden in its
practice. He looked for the principal causes of our errors in these abstractions and in the
abuse of symbols, and found them there in abundance, hi order to know our mind, its ideas
and affections, he did not study books, because they would have instructed him poorly: he
was satisfied with examining himself intentiy; and after having contemplated himself for a
long time, he merely offered to mankind in his Essay Conceming Human Understanding
the mirror in which he had seen himself'^
So modemity was not just a rejection of authority but a substitution of authority, placing its own
ideas, values, standards, and assumptions on the pedestal that had once been occupied by those of
Scholasticism.
The Enlightenment was inaugurated fully at the end of the eighteenth century by the
hidustrial Revolution and the democratic revolution.'^ As incarnations of the progress of society
and the importance of the individual, these forces instantiated the ethos of modernity: optimism,
humanism, scientism, hedonism, materialism, capitahsm, individualism, reductionism,
1 8
demystification, and secularization, hi the nineteenth century, modemity began to expand from
the intelligentsia to compose the general assumptions ofWestern society. By the twentieth
century, these attitudes had become the Zeitgeist of the culture.'^
It is an error, however, to collapse modemity simply into Enlightenment ideals.
Romanticism challenged the validity of the Enlightenment's claims to unlimited, universal
progress and the sufficiency of Reason as the basis of human existence by reaffirming the need for
recognizing and legitimating the affective aspects of humanity, while still situating itself within the
bounds of modemism. Instead of beliefs, opinions, and intentions, the Romantics conceived of
the self in terms of passion, soul, creativity, and moral fiber, all of which resonated with a depth
of being that the Enlightenment did not.'^^ Especially popular among artists and writers.
Romanticism found the Enlightenment characterization of personhood anemic�though perhaps
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not inaccurate, insofar as it went. Their main protest was that the Enlightenment failed to explain
reality accurately. That is, they saw that people did not make decisions simply based on abstract,
rational logic; rather, there were emotions, loyalties, obligations, passions that resided
somewhere other than the analytical, cerebral part of the process. Love, life, death, the depth of
being�these were their themes precisely because they felt that these had been excluded from the
modern account of reality. They were pessimistic about grand claims of progress and objectivity
and often pointed out the dark side of life, hiterested in folklore, folk songs, and fairy tales, they
were also fascinated by dreams, hallucinations, sleepwalking, and other phenomena that
suggested the existence of a reality beyond empirical observation, sensory data, and discursive
reasoning.^'
Charles Dickens exemplified this reaction against the Enlightenment, most poignantly in
Hard Times. Perhaps an allusion to Luke 10:42, where Jesus tells Martha that only one thing is
needed�full devotion to God�Dickens' first chapter is tided, "The One Thing Needful" and
opens with these instructions to a schoolmaster:
Now, what I want is. Facts. Teach these boys and girls nothing but Facts. Facts alone are
wanted in life. Plant nothing else, and root out everything else. You can only form the
minds of reasoning animals upon Facts; nothing else will ever be of any service to them.
This is the principle on which I bring up these children. Stick to Facts, sir!.... [They]
swept with their eyes the inclined plane of little vessels then and there arranged in order,
ready to have imperial gallons of facts poured into them until they were full to the brim.""
Dickens's satiric tone is hard to miss, but he drives his point home even further in the next
chapter, "Murdering the Innocents," where he pictures the inquisition received by a young girl
whose father works in the circus.
[having shown distaste for mentioning the circus] 'you mustn't tell us about the
ring here. Very well, then. Describe your father as a horsebreaker. He doctors sick
horses, I dare say?'
'Oh, yes, sir.'
'Very well, then. He is a veterinary surgeon, a farrier, and horsebreaker. Give me
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your definition of a horse.'
(Sissy Jupe thrown into the greatest alarm by this demand.)
'Girl number twenty unable to define a horse!" said Mr. Gradgrind, for the general
behoof of all the little pitchers [students]. 'Girl number twenty possessed of no facts in
reference to one of the commonest of animals! Some boy's definition of a horse. Bitzer,
yours Bitzer,' said Thomas Gradgrind. 'Your definition of a horse.'
'Quadruped. Graminivorous. Forty teeth, namely twenty-four grinders, four eye-
teeth, and twelve incisive. Sheds coat in the spring; in marshy countries, sheds hoofs,
too. Hoofs hard, but requiring to be shod with iron. Age known by marks in mouth.'
Thus (and much more) Bitzer.^^
Sissy, who has grown up her entire life around horses, receives the disapprobation of the
schoolmaster because she lacks Facts about them; Bitzer, on the other hand, who perhaps has
never seen a horse in his life and possibly could recognize one only by counting its teeth and
inspecting the marks in its mouth, passes the test with his rote, materialistic definition.
But Romanticism was a revolt that kept itself within presuppositions ofmodemity�
harmony, humanism, secularism, individualism, and Nature�for the Romantics did not deny these
key points of Enlightenment thought. They fostered a strong affinity, even an obsession, with
Nature, which made many of them as antagonistic toward traditional religion as the other
modernist thinkers. They also affirmed modern humanism, which placed humanity at the
pinnacle of Nature as its greatest product, as well as the modem emphasis on individualism.
On the other hand, it is possible to trace Romanticism to the development of existentialism,
which emphasized many of the same concems, though with a significantly different force. The
latter largely dispensed with notions of harmony and progress; in fact, the general society largely
fell out of view altogether as the individual was pictured alone in front of reality. From such a
viewpoint, morality became a mere cultural imposition on the individual, and the only moral
"ought" became the free choice. To atheistic existentialists, human freedom is the ultimate good,
and any free decision is a good decision if it does not impinge on the freedom of another. This is
barely around the comer from postmodemism at the intersection where modemity and
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postmodemity blur, so we now tum to the latter.
II. The Postmodern Age
Postmodemism defines itself by what it is not (i.e., modem), rather than what it is.
Therefore, if the explication ofmodemism was a difficult task, that of postmodemism is even more
so. This is compounded by the (unavoidable) fact that postmodemism has not made such a clean
break with modemism as it sometimes claims (or others sometimes claim) that it has; in fact,
postmodemism holds several key features in common with its ideological predecessor. Given these
obstacles, I believe the clearest place to start is with postmodemism' s origins, which may help to
give further understanding for the impetus in the movement from modemism to postmodemism.
As we have already noted, postmodemism grew largely out of the discipline of literary and
linguistic analysis, particularly the branch of analysis called stmcturalism. Language is basic to
humanity, forming the components of all interpersonal and even intrapersonal communication.
Again, some of the groundbreaking work in this regard was done by Saussure, a Swiss linguist who
invented the study of semiotics and the school of stmcturalism. To recap, Saussurian linguistics is
based on the system of the sign, composed of a signifier (the material component, such as a printed
word) and a signified (the mental concept or idea called to mind by the signifier). Semiologists
after Saussure have used stmcturalist theory to show the ubiquity and power of signs, often to
unmask the subtle messages they convey, particularly those that serve to perpetuate the power
stmcture of the status quo.
Stmcturalists later hypothesized that underlying all phenomena�not just language�was a
deep stmcture that dictated how such phenomena developed and that the world was composed of a
set of interlocking systems, each with its own unique "grammar," or system of operation. The
stmcturalist project then expanded into a quest for uncovering the hidden operations of every
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system of culture; in theory, any system was amenable to structural analysis, since all grammars
operate according to similar structures. This style of debunking continued in the tradition of
Nietzsche, uncovering the hidden agendas veiled behind the ostensible objectivity and neutrality of
language and organizational systems. The meaning of a text in the postmodem era is no longer to
be found "behind the text," that is, in the mind of the author, but rather "in the text" itself. The
result is that the generator of a text no longer controls the meaning of that text, and the possibility
arises that the text contains potential meaning(s) not related to its intended meaning(s), necessarily.
Here, the break between modem and postmodem is not so clean, as there are aspects of
stmcturalism that conform to the postmodem ethos, but others clearly support the spirit of the
modem project. The totalizing character of stmcturalism, its assertion to place all human systems
under its design, is clearly a modem claim. But the denial of language as an objective, neutral
vehicle for the dissemination of tmth certainly resonates with postmodem sympathies, especially as
it exposes language games as attempts to perpetuate the preferred status of the power brokers in a
culture.
Such an impurity of sentiments has meant that Saussurian linguistics has fallen on hard
times. Poststmcturalist theorists, such as Derrida, have demonstrated that the stability of the
relationship between the signifier and the signified is highly tenuous and dependent on individual
perspectives. Derrida regards the sign "as a fractured entity which can never capture the 'full'
meaning of words," open to a wide range of interpretations, depending on the individuals doing the
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interpreting. Hence, all attempts to convey messages are fraught with ambiguity and inexactitude.
Derrida was particularly dissatisfied with what he saw as the oppressive nature of stmcturalist
theory, which seemed to diminish human agency, relegating individuals merely to the channels
through which stmctures operate.
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He further argued against the whole vein of Westem thought, which assumes�
illegitimately, according to Derrida�that the full meaning of words is present to us in our minds
when we think them and that there is no "slippage" between the signifier and signified. This
"metaphysics of presence" is simply an ungrounded and unjustifiable assumption that posits an
identity of being and meaning as a foundation, or a justification, for discourse and regards
equivocation as a regrettable, avoidable deviation. But Derrida counters that in fact such
equivocation can never fail to exist. As a result, there is no regret or avoidance of equivocation in
Derrida because there is no "fall from 'presence,'" but rather a failure ever to attain it.^^
Poststmcturalists conceive of a much more anarchic and chaotic world than stmcturalism would
allow, with many gaps and paradoxes within the systems.
Some even go so far as to draw the existence of meaning into question. After examining
such questions as, "Where does meaning lie?" "Who controls the meaning of a given text?" and,
"What does meaning mean?" philosophers such as Derrida, Lyotard, and Rorty find that they can
arrive at no satisfying answers. The postmodem deconstmctionist declares that meaning no longer
resides "in the text," but "in front of the text," that is, in the mind of the reader. For the most
radical, any reaction at all to a text is a good reaction. With a kind of anti-epistemology, these
radical poststmcturalists claim that hermeneutics and rhetoric have become the claimants to the
seats once occupied by communication, as every attempt at communication is seen to be simply a
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case ofmanipulation and deceit with hidden interests and agendas.
Thus, even the concept of tmth, as it has historically been understood in the West, is
illegitimated. Nietzsche understood the quest for tmth as an expression ofmotives of desire for
power; consequently, metaphysical systems that claimed to be representations of tmth, were
instead, for him, merely substitutions for tmth in the name of tmth. In his introduction to Gianni
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Vattimo's The End ofModemity, Jon R. Snyder explains that "the project of nihilism," begun by
Nietzsche, "is to unmask all systems of reason as systems of persuasion. . . All thought that
pretends to discover truth is but an expression of the will-to-power�even to domination�of those
making the truth claims over those who are being addressed by them.""^
Truth, meaning the system of universal reason that tells us what reality is "out there," is no
longer a tenable concept in postmodemity. All tmth is embedded tmth; in other words, each
description of tmth is inseparable from the narratival context in which it emerges. As the modem,
objective, independent, knowing subject has been deconstmcted, both objects and subjects are seen
to be only as they are narrated in a story. Outside of the "plot," that is, the experiences and beliefs
they bring to each encounter, it is impossible to know how such objects and subjects would be, or
even if they would be at all. histead of a modem concem with a core essence or character, what
matters to postmodem tmth claims are the constantly shifting relations that bind subject and object
to each other.^� As Snyder indicates, "the disinterested, scientific, wholly rational search for the
objective, neutral tmth of a proposition is an illusion produced by metaphysical thought for its own
benefit. In the perspective of nihilism, Nietzsche points out, the difference between error and tmth
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is always a delusory one."
Taking this altered view of tmth, two avenues of exploration have emerged. One leads one
to the denial of any human capacity for comprehending or expressing tmth, following the standards
of the correspondence theory, the constmal of tmth advanced by modemism that accepts a
statement as tme to the extent that there is equivalence between the statement and the actual
reality.''" Since there is no way to gain access to the "real" reality, except by means of our
contextualized perspectives, there is no way to know whether we have represented reality as it tmly
is, and thus no reason for tmsting our representations. This is the position most associated with
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postmodemism and argued by Nietzsche, Derrida, and Foucault.
Following this track, Lyotard undermines the human quest even to understand or process
reality in any meaningful way. In his appendix to The Postmodem Condition entitled, "Answering
the Question: What is Postmodemism?", Lyotard concludes that the "business" of postmodemism
is "not to supply reality but to invent allusions to the conceivable which cannot be presented."^^
That is, the various proponents of postmodemism in art, literature, philosophy, or any arena at all,
have a common task. They must avoid what he terms "the aesthetic of the sublime," which consists
of the portrayals of reality that provide solace and pleasure to the recipient through a recognizable,
consistent form. Instead, they should point to the unpresentable in defiance of the standard,
comforting forms, in protest to the shared taste, so that such portrayals may not be enjoyed but
gleaned for the strength of their presentation of the unpresentable. However, he wams, "it is not to
be expected that this task will effect the last reconciliation between language-games,""^'* or the
completion of the Enlightenment Project, the bridging of the great divide between the disparate
realms of knowledge, particularly the phenomenal and noumenal realms,
(which, under the name of faculties, Kant knew to be separated by a chasm). . . Only the
transcendental illusion (that of Hegel) can hope to totalize them into a real unity. But Kant
also knew that the price to pay for such an illusion is terror. The nineteenth and twentieth
centuries have given us as much terror as we can take. We have paid a high enough price
for the nostalgia of the whole and the one, for the reconciliation of the concept and the
sensible, of the transparent and the communicable experience. Under the general demand
for slackening and for appeasement, we can hear the mutterings of the desire for a retum of
terror, for the realization of the fantasy to seize reality. The answer is: Let us wage a war on
totality; let us be witnesses to the unpresentable; let us activate the differences and save the
honor of the name.^^
This type of postmodem philosophy accepts the modem criteria for what counts as tmth,
namely that a statement is tme if it accurately corresponds to the extemal realities it purports to
describe. This line of postmodem reasoning, which flows from Nietzsche, does not undermine the
modem correspondence theory of tmth; rather, it demonstrates that we cannot achieve its
28
requirements, rendering truth, therefore, humanly unattainable. Thus, the anti-epistemology of
much postmodemism is a critique waged from the foundations ofmodemism, not as much a
repudiation of those foundations, as often presented.
However, the second postmodem understanding of tmth, largely pioneered by Paul Ricoeur,
undermines both the modem objectivism and the radical postmodem reduction, by dismissing the
correspondence theory altogether and embracing a new definition for what constitutes tmth. In
what Ricoeur termed the "narrative identity," the specific "situatedness" of life and the relations to
past, present, and future constitute an emergent tmth, a dynamic tmth that is determined in the
context of the narrative of one's own life. For Ricoeur, it is the narrative, not the self that is the
arbiter of tmth, though the self is free to act and to will in an effort to effect change in the narrative.
Such a narrative may or may not be positioned within a larger framework, such as God.' We will
discuss Ricoeur in more detail in chapter three. However, for our purposes here, it is significant to
note that, regardless of which tack is taken, both descriptions of human possession of tmth pose a
substantial challenge to the previous modem conceptions�the former claiming that tme knowledge
is impossible, the latter modifying the definition so that tmth may be retained.
We can see now how postmodemism came to be, as a protest against the hubris of modem
objectivism, neutrality, comprehensiveness, and systematization. There certainly is a line of
division between the two, but it is not as solid as some proponents or critics claim. In fact, that
what has gone before should shape what comes after is inevitable. Postmodemism has largely
attacked its predecessor precisely on modemism' s terms and with modem values, using the
standards ofmodemity to expose the latter' s hypocrisy. It is through the use of reason that it finds
reason to be biased and unreliable; it is by means of logic that it deconstracts logical constmcts. In
other words, postmodemism has uncovered its own antimonies, a new frontier of knowledge that is
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now much closer than Kant's noumenal realm. It lies at the border of our own perceptions, and
anything beyond is unknowable by definition. Though modemism debunked such notions as
Christianity, magic, and superstition, postmodemism has played the tmmp card, arguing for the
inviolability of language, meaning, tmth, unity, and reality. Just as modemism denied the authority
of tradition and the church, postmodemism denies the authority of modems to define reality.
Foucault observes, "since Kant, the role of philosophy is to prevent reason from going beyond the
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limits of what is given in experience."
III. Christian Postmodernism: Do We Need It?
Most expressions of evangelicalism in America can be accurately characterized as products
of modemism. They use various adaptations of the scientific method, empiricism, and
commonsense realism to articulate the gospel against the challenges of secular humanism and
naturalism, which are themselves purely modem threats. Their apologetics has proceeded along the
lines of propositions and rigorous logic, aimed at a culture that glorifies reason and deifies
science.^^ The alliance between the Enlightenment and the modem church produced a dichotomy
in the lives of Christians between the faith that they held privately and a publicly acceptable way of
thinking, leaving the church anemic, worldly, and helpless.""^ Thomas Oden writes, "It is just
because we have tried to become successful on modemity' s terms that we have contracted
theological vertigo."
Such an approach to the Christian life is clearly out of step with the way most Americans
think and act today, and is getting more and more so all the time. If Christianity were inseparable
from this form of expression, then these would certainly be non-negotiables, but in tmth they are
simply the remnants of a modem Christianity that was enculturated during the modem period.
Therefore, as these societal shifts that constitute the emergence of postmodemism take place, it is
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now the church's responsibihty to reassess its relationship with the culture, affirming and adopting
what is compatible with the gospel in these emergent philosophies and attitudes and gentiy (but
firmly) refusing what is not. Thus, my appropriation of postmodemism is both a verification and a
denial."*" Merold Westphal describes this approach as a "double challenge," which opposes both
the secular postmodemists, who see postmodemism as the means for destabilizing human belief in
God, and the religious modemists, who believe postmodemism represents an unmitigated danger to
Christianity and Westem culture, "forgetting that Balam's ass once spoke God's word. . . The link
between pious intentions and genuine insight is not tight in either direction.""*^
What sorts of messages might God be trying to get through to the church through the ass of
postmodemism? What can Christianity affirm in postmodem thinking? First, postmodems gel the
fallen condition. Though they do not frame their discussion in terms of a fall from primordial
purity, postmodems do realize the limits under which human beings now suffer, which we describe
as a result of the radical infestation of sin in the very fiber of our beings. No matter what we do, we
are incapable of extracting this bent toward ourselves, with no prospect of deliverance in this
world."*^ While Christianity cannot accept power and interpretation as ultimate principles,
nevertheless it can comfortably assert with postmodemism that this transvaluation frequentiy takes
place, for self-interest is often not entirely eradicated even in otherwise sincere followers of
Christ."*^
Second, the postmodem insight into the difficulties of the correspondence theory of tmth
opens us up to the possibility ofnew understandings of truth that can still cohere with the testimony
ofscripture. It has become common to make a distinction between the "Hebrew concept of tmth"
and the "Greek concept of tmth," the former referring primarily to faithfulness, reliability, and the
tmstworthiness of a saying or a person, and the latter alluding to a timeless Tmth that transcends the
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material world, which provides mere appearances. While this second notion of truth, the so-called
Greek concept of truth, is present in some Greek philosophers, the distinction in scripture is quite
often oversimplified.'*^ Very often, even in the New Testament, the focus is not on saying the truth
or possessing the truth, but on doing the truth, that is, living it out in one's life (cf. Jn. 3:21; IJn.
1:6; etc.).'*^ Throughout the biblical writings, truth is neither timeless nor abstract, as in Greek
philosophy or in modem science. The tmth of God proves itself repeatedly in relationships; it has
personal force and character.'*^ Postmodemism gives the church the opportunity to free itself from
the Cartesian quest for indubitable, timeless, propositional tmth and to experience the relational
tmth that seems to lie behind the words of scripture.
Finally, postmodemism can remind the church of the often forgotten care that Christians
ought to have for the powerless andmarginalized ofsociety. Throughout the Old Testament, the
Israelites are instmcted to take care of the orphan, the widow, and the alien�those who would
otherwise have no protection. These were the members of the community without resources of
their own, forced to rely on the beneficence of their society. In the New Testament, Jesus cared for
the sick, the lame, and the deformed; he touched lepers and ate with sinners. He showed
compassion for the people at the lowest level of the social order, and held up women and children
as examples of tme spirituality (cf. Lk. 7:44-50; Mt. 18:3). The evangelical church has largely
adopted the modem impulse toward individualism and has consequentiy abandoned the scriptural
command to practice authentic hospitality. But postmodemism is characterized by a deference to
the "other," the point of view that is foreign to me, and it demands that I seek to understand rather
than to be understood.
The Protestant passion to understand the scriptures made it susceptible to the rationalism of
the Enlightenment,'*^ and consequently the tendency of conservatives has been to reduce religious
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truth to propositions, which are themselves merely the conclusions we make from actual revelation.
Dogmas and doctrines, however important, are still only the "tradition of men" (Mk. 7:8). With
the advent of postmodemism, the church stands at the threshold of a great opportunity. As the
culture reinvents itself, the church too faces the prospect of striking a new posture with respect to
the culture, histead of denouncing the culture's agenda as evil (while nevertheless supporting it and
cooperating with it), as it did in the modem era, the church can push for Christ's agenda, even as it
affirms the positive aspects of the postmodem world.
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As we noted before, postmodernism is a philosophy that is not primarily thought but felt,
experienced, lived.' So, in one sense, to begin, as we did in the last chapter with the
philosophical origins and underpinnings is somewhat disingenuous. It violates the spirit of
postmodemism and does not really yield the sort of experiential encounter that is at the heart of
the postmodem critique. On the other hand, in such a format, hardly any other approach is
feasible, so I am reduced to disingenuousness.
Nevertheless, we have laid the foundation for understanding the postmodern experience
by our joumey through its philosophical groundings and relationship to modernism. By
understanding what these words mean and their affiliation with each other, we are now equipped
to get a sense of what the concerns of postmodems are and why they have them.
I. Skepticism
A. The Reason for Skepticism
Whatever postmodernism is, it is fair to say, skepticism is at its heart�skepticism about
our abilities, our motivations, and our tme intentions. It is, indeed, a philosophy that denies
rather than affirms, that criticizes rather than commends, that deconstmcts rather than constmcts.
It can be distmstful, cynical, and even snide, having no confidence in any representation of
reality as tme. Sometimes this skepticism devolves into a nihilistic pessimism that pulses
throughout the culture. We can hear this in the "gmnge" music on the radio, see it in the dark
comedies in the movie theaters, and perceive it in the sad school shootings that yield their place
on the front page only for the next tragedy in line. I contend that these phenomena are the
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ultimate outcomes of a despair that hangs over the country, which finds its origin in the
skepticism of ever again laying claim to anything certain, the realization that true knowledge of a
real world will never be held again�that, in fact, it never has been held.
This pessimism, however, is not an arbitrary outcome of some ideas connected with
postmodemism. hi many, ways it is the warp and woof, the very threads woven to create the
fabric of its thought and behavior pattems. For postmodernism is a philosophy of
disillusionment. It did not fall from space and crash into a hillside in a hermetical package,
insulated from its environment, but from a community who had lived in modemity, had breathed
its air deep into their lungs, had hoped with it, clung to it, and feared with it, but who had, in the
end, been left wanting. They saw that modernity had been only an empty shell that had promised
discovery but had brought only betrayal, resulting in disillusionment.
Once again, we must go back to Rene Descartes. Remember, he is the one who
impressed new requirements on information for it to attain to the level of knowledge. Tme
knowledge was now only that which was clear, distinct, and indubitable. His aim was to
solidify our knowledge so that we could bring to an end our interminable disagreements and
arguments about theology and politics, but the actual consequence has deviated markedly from
the intended one.
In the postmodem age, we have discovered that he placed the bar too high. As the
boundaries for what we felt we could prove with absolute certainty closed inexorably in on us,
suddenly we realized that there was nothing certain beyond our own existence. Descartes had
said, "I think; therefore, I am," and had then constructed what he perceived to be an airtight case
for the reality of God and of the universe. It has long been realized that Descartes made a false
step in his reasoning, but most modern philosophers have argued that God is an unnecessary
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premise in any event. They have taken the reliabihty of reason to be self-evident and have in this
way simply co-opted Descartes' agenda without dealing with his concems. Postmodemism has
exposed the bias that inheres in the use of reason, has belied reason's "disinterested" position,
and has thus pushed the question back one level more, asking how we can know that we do
indeed think, as Descartes has insisted that we do. For in fact what we have called thinking more
often has been simply convincing manipulation, as we refuse to allow ourselves to confront what
cannot be comfortably assimilated into our systems of being. Or, in the words of Simon and
Garfunkel: "Still a man hears what he wants to hear/ And disregards the rest."" At the very best,
what we fmd sitting alone at the bottom of Descartes' project is the last resident of the world of
Cartesian certainty, the maxim, "I have sensations; therefore, I am." Anything more is
conjectural at some level.
Even the most intuitive and seemingly self-apparent aspects of daily life cannot be taken
for granted. We assume an external universe, but what direct contact do our minds experience
with it? All we know directly are our sensations. Even when we see a truck, we do not have
direct contact with a tmck, only our sensations. When we eat green beans, we perceive heat and
taste, but, at the root, these are only the brain's interpretation of sensors from within the body
itself, only an indirect experience of green beans. Now, it is tme that nobody lives as if the
reality of these incidents were a point of controversy; such a view of the world is absolutely
impractical. But if we are interested in Cartesian certainty�and the West has been very
interested indeed throughout the modem age�then we grasp the importance of having a solid
foundation for knowledge. Without it, literally everything falls into doubt. Because we have
failed to discover any sufficient foundation, all scientific, historical, theological, and any other
mode of inquiry has been delegitimated. It has become impossible to be sure of anything at all.
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On a practical level, this has not led to a loss of faith in physical laws and the like�it is
impossible to live in any sense that we call living without assuming that rain will fall down
rather than up, or that we move in three dimensions. But there has been a significant loss of faith
in politicians to have the public's interest in mind, in historians to provide accurate
representations of the past, in leaders to work for the aims of an organization rather than their
own benefit, in any ideology to systematize the world in a truthful way. Our culture has gone
from not tmsting anyone over thirty to not tmsting anyone at all. If America seems cynical, it is
only because Nietzsche, Foucault, Derrida, and the like have shown us how blind people have
been in the past to various manifestations of their own self-interest, so why should anyone else�
including you and me�be any different? How can anyone extricate themselves from the
irresistible lure of acting in their own benefit?
This avenue of thinking is indeed skeptical, but the proclivity toward skepticism is driven
even further by the realization that our Western culture has been on a misguided cmsade for
centuries now. The search for stable knowledge was not an esoteric practice engaged in by ivory
tower scholars only on rainy weekends but rather the consuming quest of such culture-forming
thinkers as Thomas Hobbes, Adam Smith, John Locke, Immanuel Kant, G.W. Hegel, Karl Marx,
Sigmund Freud, and many others. They searched for the most perfectly rational incarnations of
politics, philosophy, education, religion, ethics, business, and everything else related to life, and
they inspired the people of the West to have faith in their search. New disciplines, such as
psychology, sociology, anthropology, economics, and political science, were launched and
established in the academy in the confidence that one day they would become bona fide sciences
with laws as predictable and as sure as those of physics. The entire academic enterprise
revolved around providing warranted grounds for the methods�and for the knowledge
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uncovered by those methods�of each discipHne's mode of inquiry. Some thinkers, such as
Hegel and Marx, even believed that they had found the ultimate, unifying rubric for all
disciplines and all knowledge.
But the entire project was in vain, or at least the efforts were misdirected. The only point
that they have led to is one of seeing that such a project is doomed to failure. Cartesian doubt as
a method could never yield an understanding ofpurpose of the world because purpose remains
shrouded in the mind of the one whose purpose it is�only when it is realized or revealed can the
purpose be known.
*
Therefore, the result of the failure to understand the purpose of the world is
a world without purpose, the postmodem world. It has been an expensive lesson, not only
economically, but also in terms of the human lives, the hopes for humanity, and the resulting
disillusionment that have extracted their toll on the psyche of the culture. In essence, we
hoodwinked ourselves; we believed that we were driving�now and again getting out to polish
the fender and straighten the mirrors�but when we looked under the hood, we discovered that
there was no engine.
B. The Performance ofSkepticism
Of course, we have seen advancement in transportation, medicine, manufacturing and
home appliances, all brought about by modern impulses, but this technological progress has not
led to a better society as promised. While technology has subdued nature to a large extent, our
society has grown more impatient, more consumeristic, and more violent, and even the conquest
of humans over nature has come at the price of widespread concem for the effects of this process
on the environment.^ Technology has become a significant contributor to the incoherence and
instability of postmodem life. In previous times, persons remained in a small geographical area
their entire lives, and even short distances of travel were difficult and time-consuming.
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Relationships were fixed and stable, and strangers from outside the community were rare. If
someone did leave the community, a meaningful relationship became impossible because of the
difficulties of communication. Today, however, with interconnected highway systems,
supersonic jets, cellular telephones, automated voice mail, personal computers, and modems,
these barriers have been erased, resulting in an endless parade of people and information. The
multiphcity of incoherent and disconnected relationships pulls postmodems in myriad directions
with a variety of roles, resulting in a fragmentation of the self that compounds the instability of
knowledge mentioned above. Private self-doubt and internal incoherence produce anomie, a
feeling of disconnect from the extemal world, which is relentless in its ever-marching urban
sprawl, daily-doubling technology, increasing specialization, and unmanageable onslaught of
information.^
In the postmodem world, then, "there is no individual essence to which one remains tme
or committed. One's identity is continuously emergent, re-formed, and redirected as one moves
through the sea of ever-changing relationships." Commitment to an objective identity becomes
arduous because reality continually assails the individual with the consciousness of the artifice of
life, that one's being is a matter of contingent and constmcted contrivance, custom-tailored to fit
the immediate situation. Consistency ceases to be a virtue; flexibility that adapts to the
innumerable choices is what is admired.
This contemporary experience of reality collaborates with the philosophical critique
outlined in the previous chapter, resulting in many of the same impulses. The first of these
involves the decline in the belief in our ever achieving rationality (which is to say nothing about
unbridled faith in the efficacy of our use of it). As postmodem life is characterized by a
proliferation of obligations and concerns and the self feels the pull ofmultiple competing
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loyalties, one consequently has many objectives to pursue on a number of fronts, with a
correlating number of ways to evaluate each objective, hi such a context, the idea of rational
decision-making is difficult; nearly everything is reasonable from some perspective.
Furthermore, many decisions demand to be made even before rational thought can be given to
them, forcing postmodems often to succumb to utter arbitrariness. When one realizes that one's
perspective shapes one's concept of reality and that one's experiences shape one's perspective, it
must then be acknowledged that it is impossible for any two people ever to share the same
concept of reality. Furthermore, since any act, situation, or object is subject to multiple
perspectives, and validated only by appeahng to other perspectives, it seems that no single
position can be the only rational one. In fact, the idea of rationality itself is exposed as merely an
attempt to legitimate one's own position over and above others' !^
With the disappearance of rationality, tmth becomes much less important of an issue.
Broadly speaking, tmth (such as it is) exists only in an interpretive community; many
communities produce many traths. Thus, postmodems live with an attitude of relativism and
pluralism, which is no longer just to be tolerated but celebrated, as diverse perspectives create
diverse tmths. Consequently, in postmodem circles, there is a rejection of the authority of the
historically dominant culture�Westem, bourgeois, patriarchic, rational, linear, etc.�to have
controlling power over the definitions of terms (such as sane, normal, moral, reasonable,
noteworthy, tme, etc.), the articulation of human history, or the policy of government. In the broad
language of "multiculturalism," postmodemists defend the rights of "minority voices" in society
that have historically been considered unimportant by the dominant culture. This explains the
widespread proliferation of new academic departments in many major universities, dedicated to
investigating African-American Studies, Latino Studies, Women Studies, and other such areas. It
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also accounts for the exploration of revisionist history, which seeks to overturn the prevailing views
of history with the aim of accenting the achievements, contributions, and situations of those
neglected by the prevailing view, without any eye toward traditional standards of veracity or
evidence.
As postmodems look at all tmth claims as tme in their corresponding contexts, they are
more apt to be sanguine about the combination of incompatible belief systems, which often
appears to someone outside of postmodem sympathies simply as illogical or less systematic
thinking. Arguments no longer proceed along the Hues of right and wrong, but rather each
person assesses his or her own context and chooses a collection of beliefs that "work" for him or
her.'� Any constmction or reconstmction of reality that can be negotiated by an individual is
considered a viable one."
With all tmth claims on equal footing and the individual in charge of constmcting a
workable belief system, authorities have seen a marked decline in influence and input. Though
modemity demanded that all knowledge come from science or rigorous rationalism and thus
undermined the authority of law, govemment, and religion, postmodemity has played the tmmp
card, deconstmcting the subject of knowledge itself. In principle, there is no true or false,
humanly speaking; ergo, all claims to authority are, again, simply a grab for power.'" Without
commonly regarded authorities, there are no common standards across the culture, and a feeling
13
of "centerlessness" permeates. Society becomes a conglomerate of societies.
In the end, the postmodern problem is that there is nothing to hang one's hat on, no
foundation, no self-evident tmths, no absolute, no cosmic authority, no non-negotiables, no
stability, no surety, beyond one's own mind. There is nothing we all hold in common. The
Enlightenment Project that sought secure, objective knowledge outside the context of divine
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revelation has hopelessly failed. Therefore, the mind is never convinced, existing in an
everlasting state of flux, unsure, yet compelled nevertheless to act and to choose from among an
unrelenting barrage of information and options, with no standard with which to judge between
them. Rationahty and objectivity are denied. Optimism becomes impossible. Emperor
Modemism is seen to be naked.
II. The Longing for Transcendence
Yet, there is a seldom noted facet of postmodemity that prevents it from spiraling
completely into utter nihilism. I would argue that this is a God-given, natural human impulse,
akin to the survival instinct, bestowed on us to prevent the complete min of any society. And
that is an inexplicable longing to transcend the meaninglessness inherent in secular
postmodemism, which the culture simply cannot accept. At the root, it is the desire to connect at
a deep level with others, to belong to a community of people who value our stories, to have a
workable�yet flexible�understanding of the world, the hope that there is a cure somehow for
the postmodem malaise. There is an awareness even in postmodemity that the postmodem
vision of the world is not satisfying, even though the arguments in its favor are strong. So the
postmodern is left, perhaps characteristically, in limbo�compelled by argument and experience
to deny human meaning and desperately yearning to believe it can be had.
There are several manifestations of this inclination in contemporary American culture,
which all depend on the ability to "get away" from the stmggles of life, to transcend the realities
of the chaotic, meaningless, hectic postmodem world. It is through this getting away that we feel
we can leave behind an untidy existence that assails us with more information and demands than
we can assimilate. Through the fleeing of the pressures of life, there is a sense for the
postmodern of a return to a world that one has never known, yet about which one feels as if it
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should have been there all along. There is a sense of "rightness" in these getaways, which hinges
on the sensation of control that comes through simplification. Suddenly, the cosmos becomes
manageable and therefore intelligible, as it must have been for people in "simpler times."
Certainly, escapist pursuits are not unique to a postmodem world�they have been a noted part
of the human experience for centuries, since the Roman Coliseum and before�but the inimitable
quahty of this postmodern era is the magnitude and fervency with which such activities are
pursued,'"^ and the new importance they have for what makes a full life. They have ceased to be
a luxury of leisure time, a restful engagement when no work is required, and have become
instead a quest in their own right. Many postmodems seem to be happy only when they are
diverted.
A. Transcending Space
The first getaway is the vacation, the escape from space. As America has become more
affluent and more technologically advanced, mobility has become easier, resulting in an
accompanying rise in the incidence of recreational travel. In the last thirty years, airplane travel,
ocean cmises, and car rentals have climbed exponentially, as prices have remained steady or
fallen.'^ Likewise, the hotel and motel industry has undergone massive proliferation in recent
years. Although business travel is on the rise, it is the leisure vacation that has been the major
impetus behind this trend. Tourism gives postmodems the opportunity to leave their everyday
surroundings�along with their attendant dmdgeries�on a regular basis. Indeed, it has emerged
as such a major force in our society that sociologist Dean MacCannell has suggested that the
18
concept of "the tourist" should be used as a model for the contemporary American person.
Closely related to the vacation for our purposes here as an escape from space is the
occasion of permanent relocation. Many people move as a means of fleeing some undesirable
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relationship or other situation in the hopes ofmaking a clean break and a new start on life. If one
has made too many mistakes or has too many negative associations with his or her surroundings,
a move can allow the individual to therapeutically "leave it all behind." The Hfe is simplified by
forgetting about the problems and relationships and obligations in the former place. Altemately,
some people at pivotal moments of life move in order to "find their identity"; it is believed that a
change of surroundings will help them to understand who they are. Ironically, in former times, it
was precisely one's community that formed the identity of a person.
B. Transcending Time
The second getaway is the practice of nostalgia, the escape from time. Postmodems seem
to want to enter alternate worlds that take place in a time removed from the present. New
baseball stadiums are constmcted with the express purpose of evoking the feel of parks built
around the turn of the century, including liberal use of brick, irregular field dimensions, and
natural grass. Often these new arenas replace massive steel and concrete stmctures, which are
still stmcturally sound but whose multipurpose rationality overwhelms the postmodem baseball
fan.
Additionally, a new breed of museum has come into being, the heritage museum, which
relates to its visitors a former way of life, one which was defined by a relationship with a
particular work, such as the production of coal, furniture, or cotton. For people who lived during
this time, their identities were rooted in the local region around the workplace and in the industry
for which they labored. Now the land, which used to house the factories and mines, has been
developed for housing and shopping and perhaps a heritage museum, which
epitomizes the postmodern process whereby a past is nostalgically recreated as a form of
substitute reality. Ex-miners are employed to inform the rest of us about mining in a
time in which they did not live, while the need for 'real' mining has all but disappeared.
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We pay our money and are entertained by consuming second-hand experiences which
once formed the basis of social life.'^
Finally, although the possibilities for the enumeration of "retro" phenomena are perhaps
endless, as this type of postmodern styling and design encompasses catalogues of consumer
goods from telephones and radios to bathroom fixtures and furniture, this desire to transcend
time is not limited to a journey to the past. Science fiction, which depicts the future, has
emerged as a new genre in the postmodem age. The open-ended possibilities of the future serve
as a vehicle for a playful and imaginative communication of possible universes, replete with
extra-terrestrial life forms, interstellar travel, fantastic new technologies, and often an egalitarian
society that embodies the highest human ambitions of justice and social integrity.
C. Transcending Life
The final getaway is the world of entertainment, the escape from life. Our culture has
become an entertainment culture, endlessly absorbed with being amused and satiated, adoring the
technologies that undo our capacities to think."" This a-musement"' finds its expression in such
mindless activities as professional wrestling, banal TV sitcoms, and the exploding pornography
industry. These leisure interests a-muse by releasing the participant's mind from the realities of
life and allowing it simply to absorb stimuli without having to analyze, evaluate, or interact with
them in any meaningful way.
The negative effects of many hours of television viewing, for instance, are well-
2''
documented, even as the daily average intake of television continues to rise.
- One more
example among seemingly infinite options is the world-wide web. For far too many, the internet
has become a reality substitute as web surfers pass hours�even days�in virtual community
chat rooms, mixing facts with fantasies, while their marriages cmmble and their children are
neglected. As the problems of life accumulate, the a-musement dispensed by the computer
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becomes increasingly important to the consumer of distraction, so that he or she will not be
forced to address the developing crisis. Many postmodems have latched onto entertainment with
insatiable desire as a means for escaping life.
D. A Note on Artificial Transcendence
Each of these quests for transcendence is an expression of the yearning of the postmodern
person for a manageable life, an intelligible world, hi each of these fantasies, we can pretend
that relationships are stable and information is controllable because we limit the amount of
information considered (or it is limited for us). On vacations, or in old-time ballparks, or in the
world of television, events are packaged for us in easily digestible chunks; we do not have to
think about many of life's dmdgeries or our responsibilities at work or the challenges facing
humanity. These quests for transcendence are needed retreats for postmodems that satisfy the
yeaming for an intelligible universe�though only partially and temporarily, which is why they
are pursued incessantly, hi the end, any meaning derived from them for life is illusory and
ephemeral because it cannot be carried back into "the real world"; it is only the resident of the
artificial world created for the temporary respite.
It is interesting to note that each of these getaways is even more artificial than the
constmcted worlds we inhabit on a daily basis. It is not, then, a need to get away from the
manufacturedness of life that creates this yeaming in the postmodem self (for there is no escape
from artifice)�rather it is the desire for a manageable world that seems to energize the getaway
mentality. It is a telling facet of our culture that this can be gotten only in an entirely unreal
context.
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III. Christian Postmodernism�A New Hermeneutic, Part I
So far, we have addressed the uniqueness of the postmodem Hfe and, in doing so, have
painted a picture of how postmodems navigate their way through what has become for them an
incomprehensible world. With this understanding of postmodem doubts and postmodem hopes,
we have leamed that while postmodernism can be said to be characterized by skepticism, it is
also punctuated by an undercurrent of aspiration to transcend the skepticism. For the
postmodem church, it is possible to unite these divergent impulses, acknowledging the
hermeneutical legitimacy and wisdom of the skepticism while offering a complementary vision
of hermeneutics that promises a way through it; for the postmodern ethos is largely the result of a
loss of a hermeneutic, a faithful way to interpret the world, as the myths ofmodernity cmmble in
absurdity.
A. How Modern Hermeneutics Overestimates Its Worth
Before constructing a postmodern hermeneutic, however, it is important to estabhsh in
light of the postmodem critique the weaknesses of the currently dominant method of
interpretation among evangelicals, which is firmly grounded in the assumptions ofmodernity,
namely, the historical-critical paradigm.^^ Though often associated with secular and liberal
scholars, who have employed redaction and form criticism to produce interpretations outside of
orthodoxy, the historical-critical paradigm has also dominated the evangehcal church, which has
merely applied it within predetermined "acceptable" boundaries. The characteristics of this
method are as follows:"''
r- It assumes two churches: the one originally written to and the one today.
> It locates a text's meaning in the past.
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y It assumes that once the historical meaning of a text is settled, the exegetical task
is complete.
> It assumes that there is one singular, historical meaning to any text.
In Gordon Fee and Douglas Stuart's How to Read the Bible forAll its Worth,-^ such a
paradigm is presented clearly and proudly.
The biblical texts first of all mean what they meant. That is. . . God's Word for us today
is first of all precisely what his Word was to them. Thus we have two tasks: First, to find
out what the text originally meant. . .Second, we must leam to hear that same meaning in
the variety of new or different contexts of our own day.^^
This short description of their method reveals that it follows the historical-critical paradigm as
outlined above. 1) It assumes that the biblical texts were not intended for the church through
time, but instead are exclusively historical documents, to which we have the fortune of being
privy. 2) The meaning of the text is determined in the past; that is, "A text cannot mean what it
never meant." 3) The process of exegesis is coextensive with Fee and Stuart's first task, which
is exclusively historical�this is all they require before going on to applying the text. 4) The
meaning of the text is controlled by ''the original intent [behind] the biblical text."'
This "what-it-meant/what-it-means" approach to the text fails under the scrutiny of the
postmodern critique on several counts. First, it denies that the community reading the text is
connected to the community who first received the text. In actuality, the church today shares all
of the same hopes, agendas, and concerns as the primitive church�they are both the church.
Thus, we must understand the Bible as having been written to us. We are not "reading someone
else's mail"; we are part of the community intended to be formed by what was written.
Sometimes Christians lament that we do not have apostles in the church today; under a
postmodern conception of community, the aposdes to the church today are the same as those in
the first century�Paul and Peter are our apostles too.
Second, to locate the meaning of a text in the past, whether in the mind of the author, in
the occasion of the text itself, or, even further back, in the event described by the text, is to
render it inaccessible to us in the present. To claim that we can accurately discern the mind of
the author, for example, is to postulate a ledge of neutrality upon which we can stand that denies
our prejudices, assumptions, experiences, and beliefs, all of which, in actuality, we bring with us
to the hermeneutical task. We are unable to extract ourselves from our situatedness in order to
peer inside the mind that produced the text; it is unavailable to us. Ifmeaning must be found
behind the text, then we must say that we can never be sure of what any text means (though we
may have theories).
Third, to define exegesis simply as historical investigation is to truncate it and to
objectify the text as something "out there" to be manipulated. Therefore, its primary purpose is
description, wherein the original meaning is transformed into a new, "modern" application, but
because it is the biblical message that is transformed and the contemporary cultural assumptions
are left untouched, that application is necessarily geared toward modern thought forms. Such an
exegesis will rarely bring the reader into a new understanding of a text because the text is not
permitted the opportunity of challenging his or her culturally established assumptions about it.
The text is not considered as a conversation partner that might challenge a reader's culturally
inherited notions about justice, truth, stewardship, or sin; instead, it is controlled and tamed
through scientific processes that ensure that its message will accord with and confirm the
assumptions of the interpreter.
Finally, the assumption that a text has only one meaning, which is regulated by historical-
critical considerations and which can be simply downloaded into the contemporary context,
actually denies the historical situatedness of the text, despite the system's obsession with the
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past. This method postulates a propositional netherworld into which "eternal principles" go after
they are extracted from the text. They are then ready to be instantiated in the contemporary
milieu, applied to whatever specific situation demands them. Such a hermeneutic strips the text
of its historical and cultural concems that led to the occasion of the text in the first place. It also
tends to prefer the didactic texts over the narratival (which incidentally comprise the bulk of
scripture) because they are more amenable to such manipulation.
With the advent of postmodernism, we can see that the hermeneutical approach of the
modern church is open to a variety of valid criticisms. Following is the beginning ofmy
suggestion for a postmodern hermeneutic that addresses these concems, while still maintaining
faithfulness to scripture.
B. Westphal 's Hermeneutical Method
As we noted in the last chapter, postmodernism accurately describes humanity's limited
condition since the fall. It behooves the church to incorporate such an understanding into our
hermeneutics, not only as a matter of expediency to connect with the postmodem culture, but
also as a matter of principle to remain faithful to the witness of scripture. Merold Westphal has
proposed the twin hermeneutical principles of the hermeneutics offinitude and the hermeneutics
ofsuspicion,-^ which together affirm the postmodern attitude of skepticism toward human
capacity and human motivations, respectively. They serve as safeguards to prevent a practitioner
of biblical interpretation from becoming overconfident in his or her ability to lay claim to
absolute tmth. Any sufficiently postmodern hermeneutical strategy must take seriously these
twin hermeneutical principles.
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1 . The Hermeneutics of Finitude
Much of postmodem philosophy centers around just how much is unknowable in a
Cartesian sense, which entails a certain amount of affinity with a modern philosophical
framework. Lyotard asks and responds, "What. . . is the postmodem? It is undoubtedly a part of
the modem." As we noted in passing in chapter one, it is in many ways an extension of the
modem, the natural and inevitable result of the modem, since the postmodem agenda of debunking
modemity has proceeded under the original standards of Enlightenment thought and attitude, tumed
back in on themselves. Taking the Enlightenment view of Reason, we can see that philosophy itself
is unreasonable and illegitimate. By "objectively" analyzing discourse, we can discover that there is
no such thing as objective neutrality. By continuing in the modem traditions of rejecting authority
and debunking myths, we can reject and debunk even the myths of the Enlightenment. Whereas
Descartes beheved that everything could be subsumed under his system of knowing, and Kant roped
off the noumenal realm from human understanding, postmodemism has shown that the whole
endeavor is pointless, since nothing beyond one's own sensations can attain Cartesian certainty.
For the biblical hermeneut who is sensitive to the concems of postmodemism, then, a strong
sense of one's own finitude is essential in entering into an encounter with the scriptures. The
postmodem critique is correct in ascertaining that we do not see the world from "a God's eye view"
or "a view from nowhere." Westphal maintains that, in this regard, postmodem philosophies, which
have richly plumbed this subject of inquiry, can be extremely helpful and illuminating�without
forcing us to accede to their atheism, hi fact, such a humility and acceptance of finitude is a proper
outcome of the doctrine of creation.^ ^ This hne of thinking is further developed by Steven Bouma-
Prediger in the same work, where he identifies finitude as a necessarily good aspect of our persons
since we were created finite in our original state and God pronounced us "good.""^"
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We Christians, while accepting postmodernism' s warnings about fmitude, do not need to
follow certain postmodemists in seeing the fmitude as a dead end. Such an appraisal is much too
obsequious to the modem agenda, which sought to know everything and to categorize everything.
To continue in the lament over our fmitude is to perpetuate the first sin anew. Although there is a
juridical aspect to the fall�the transgression of a clear, stated law�it is also much more than that.
The first sin was an expression of the human penchant for wishing to exceed our God-given
boundaries, a dissatisfaction with limited knowledge. The desire of the first humans was to know
good and evil, to be like gods, to rise above their limited perspective and to lay hold of divine
knowledge. They exceeded the boundaries laid out for them by the one who made them and
knew all about them. Such an attitude was also the spirit of the Enlightenment Project.
To continue in the desire for sure, concrete, unambiguous knowledge is a symptom of
our longing for power and control over our circumstances, instead of a readiness to trust God. In
any given situation, when we do not have knowledge, we are forced to rely on others
�such as
lawyers, doctors, pilots, and tour guides�who do possess that knowledge. When we try to grasp
at our own forbidden fruit, the knowledge that lies beyond our limited condition, it uncovers a
lack of tmst in God, who knows everything we do not. To be satisfied with finitude and aware
of its limitations is to express faith in God, who has already demonstrated his tmstworthiness.
One important practical implication of a hermeneutics of finitude is a readiness to respect
the Other. If we have tmly internalized an awareness of our limitations, we are reticent to insist
that we are indubitably correct, even while we maintain strong convictions about the rightness or
wrongness of any position. Any belief, no matter how firmly held, still falls under the caveat of
human finitude. Such a disposition frees us to engage humbly in conversation with an unUmited
range of partners and allows us to coexist harmoniously without the harmony being purchased
at
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the price of dominating the Other or converting the Other through coercion. Otherness is
acceptable because difference is a part of the creation itself.^^ More will be said about the ethics
of the Other in chapter four.
2. The Hermeneutics of Suspicion
Another chief avenue of inquiry of postmodern philosophy is the uncovering of the
proliferation of ulterior motivations, disguised attempts at self-aggrandizement, and participation
in systems that raise oneself at the expense of diminishing others�often with little conscious
awareness on the part of those on the benefiting end. Postmodemism challenges the modern
concept of the autonomous self who is the center of knowledge; the possessor of rationality; the
author of his/her own words; and the creator, decider, manipulator, and intender of his/her own
desdny. Postmodemism instead emphasizes one's role as that of a participant in a complicated
social web of relationships, experiences, and influences that is bigger than the self As a result,
there is an unremitting skepticism in postmodernism that never accepts the prima facie portrayal
of any action or belief; rather, it constantiy searches for the self-promoting motivation that
invariably lurks in the dark dungeons of the self.
Once more, we see that modemism has been naive in its pretensions to laying hold of
ultimate reality; whereas modemity saw only the goodness of creation without the cormption of the
fali_or even limitation�much of postmodemity tmmpets the tragedy of the fallen human
condition and the insidious effects of sin for human knowledge without any hope of redemption or
restoration.-^^ To our humble hermeneutics of fmitude, Westphal further suggests that Christian
interpreters of the Bible need to incorporate a hermeneutics of suspicion in order to take seriously
the consequences of our fallen nature. However, as with the
hermeneutics of fmitude, though most
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articulators of postmodem suspicion are atheists, such a hermeneutics need not take an atheistic
form in our expressions of it to be both helpful and illuminating.^^
Anthony Thiselton cautions, "A Christian account of human nature accepts the capacity of
the self for self-deception and its readiness to use strategies ofmanipulation."^^ This waming is one
fully in line with scripture. 1 John 1:8 counsels, "tf we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves,
and the tmth is not in us" (RSV; my italics). The prophet Jeremiah also witnesses to this fact. "The
heart is deceitful above all things, and desperately cormpt; who can understand it?" (Jer. 17:9 RSV;
see also Ro. 1:21; 12:3; ICo. 3:18; 13:8-12; Heb. 3:13). The scriptures give ample testimony to the
fact that there is a force within us that works against us to conceal from us even our own
motivadons and ultimate desires. If we are to be honest in our capacity as biblical hermeneuts, we
must affirm with postmodemism that "our interpretations are necessarily and hopelessly bounded by
the presuppositions and prejudices" in which we have been instmcted, for they are the water in
which we swim, indeed, in which we leamed what swimming is.
But such a reality does not entail that there is no rising above such a state, and here is where
Christianity must part company with most expressions of postmodemism. Appropriation is both a
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"yes" and a "no," both an acceptance and a recontextualization, so here Christianity has something
unique to offer the culture. Romans 6-8 is perhaps the most eloquent exposition in the Bible of the
power of God over sin in the heart of the Christian. Elsewhere, Paul develops this theme that such a
sorry state as that described above is incompatible with the new creation that comes as a result of
the transforming power of Christ (cf Eph. 4: 1 1-5:20; ITh. 5:4-8). Even for those without Christ,
the application of human reason seems to penetrate at least some of the artifice. Otherwise Freud's
work of psychoanalysis, let alone therapy and later development in psychological diagnosis and
treatment, would have been impossible.''^
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Yet it must be remembered that we hve our Christian lives inside a framework of
"already/not yet"; while Christ in our hearts gives us some protection from a bent toward sin, it is
not eradicated in us fully, and we are still subject to its influence on our lives. Even adherents of
Wesleyan perfection must admit to unconquerable "infirmities." Therefore, we have an obligation
never to drop our guard against our own capacity for self-deception. We can affirm to a certain
extent Emmanuel Levinas's assertion, "hi the beginning was the interest," since it is within the
confines of interest and desire that any thinking occurs.''^
C. Gadamerian Dialogical Hermeneutics
With these hermeneutical safeguards of finitude and suspicion in place to guard against
overconfidence, we are now free to proceed to a constructive approach to postmodern
hermeneutics that fulfills the postmodem longing to transcend the mire of suspicion. I suggest
that the dialogical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer represents one potentially rewarding
path of exploration. In chapter three, we will add to this discussion the hermeneutic of Paul
Ricoeur.
Gadamer, in noting the limitations of science for the discovery of tmth in a variety of
settings, set out to develop a theory of interpretation for the non-scientific relationships of human
life, which compose the vast majority of human relationships. By using as an example the
interpretation of art, whose tmth�consisting in an encounter between the observer and the work
of art�is not even able to be captured through verbal description (let alone scientific
investigation), Gadamer set out to describe the kind of tmth we can know with regard to such
endeavors, particularly in the areas of philosophy and history .^^ We can notice right away that
this approach differs from the historical-critical paradigm, which proposed the biblical text to
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fall, indeed, under the regime of scientific investigation, and therefore hypothesized an
illegitimate objectivity. There is no such hypothesis in Gadamer.
Gadamer' s hermeneutic can best be described as dialogical because of the emphasis that
he places on the role of the dialectic in the realization of non-scientific truth. Gadamer asserts
that authentic conversation between two or more participants is the only protection against a
manipulative presentation and use of truth because only in conversation can something really
new arise that does not reflect the prior agenda of one or more of the speakers. "To reach an
understanding in dialogue is not merely a matter of... successfully asserting one's own point of
view, but being transformed into a communion (commonality) in which we do not remain what
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we were.
With regard to biblical hermeneutics, we can see this conversation taking place on two
levels. First, in order to rightly understand the text, our community, our situation, or ourselves,
we require others who are beyond the boundaries of our inquiry. Only then can we receive a
perspective that is not merely self-confirming. Though there is no obligation to accept the
assessment of the outside voice, nevertheless, we are obligated by the rules of authentic
conversation''^ to give the new perspective a fair hearing and to consider the merits of its
appraisal. This principle applies not only to various conversationalists within one's temporal
orientation, but also those who, throughout history, have been contributors to the formation of
the community. In this way, Gadamer affirms the importance of authority for community.
The authority of persons is based ultimately, not on the subjection and abdication of
reason [as Descartes and other modems seemed to think], but on recognition and
knowledge�knowledge, namely that the other is superior to oneself in judgment and
insight and that for this reason his judgment takes precedence, i.e., it has priority over
one's own.... It rests on recognition and hence on an act of reason itself which, aware of
its own limitations, accepts that others have better understanding.''^
58
Despite the concern for authority and tradition, however, in contrast to scientific truth, dialogical
truth is not determined beforehand, since the tradition is itself only one participant in the
conversation and does not receive special favor or status."*^ Thus, the potential exists for
transformation of the self�and even the tradition�as a result of this encounter.
On the second level, the hermeneut enters into a conversation with the text itself,
encountering it as a fellow interlocutor with the capacity for original claims and demands on the
reader. Vattimo explains, "Our encounter with the work of art [or, in this case, a text] is not an
encounter with a determinate truth...; it is rather, in the last analysis, an experience of our
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belonging, and of the work's belonging, to. . . the tradition that it continues." For the Christian
reader of scripture, it is imperative to experience the text as a conversation partner in the context
of an ongoing tradition, namely, Christianity, with an expectation that the text, when its meaning
is truly grasped, holds the potential for a surprising word for the reader. This does not discount,
however, the "pre-understanding" of the interpreter, as if he or she came to the text as an empty
vessel. Rather, Gadamer describes the process of textual encounter as one of "the fusion of
horizons," which refer to the horizons of meaning belonging to each of the interpreter and the
text, as these potentially diverse perspectives are brought into agreement.''^
In a Gadamerian world, difference is not necessarily inimical to community (as in the
modem age, which demanded conformity), nor is it just a play toy (as represented in some
postmodern deconstmctionists); rather, it is the basis of human existence, created by God.^� The
diversity of experiences necessarily produces a diversity of perspectives, which are not to be
flattened out, but engaged�whether in the Christian community or in the biblical texts.^'
At the heart of Gadamer' s hermeneutic is the concept of relationality . The encounter
with the unfamiliar, an Other, is a precondition for interpreting and understanding oneself and
59
others. If our world were truly solipsistic, we would have no way to know even ourselves, for
understanding comes from the distinctions we make. If everything is undifferentiated unity,
there can be no understanding of what it is not, nor of what it could be, and thus no
understanding of what it is.
To apply the point, before I ever seek to know how a text relates to me, or how another
person's experience relates to mine, it is not good enough simply to approach that text or
person with supposedly value-neutral observation. For then, as Hume and Kant
perceived, we shall at once begin to impose upon what we seek to understand prior
categories of thought and stereotypification. The first requirement is respectfor the
otherness of the Other as Other. This invites not observation but listening.
Thus the direction of the current of thought from the interpreter to the text, which characterized
modem exegesis, is reversed, and Gadamerian hermeneutics allows God to address his followers
through dialogical encounters with the text.^^
Gadamer' s dialogical hermeneutic holds great potential for the church in a postmodem
age. First, it takes the text of the Bible seriously, permitting it to make even stronger claims on
the reader than the "what-it-meant/what-it-means" hermeneutic of modernism. Second, it
expects transformation in the world and life of the interpreter as a result of an encounter with the
text, a process which lies at the heart of the scriptures, the original purpose of which were to
serve as formative documents for the community of God. Third, it fully acknowledges the
postmodem concems about finitude and manipulative self-interest by appealing to tradition and
by adopting an attitude of dialogue, respectively, thus doing away with the need somehow to
uncover objective, certain, and accurate knowledge of a person's thoughts thousands of years
ago. Fourth, it offers hope to the postmodern of achieving tmth and meaning, despite the above
concerns. Fifth, it locates the interpreter within the context of a supportive community that
provides stability, identity, and belonging, all cures for the postmodern malaise. Sixth, it is
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applicable only within community, which is a central facet of the spiritual life portrayed in the
Bible.'"
IV. Conclusion
In describing the postmodem ethos as one of skeptical longing, we have uncovered the
sources for much of the motivation behind this powerful force of change in our culture. We have
further identified this ethos as the result of a loss of hermeneutic, which renders the world
incomprehensible for many postmodems. This situation serves as a substantial opportunity for
the church to offer to postmodems a way to understand their world which affirms their
skepticism yet does not permit it to spiral into nihilism. Further, such a hermeneutic is consistent
with scripture regarding the biblical themes of creation, the fall, and community�all
foundational issues for the church. This discussion has further provided us a context within
which we may place the phenomena of the postmodern world that constitute the rest of our
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One result of the use of the historical-critical paradigm among evangelicals is the tendency to steamroll
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scripture, the "authorized" portion of that discussion. Postmodemity allows us to speak comfortably about Luke's
perspective on salvation, for example, in distinction to that of Paul, without forcing us to judge one of them









One of the hallmarks of the postmodem era is a renewed focus on the internal life.
Modemism emphasized outcomes and results�whether considering the utilitarian value of a
new technology or the aesthetic merit of Romantic poetry�but part of the postmodem critique
has been a concentration on process. Since, for the postmodern mind, the external world has lost
much of its former significance, it is now the internal sensations and thoughts that receive the
attention formerly given to the products of those sensations and thoughts.
Consequently, there has been a tremendous growth in interest among Americans in the
spiritual aspects of life.' According to Gallup, 78% of Americans now feel a need to experience
spiritual growth, up from 20%, even as recently as 1994. Barna concludes, "The failure to
understand the role of spirituality in our culture renders a social analyst incapable of ...
comprehending the dynamic of American life."^ But this resurgence of interest in things
spiritual is not a revival of classical Christian spirituality; the advent of a postmodem spirituality
is the emergence of a secular spirituality, a psychologized spirituality�rather than a theological
spirituality�that permeates the culture, including much of even the evangelical church.
I. The Advent of Psychology
This new type of secular spirituality differs from its religious rival in several essential
aspects, which we will examine below, but first we must explore some of the characteristics of
psychology in general, in order to achieve a broader perspective on the spiritual landscape.
Since both theology and psychology deal with the internal life and share many of the same
objecdves, it is perhaps inevitable that the boundaries between them have blurred. It is central to
both disciplines to define what constitutes a human being, to determine the internal processes
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that produce actions and patterns of behavior, and to develop ways of effecting positive change
viz. those pattems of behavior. Each of these two fields has advanced certain claims and
assertions about people, however, that conflict with insights deemed essential by the other,
creating a cognitive dissonance in those who understand themselves and others to any extent
both in theological and in psychological terms."*
Reconciling such antipathetic notions is indeed a daunting task, and yet a stmggle that
did not exist until very recently. The language of psychology was not even present only 200
years ago, and now to think outside of a psychological framework is all but impossible. Thus
has the Freudian idiom of psychoanalysis and its descendants come to revolutionize language
(and subsequently, worldviews) in the West to an extent rivaling�or even exceeding�that of
the computer. American society has largely tumed to psychology to answer what were formally
"religious" questions: "Who am I?"; "Why do I do the things I do?"; and "How can I change
the things I do?"^ Consequently, the therapeutic outlook has displaced the religious as the
organizing framework of American culture. How this transition took place is the key to further
understanding.
A. The Challenge ofRomanticism
As we have already noted. Romanticism emphasized the emotions and affective aspects
of life in protest to the overly rational and mechanistic Enlightenment priorities, and there was a
mysterious, almost mystical, fascination with these inexplicable experiences. The Romantics
insisted that life, love, death, and being were not reducible merely to empirical observation.
The spirit of the Enlightenment found its answer to the Romantic challenge in Sigmund
Freud. In him, modemity had found a way to address the concems of the Romantics from within
the language and worldview of the Enhghtenment. By subjecting the deep interior of the self (a
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Romantic concem) to rigorous objective analysis (an Enlightenment methodology), Freud
unified the opposing discourses of Romanticism and Enlightenment. He concluded that this deep
interior consisted essentially of the energy of desire, especially desire for sexual expression; the
heretofore mysterious Romantic passions had now been explained in biological language
accompanied by a mechanistic worldview.^ It was nothing less than a revolution in the
understanding of human nature, "the single most important set of ideas whereby men and women
in the twentieth century have come to understand themselves and their civilization."
Enlightenment sentiments emerged from the confrontation with Romanticism stronger
than ever. So promising were the possibilities that, by the mid-twentieth century, science had
eclipsed all other forms of academic inquiry. Ethics, metaphysics, theology, and such all but
disappeared from university curricula. Failing to treat "observables," it was argued that they
Q
were merely empty speculations�like so many angels dancing on the head of a pin. Darwinism
had already raised questions about the viability of the continuance of human life, and these were
answered by wave after wave of calls for more science, more technological advancement, and
the complete conquest of the natural world�a reassertion of Enlightenment idealism.^
B. Modem Man Masters Mind
1. Who We Are
Enlightenment ideals once again dominated the modem cultural landscape, and as the
concems of the Romantics quietiy slipped away from the cultural consciousness, "Freud's
cauldron of seething and repressed motivational forces, so central to the Romantic definition of
the person, slowly dropped from view. In its place the ego, the beleaguered and obfuscated
center of rationality for Freud, gained centrality."'� Subsequent generations of psychiatrists
focused on cognitive development (rather than psycho-sexual) and proposed the possibility of
rational self-analysis, with the result that now problems were not seen as buried deep within the
67
recesses of the self but were actually in the easily accessible realm of thought. The consequent
assumption was that people could achieve meaningful self-knowledge without any referent to
God, His image on us, or the human sin nature."
2. Why We Do What We Do
With the triumph of psychology as the final arbiter in determining the definition of the
self, human evil, the fact that we fail to live up to our aspirations, is attributed to environmental
and physiological (i.e., genetic, chemical, biological) factors; the assumption behind psychology
is that humans are basically good.
" As a result, the most recent century has seen a tremendous
growth in ways of talking about psychological deficits of the self, in contrast to moral deficits:
low self-esteem, over-stress, obsessive-compulsive disorder, self-alienation, anorexia/bulimia,
voyeurism, anti-social tendencies, bipolar disorder, attention deficit-hyperactivity disorder, light-
affective disorder, etc. It is incontestable, certainly, that the labeling of some of these conditions
as psychological diseases (bipolar, for instance) has led to the empowerment of many to modify
what were once experienced as uncontrollable conditions; similarly, the introduction of
medication that rectifies chemical imbalances in the brain are a tremendous help in many
situations. On the other hand, the trend in recent years has been to distribute the label of mental
illness to what were widely once considered moral faults with the result that the psychological
label has often become an excuse for the behavior, masquerading as a cause. We have developed
coundess ways of discussing our faults and the faults of others in a language that entirely avoids
connotations of sin or responsibility, creating a need for professionals to help us arrive at
solutions to the problems of life. This trend of diagnosis and treatment requires a steadily
increasing vocabulary of psychological disease, which produces a corresponding increase in the
13
perceptions of illness, creating a continuous spiraling cycle of enfeeblement and infirmity.
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3. How We Can Change What We Do
Even though rehgious explanations of reality have been replaced by psychological ones,
there still remains an understood need for salvation, redefined as deliverance from our enfeebled,
infirm conditions. Instead of sin, however, we have sicknesses, problems, issues that we must
"deal with"; instead of guilt, we contend with anxiety and instability. Christopher Lasch
identifies such a person as "psychological man," who seeks, above all, peace of mind; he
pursues "happiness" at any cost. Therapists replace priests as his model for a vehicle to this
salvation because the therapist will tell him the blame for his problems are outside of himself,
while the solutions lie within himself; a priest would tell him that the problem is inherent to him,
while the only solution exists in the activity of God in his life. For psychological man, the need
for love�a pregnant theological concept�is reclassified as the need for fulfillment of the
patient's emotional requirements, leading not to an admirable character, but "psychological
wholeness."'''
While there is some validity to Lasch 's assessment�our sin nature always favors
exonerating itself whenever possible�at the same time, we must question the church's role in
this development. Why is it that "psychological man" could not find his happiness and
satisfaction in the church? While these are not the chief ends of a biblical spirituality, they are
important outcomes of being in fellowship with God and those who follow him. For too many
would-be Christians, the church has communicated only a message of condemnation, rooted in
manipulation through guilt, fear, and intimidation.'^ Consequently, it has surrendered the
privileged position that it formerly held in the culture�postmodems simply cannot accept the
church's formulation of how to change what we do when they see that so many Christian need to
change how they interact with those with whom they disagree.
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II. The Psychological Spirituality of Postmodernism
At first blush, it would seem that the explanatory power of psychology would lose its
influence as postmodernism gained ascendancy. Grounded in the Enlightenment Project,
psychology is based on supposedly objective, rational analysis, which postmodernism denies. It
views humans simply as so many mechanistic examples under the control of the forces of cause
and effect. But in fact, the trend is the opposite. The continuously spiraling cycle of
enfeeblement and infirmity expands without abatement, and the prestige of the field of
psychology grows ever greater. How is it that postmodernism, which denies all the foundational
principles upon which psychology is built, can continue to ally itself with the psychological
paradigm?
There seem to be two primary reasons. First, psychology shares with postmodernism the
assumption of ulterior motives, hidden agendas, and attempts at manipulation to the advantage of
the self Personality-type and defense-mechanism theories explore this facet of life, showing
how humans have a tendency to hide even from themselves their true reasons for some, or even
many, of their actions. Though psychology has moved beyond Freud in many respects, and
many of his key theories are now discounted, his influence is still heavily felt in psychology
today, particularly in its objectives and basic worldview. It is precisely in this regard that Freud
is at his most proto-postmodern, as he challenges "the notion of the modern self in control of its
own choices, values, and goals." Instead, he proposes a picture of "the self, first, as an amalgam
of neurological, quasi-physical or psychic 'forces' which serve to define and to shape it; second,
as a victim of its own manipulative deceptions."'^ This agrees with the postmodem assessment
of human tendencies, and postmodems are drawn to psychology to discover�to whatever extent
it is possible�ways in which these primal urges for power have created unfortunate, damaging.
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or even destructive results in their lives, making the negotiations through life more difficult than
otherwise necessary.
The second reason for the postmodern attraction to psychology lies in the historically
unparalleled spotlight that postmodemism shines on the self. In a world without a knowable
extemal reality, the self becomes the only thing to know; in a world with no extemal meaning,
the self becomes the only avenue to meaning. So the attention focuses on the inner workings of
one's mind, its development, its history, its desires, and its proclivities, spiraling into a web of
narcissism. The failure of the Enlightenment Project to find stable meaning in the world "out
there" has been pivotal in tuming the attention of postmodems to their experiences, thoughts, and
feelings; as technology has increasingly alienated postmodems from the external world, the inner
world and inner life have become the focus and provide identity in the face of the competing
claims, opposing roles, and adversarial loyahies of the fragmented external reality.'^ Religion is
sdll denied the authority to explain the operation of the interior realm because of its
metanarradval claims and subsequent demands on the inquirer, which are seen to be motivated
by power interests. That leaves psychology, then, as the only mechanism for explaining the self
that does not propagate a metanarrative.
Clearly then, psychology, holds sway in the stmggle to define the self. Yet its
reductionist oudook does not preclude an explosion in the interest in spirituality. Psychology,
which concentrates on the internal life of the patient, and spirituality, which is "the experience of
consciously striving to integrate one's life in terms not of isolation and self-absorption but of
self-transcendence toward the ultimate value one perceives,"'^ have been conjoined in
postmodemity to result in an attempt at self-transcendence that aims at one's psychological
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wholeness. The best way to see the paradoxical merging of these two pursuits is to view the
junction against the backdrop of classical Chrisdan spirituality.
A. Private
Classical spirituality occurs in the context of a community of faith, but in a very
important sense, psychologized spirituality is almost entirely a private affair, centered on the
internal life of the individual. While postmodems do yearn for coramunity, they have found that
actual communities (particularly religious communities) have neither been accepting of them,
nor supportive of their spiritual quests, so in practice, they have tended to withdraw at least from
traditional religious communities. The majority of 20- and 30-year-olds care deeply about
spirituality, but less than one in three believe the church is helpful in that pursuit,^" an assessment
that probably says more about the church than about the 20- and 30-year-olds.
Necessarily, then, there is a common perception throughout the culture that one can be
spiritual without going to a church or synagogue regularly, which has been accompanied by a
perceived bifurcation of religion from spirituality, as the external (potentially "artificial") from
2 1the intemal ("genuine"), respectively. As their experiences with "organized religion" have left
them cold, they have come to see the external religious practices as simply expressions of
fondness, components chosen by a person to correspond as nearly as possible to the subjective
experiences the individual has had, a match of personal preferences with institutional realities,""
like searching for the perfect shade of upholstery to match the carpet and wallpaper already in
place. Postmodems will not casually accept religious tmth or instmctions from an authority or
institution without the authentication of personal experience. The ultimate test of what "counts"
as spiritual is one's own personal experience."^
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In sympathy with this appraisal of today's church, author Kurt Vonnegut has made it a
consistent practice in his novels to invent his own religions to make up for the deficiencies of
Christianity. In his autobiography, the atheist claims:
We need a new religion. An effective religion allows people to imagine from moment to
moment what is going on and how they should behave. Christianity used to be like that.
[But] our country is now jammed with human beings who say out loud that life is chaos
to them, and that it doesn't seem to matter what anybody does next.""*
The church has somewhere lost the ability to make sense of the world for postmodems.
Although Christianity formerly answered the questions the culture was asking, the culture has
moved on to new questions, but the church sdll fights the specters of modernism. Postmodern
people have a utilitarian atdtude toward religion�they want a community that will help them
interpret their world, something that allows them to process their experiences, a meaning-making
system. But instead of listening to the needs of postmodems, the church has been insistent on
preaching doctrines, universal principles, and the pursuit of Truth, neglecting potential points of
contact and leaving postmodems wallowing in "chaos." Many Christian authors, such as Doug
Groothius, argue that if this is the case, then postmodems will simply have to change their
25
oudook viz. religion and its purposes before they can come to a saving knowledge of Christ. I
contend that if the church is not trying to be useful to postmodems while claiming to be right,
their claims will never be convincing ones, and postmodems will be left to their own spiritual
paths without the input of the church�and this is indeed what is happening. The church too
often seems impadent with people who have not been instmcted in the faith but who,
nevertheless, are seeking God.
The result of the alienadon and abandonment of postmodems from the church is that
postmodem people pursue spirituality on their own. Unfortunately, as Irving Kristol has noted,
when spirituality is divorced from community, it "quickly diminishes into an indoor pleasure, a
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kind of hobby of one or more individuals, like reading a book or watching television'""^ because
there is no community structure for accountability. This sad hobby-version of faith manifests
itself most often in baby-boomers and their progeny. Boomers, who had started to retum to
church in the 1980s and early 1990s in the hope of finding the goal of their spiritual pilgrimage,
after being disillusioned once more, have now begun to question again the value of organized
faith. Generadon Xers, reared in an environment that has considered the church merely as a
disposable option rather than a prerequisite for personal wholeness, have shown a predilecdon to
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rejecting religion outright. If the church is ever to reach this people group with any
considerable success, it must craft a spirituality that speaks to their needs and concerns, or else
the faith can hold no real meaning for them.
For those who do find a home in the church and experience spiritual growth through a
relationship with Christ, they are congratulated by other postmodems who are still in process.
They might be told something like, "I'm glad you found something that works for you\"
However, postmodems are often very sensitive about convictions that might be expressed as a
result of this spiritual self-understanding of the Christian because of their negative encounters
with other Christians who have illegitimately tried to manipulate the behavior of those beyond
the walls of faith. In this manner, authentic believers are often forced to pretend that their
religious beliefs really do not make any difference except for their own sense of personal
fulfillment, causing a rift between the public and the private self.
" Wade Clark Roofe observes:
Privatized faith is common in contemporary America because it is so very congenial with
a highly differentiated society. Restricted largely to the spheres of family and personal
life it encroaches very litde into the larger public world, which Americans increasingly
define as off-limits to religious institutions. With believing disjointed from belonging, it
amounts to a 'portable faith'�one that a believer can keep in the inner life and take along
in life, having litde contact with a religious institution or ascribed group.^^
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B. Unorthodox
Classical spirituality is consistent with the creeds and other professions of belief of the
church over dme, but this hobby-spirituality mentality allows for a connected aspect of
privatized, phsychologized postmodem spirituality: unorthodoxy. Since spirituality is seen as
essentially a matter of inner-personal operations, each individual is free to choose his or her own
beliefs, unencumbered by any duty to an organization or institution�even for those in the
church.
Ours is a society built on "freedom," which has been conceived now to be coextensive
30with choice, the religious corollary to consumerism. David Wells claims that choice is the
defining feature of our culture: we choose our own social standing, occupation, marriage
partner(s), whether we have children and how many, even our own identities. Why should we
not then be able to choose things like meaning and values?" Kay Meyer would agree with the
perspective behind that question. "Why do I have the right to say someone's going to hell just
because they believe something different than I do?" she asks. As she appropriates her new
Unitarian Universalist attitudes to her Baptist upbringing, Kay feels "like I'm becoming an
evangelical Unitarian." Unitarian Universalism is a religion without creed, accepting as
members former Muslims, Christians, Jews, pagans, Buddhists, atheists, agnostics, and
humanists into their fold, with no requirement of assent to any dogma, and its numbers have been
increasing for the last twenty years.'^^ Barna reports that fully 45% of Americans believe that
religious beliefs do not matter at all.^'^
The younger the person the more likely they are to hold unorthodox beliefs; refrain from
spiritual disciplines, such as prayer and Bible-reading; not profess commitment to church or
Christianity; and not consider themselves "religious."'"' Moreover, it is the young who are most
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immersed in postmodem assumptions;'''' yet, even among adults, one in five is "closely aligned"
with the belief pattems and lifestyle of New Age teaching/ Though 93% of Americans believe
God exists, almost 30% of those who believe in God conceive of deity outside of biblical
boundaries/ Beaudoin considers experimentation with heresy and even blasphemy key to
Generation X's religious experience. The World Wide Web houses holy home pages along side
pomography and sacrilege, and music videos routinely mix the sacred and the profane. Thus,
Generation X removes the ideas of holy and unholy from their black-and-white environments and
throws them together as expressions of one another.
The phenomenon of the Intemet and its random, chaotic character is important for
understanding this rise in the unorthodoxy of the young. In browsing the religious options on the
Web, one easily passes from orthodoxy to heterodoxy and back, each standing side-by-side in
cyberspace, equally available and accessible, which raises questions about their metaphysical
equality. Cyberspace is theologically fluid, flowing with religious options from high popery to
astrology, Scientology, and paganism, and there is no central authority. For many Xers, the Web
is taken as an ontology (a way of being) and an epistemology (a way of knowing). Changing a
letter (or a few) transports the surfer to an entirely different reality, a wholly different experience
than visiting different religious sites in the "real" world, some of which may not even be open for
"browsing." "When religious devotees note the ephemerality and heightened access of religion
in cyberspace, they may begin to doubt the absolute claims of sacredness and permanence" of
religion.^^ Beaudoin says the Net is becoming a "virtual monastery for the spiritually
dispossessed," replete with options for self-reflection, prayer, meditation, or Scripture studies.
One can even listen to monks chanting, gaze on iconography, and read holy texts."*" It is
expected that in ten years, 20% of Americans will have their entire spiritual experience on-line.
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Classical spirituality is focused on God as its ultimate point of focus. Psychologized
spirituality focuses ultimately on the self and its mental health as its highest aspiration: self-help,
self-empowerment, self-improvement. Since it is launched from the moorings of community and
tradidon, this personalized, customized form of faith, which bears little resemblance to the
"pure" forms of any of the world's major religions, is available to be shaped and molded by its
adherents for the primary purpose of meeting personal needs."*^ As the therapeutic outlook has
displaced the religious as the organizing framework of American culture, it should not be
surprising that it should determine the purpose and content of the latter, or that the manifestation
of this trend is widespread.
The doctrine of sin is conceived, no longer in relation to God, but to the self. Though
people still believe that sin exists, they do not accept rigid definitions of sinful behavior.'*^
Instead, they view it as a disloyalty to oneself, or the manifestation of psychological disorders
that prevent one from achieving or enjoying all that one would otherwise. The chief problem of
humanity becomes the psychological deficits discussed above (low self-esteem, obsessive-
compulsive disorder, self-alienation, et al.), and God functions only to calm, assuage, and mend,
never to judge or condemn, like a divine dispenser of holy wholeness."*"
As sin is psychologized, salvation necessarily receives the same fate; since salvation is
deliverance from sin, if the definition of sin changes, that of its deliverance does as well.
Salvation is retooled in terms of achieving one's potential and finding self-worth. Spiritual
needs are psychoanalyzed, and self-help books become "portable pastors," containing all the
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wisdom and advice necessary to negotiate through hfe,"^ supplementing 12-step programs and
motivational video tapes. These trends, taken collectively, are the expressions of our culture's
craving for "happiness," the secularization of the religious quest for redemption from sin."^
Without a theological understanding of the world, there can be no conviction conceming
the vileness and offensiveness of sin. As a result, the hunger today is not for salvation from that
sin, but for the feeling, the momentary illusion of psychological wholeness and security, which is
absent in the hectic, fragmented pace of life. From a Christian perspective, however, "[t]he
dreadful thing about the [postjmodern pursuit of happiness ... is that people become imprisoned
in themselves, endlessly ransacking their own emotional needs in order to attain what in reality is
unattainable" apart from God."^
This development is widespread even in the church. Loving God and being in love with
God have replaced consecration and commitment of oneself to his agenda. This "love" is not
conceived of as a dedication of oneself or a sacrifice of oneself, but rather a private,
individualized, experience-based emotion that is more therapeutic than moral."^ This is a
spirituality of feelings, generated by subjective, mystical experiences, instead of connection with
the biblical stories or participation in the church body. This desire for emotional satisfaction is
witnessed in the trend of church-hopping�little religious continuity, non-adherence to the
traditions of the people of God, and most importantly a failure to live with integrity."^ Emotions
are regarded as self-authenticating and must be lifted up without reference to doctrinal content.'"
It is the fault of the church that it has not communicated the message of scripture to its members
in convincing ways, opting more often to pontificate rather than to explain, and to delineate
rather than to accept a proper stance of ambiguity and flexibility when appropriate.
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One thing that has come out of the new transformation of the culture is a more assertive
stance toward anything that stifles creativity and play, including�and perhaps, especially�
religion.'' The perceived inflexibility of the church on a variety of issues has led postmodems to
consider it as an institution typified by arrogance. They thrive on ambiguity as a major
component of the spiritual life that reflects the instabilities that characterize the postmodern
existence.
" Postmodems claim that institutions, including the Church, are socially made, not
CO
divinely given, and that they can therefore be unmade or reformed or reconstituted." Women,
for example, demand a say in determining the morality of abortion and of views on divorce and
remarriage. The democratization of decision-making is regarded as essential in all social
institutions�including the church'"�as the priesthood of all believers has become the
democracy of interpretation. Norman observes that postmodern Christians
can only accept [sic] as religious tmth what seems to them to be comfy and conducive to
a painless safe-passage through experience. Religion is perceived to be the heaped-up
accumulation of the agreeable; God is love, and therefore he is to be envisaged as the
great guarantor of whatever in life makes for human satisfaction."
Psychological happiness becomes the First Principle of postmodemity, the unquestionable
foundation, what is self-evident. Personal satisfaction, pleasure, and the emotions are bifurcated
from and elevated over moral character, which is replaced by self-expression, self-gratification,
and self-fulfdlment.'^
III. Christian Postmodernism�A New Hermeneutic, Part II
It would seem that psychology as a replacement for religion is a poor substitute; yet few
would deny that it has tremendous explaining power and has brought about benefits, even
substantial ones, in the description of human behavior. Nevertheless, the discipline of
psychology is inherently reductionist and, as such, does not do justice to the profundity and
mystery of the human experience.'^ If Christianity is to regain the historical fervency of its
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spirituality, it must find some way to challenge the dominance of psychology over Christians and
non-Christians alike without denying psychology's relevance to certain situations. We cannot
retum to a pre-psychological world, as if the discipline had never arisen; it is all but
unimaginable to conceive of our urbanized, postindustrial society without any of the forms of
psychotherapy and theories of personality derived from them. Moreover, in an era when
rehgious frameworks no longer carry influence across the culture, psychology has become the
common parlance to discuss the events of the inner life, a secular reordering of self-
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understanding.
Using psychological language, then, is unavoidable if the church wishes to communicate
with the culture. But it must do a better job of explaining that entering into relationship with the
living God is much more than a psychological experience. Furthermore, the church must tell
postmodem people the Bible provides the individual with an identity that is much more full-
orbed and profound than the tmncated and incomplete version offered by psychology.
Grounding one's life in God does provide psychological wholeness and health, but the Christian
life is about much more than self-actualization. The church must demonstrate that it has relevant
answers to the questions of who we are, why we do what we do, and how we can change what
we do; to communicate otherwise is to denigrate the gospel and to render it impotent. I believe a
powerful way to do that�and further to connect postmodems to the communities of which they
yearn to be a part�is through a Christian application of the narratival hermeneutics of Paul
Ricoeur.
A. Ricoeurian Narratival Hermeneutics
As we briefly mentioned in chapter one, Ricoeur has largely pioneered a new way of
understanding tmth, as well as the self To review, most postmodem philosophy accepts the
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modem criteria for what counts as tmth, namely that a statement is tme if it accurately corresponds
to the extemal realides it purports to describe. This line of postmodem reasoning, which flows from
Nietzsche, does not undermine the modem correspondence theory of tmth; rather, it demonstrates
that we cannot achieve its requirements, rendering tmth, therefore, humanly unattainable. Thus, the
anti-epistemology of much postmodemism is a cridque waged from the foundations ofmodemism,
not so much a repudiation of those foundations, as often presented.'^
But a Christian view of truth need not be a modem one. I suggest that it might follow the
thinking of Ricoeur' s theory of narrative, which has much to recommend it from a biblical
worldview. The "narrative identity," according to Ricoeur, is an entity who acts within a dual
framework of continuity and change through time, hi other words, on the one hand, the self is
not separated from itself; since the narrative holds it together, a person's identity remains
constant from one moment to the next and over a prospectively infinite succession of moments.
On the other hand, the self can undergo potentially radical change that renders it unrecognizable
from the perspective of an outsider who comes in contact with that person at sufficiently distant
time intervals,^" and in a very real sense we can say that this "new" self is not the same person he
or she used to be.^'
This rather simple concept, which accords with common experience,
"
serves as the
launching point in the thought of Ricoeur for a contrary understanding of tmth, yielding several
important and profound insights. Tmth, from within the understanding of the narrative identity,
is formed by its relations to the past, present, and future of the narrative; it is a trajectory created
by the timeline of one's life, rather than a timeless proposition, extracted from the context in
which it emerged.
The present acquires understanding, significance, and interpretation in light of the
relation between its 'situatedness' in terms of the past and its transformation and destiny
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in the future. It relates to creative processes ... of transformation into the ever-maturing,
ever-developing [telos].^^
The Chrisdan, then, locates his or her identity within the larger story of God's activity in
the world. Biblical notions of truth are bound up in the concepts of witness, promise,
accountability, covenant, faithfulness, hesed-love, all of which emerge over time in a relationship
with God, highlighted by events that illustrate these truths�narratives. God's character and the
Christian's character serve as aspects of stable continuity in the narrative, amidst the constant
change of circumstances.^"
Derrida's concentration on linguistic markers in the literary domain led to his assertion
that texts could never achieve stability of meaning or closure. But his focus on the minutiae of
discourse prevented him from seeing that the stability of truth of human behavior in extemal
reality could exist on a large scale�that, in other words, the whole could be greater than the sum
of the parts. There is a truth, found in the constancy of actions and activity, that transcends
definitions.^'
This tmth, then, is the basis for our understanding of who we are, why we do what we do,
and how we can change what we do. All these components of human existence are included in
the narrative. We are God's creation, specially chosen by him to bear his image and to enjoy
fellowship with him. Our sin, discontentment with and rebellion against his limits, severed us
from him and led us to engage in self-destmctive and alienating behavior. However, we can
begin to experience redemption in the power of the Spirit through faith in Christ Jesus, who
serves as the mediator between God and his creation, with the promise of total deliverance
someday. This is the identity-producing narrative; it is the gospel; it is the community-
constitutive story that binds Christians of all stripes together; it is the explanation of who we are,
why we do what we do, and how we can change what we do.
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When we plug ourselves into the story, we fmd a place for ourselves that is consistent
with the beginning and end of the grand story, but our own individual stories are yet to be told.
When we enter into and appropriate the "world of the text," as Ricoeur invites us to do, it is this
process that gives the text its fulfillment. Discourse is incomplete unless there is someone to
whom the discourse is directed and that someone receives the discourse. When the reader
accepts the author's proposal for how to be in the world, the world of the text and the world of
the reader intersect, marking "the realizadon, the enactment, of the semantic possibilities of the
text."^^ It should be noted that this process of appropriation is not a matter of the reader making
the text the reader's possession, but of surrendering to the vision of the text, giving up (at least
temporarily) one's ideas about how the world works and one's place in it. This process has
ethical ramifications as well, for the narrative provides the reader with a telos that shapes the
subsequent decisions to be made. "There is no ethically neutral narrative.
"^^
Additionally, in this unique version of appropriation, we become a text for interpretation
TO
as well. We understand our lives in light of the narrative and plan our future to align with the
telos of the story. This acceptance of ourselves as "text" further allows us to permit the existence
of self-deception because as a "text," we must constantiy hve in a perpetual state of
interpretation, a project that never achieves finality.^' Contrary to Descartes, Hume, and the rest
72ofmodemity, Ricoeur reminds us that the self "is never the subject one thinks it is."
Thiselton summarizes, "Ricoeur' s profound achievement was to undermine equally the
autonomous self which commands the center of the stage in high modernity and the reduced de-
centered self of postmodemity. This comes closest to the self of scripture."^^
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B. Unifying Gadamer and Ricoeur
The hermeneutical strategies of Gadamer (introduced in chapter two) and of Ricoeur
should not be understood in isolation from each other. While they are clearly different authors
who have achieved somewhat different conclusions using different methods/" their work is not
incompatible with each other. The majority of Ricoeur' s work in hermeneutics has come since
the publication of Gadamer' s magnum opus. Truth and MethodJ^ and he has favorably cited the
latter many times, sometimes even drawing on his arguments extendedly.
Essentially, Ricoeur places our lives within a larger narrative that provides us with insight
into our place in the world, while Gadamer places our lives within a larger community that helps
us to understand better both our own stories and the larger stories. The stories form the basis for
our identity, but the community gives us a broader perspective to more correctly understand our
identity than we could alone.
Both thinkers acknowledge the postmodern limits on the individual in terms of both
finitude and corruptibility, and both have given complementary strategies to overcome them
without brushing them aside. By removing the possession of truth out of the hands of the
individual, where it had resided in the modern era, and bestowing it upon the narrative itself and
the corporate body with whom we are in relationship, Gadamer and Ricoeur have preserved the
notion of truth while recognizing the need for its transformation.
Furthermore, the work of both thinkers implies an ethics of the Other, which we will
address in more detail in chapter four. However, it is sufficient to note here that Gadamer' s
concept of conversation, which entails respect for the other partner(s) in the exchange, and
Ricoeur' s respect for the otherness of the text both conclude with a respect for differences and a
hope of agreement, even in the midst of conflict. Both strategies are characterized by a
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deference and a humility in approaching the Other that should shape all our interpersonal
relationships.
IV. Conclusion
In our exploration of postmodem spirituality, we have leamed that�contrary to the
naturalistic impulses of the modern era�postmodems conceive of humans with an irreducible
component of religiousness. The religious being cannot be defined adequately as simply a needy
being; it is also a being with a desire and aspiration for otherness. The desire of the
postmodem, who acutely senses the limitations of human finitude and cormption, is at least to
come in contact with a reality deeper than one's own senses, though that desire is admixed with a
decisive drive for personal satisfaction and happiness.
While it would seem that such a shift in attitudes would be a boon to the church,
prompting seekers of God to come leam more about him, there has been no Great Awakening,
and most churches in America continue in plateau or decline. Much of the evangelical church
has not considered the emerging spiritual quest of postmodernism to be an opportunity, but has
instead viewed it simply as another indication of the worldliness of the culture because it has not
been expressed in rational, orthodox expressions of faith. It has asked uncomfortable questions
in Sunday School classes, has not dressed in acceptable clothing, and may still get dmnk on the
weekends while it is trying to figure out what it believes. And when it visits most traditional
evangelical churches, it can sense that it is out of place, an unwanted nuisance, a burdensome
imposition, so it leaves to continue on its own.
The narratival hermeneutics of Paul Ricoeur, in conjunction with the dialogical
hermeneutics of Gadamer, offer a way of grafting into the family of God those who are not
"church-broken." The inclusion into the story of the community gives identity, security, and
hope. It provides the seeker with a purpose, and it offers help and support in finding and in
realizing that purpose. It meets the needs of postmodern spiritual sojourners while at the same
time protecting them from the equally grave errors of heterodoxy and hypocrisy. It also offers
new possibilities for established believers to envision their spiritual lives in ways that they had
never considered before.
Even with these appropriations of postmodemism, however, important as they are, the
church may not experience any impact in the lives of postmodems until it addresses the crucial
topic of ethics. We tum now to such an examination, which represents perhaps the biggest
obstacle for postmodems considering the evangelical church.
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One of the more often noted characterisdcs of our current society is the decline of
traditional ethical standards; indeed, perhaps no element of culture has felt the change of
postmodemism more keenly than that of ethics. The revolutions in ways of thinking about the
self, extemal reality, and objective tmth have utterly transformed the ethical assumptions of
Westemers and the ways they make ethical decisions. The moral consensus that was once
assumed has now dissipated as reladvism and diversity flourish.
That such a transformation has taken place should not be surprising. A society's ethics
flow out of its spiritual and religious moorings. That is, the spiritual beliefs of a culture define
the good and the telos of humanity, while ethics serve as the bridge between the actual state and
that desired telos. When a civilization experiences a radical transformation in its understanding
of spiritual realities, it is inevitable that its ethics should change accordingly as well. A dramatic
change in the goal presages a significant modification in how to arrive at that goal. Thus, with a
psychologized spirituality, we have emerged with a psychologized ethics.
I. The Impact of Psychology on Ethics
As we saw in the last chapter, the culture has largely tumed to psychology to answer
what were once "religious" questions: who we are, why we do what we do, and how we can
change what we do. Therefore, the religious concepts of sin and salvation have been repackaged
in psychological ways that excise from them the implication of moral judgment. This, then, is a
spirituality that is in many ways unconcemed with ethics as tradidonally understood and that
does not prescribe morals.' histead of character, it is concerned with achieving power over
anxiety, addicdon, self-alienadon, guilt, etc.�in short, one's daily functioning." As the ultimate
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goal of the human life has changed, the ethics, the means to that goal, have also undergone
transformation, now in line with the psychological goals of the new spirituality.
If the new spiritual telos is the achievement of personal fulfillment and psychic
wholeness, then the ethical imperative for each person is to find and engage in whatever
contributes to his or her own contentment. On a societal level, the ethical injunction is to allow
each person the freedom to engage in this search. This, then, is an ethics mostly absent the
contribution and support of the wider community in favor of a localized group of those who have
arrived at similar conclusions conceming what is fulfilling for them; in fact, the only mandate for
the broader society is to get out of the way and to leave the individual alone! An essential
component of such an outlook is the resolute principle that no one way of pursuing happiness
and fulfillment is better than any other way�the only authorized arbiter of determining the
worthiness of one's path is the individual whose path it is.
This characteristic of postmodern ethics is in direct parallel with the privatized and self-
oriented postmodem spirituahty, for, since personal satisfaction means something different for
each person, it comes within the domain of one's freedom. In this way, this characteristic of
postmodem society is inextricably linked to the postmodern viewpoint regarding the ultimate
spiritual goal of humanity�the acquisition of happiness. The private and self-oriented
spirituality of postmodernism has produced a private and self-oriented system of ethics, which
can best be summarized under the mbrics of individualism and egalitarianism.
In assessing the moral stance of the country in contrast to the America of the past,
cultural analyst Robert Bork identifies two culture-wide moral precepts that have been part of
America since the beginning, but have now become radicalized in postmodemity: individualism
and egalitarianism. According to Bord, in modemity, these impulses were tempered by various
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forces that restrained them from extreme expressions. The fear of want in cooperation with a
cuhure-wide stable family system, church, and other private associations produced a restraining
effect on individualism and egalitarianism that limited their harshness. But the decline of these
restraining institutions in conjunction with widespread affluence has led to the radical
expressions of these concepts."*
Radical individualism is demanded in areas in which people wish to be unhindered in the
pursuit of pleasure, finding expression especially in sexuality and the popular arts. It is in these
situations that nearly any individual choice is acceptable. This is coupled, however, with a
radical egalitarianism, which denies that anyone can be superior to anyone else, or that any group
could be superior to any other group. In situations where one could conceive of competition and
being better than another, then, we are pressed into a state of utter equality. Such a philosophy is
motivated by the desire to protect people from their failures, the acknowledgement of which
could lead them to have a poor opinion of themselves and prevent them from achieving
happiness, the attainment of which lies at the heart of postmodern ethics.
These complementary movements have created a culture of self-authentication, anti-
institutionalism, anti-authority, and relativism, embodied in the only ethical injunction put on
postmodem Americans: tolerance.' To criticize, or to be "intolerant" of, another person is to do
more than voice personal displeasure; it is to appeal to a common standard, which
postmodemism rejects. Although the Enlightenment also stressed individual autonomy.
Enlightenment autonomy did not result in a postmodem-type antinomianism because of the
presuppositions of the universal, knowable Natural Law, which everyone agreed on.^ But with
the departure of a belief in universal reason and universal ethics, the modern moral consensus
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has evaporated, individual autonomy has been radicalized,^ and ethical restrictions on behavior
become difficult to impose.
Traditional, modernist ethics involved living in accordance with a higher reality that
established fixed standards and rules for right and wrong. A sampling of ethical activities
according to this old standard might involve consistently telling the truth, treating elders with
respect, volunteering to work with the poor, or lending assistance to a stranded motorist.
Although such activities are not necessarily denigrated in the new ethical climate, neither are
they regularly heralded as acts of virtue. What is most often lifted up as an exemplary deed is
that which gives meaning and satisfaction to the doer; if the performer of the deed testifies that it
was instrumental to him or her in bringing worth to his or her life, that is all the authentication
any action demands. Thus, there has been a corresponding .decline in understanding any general
behavior as right or wrong, depending on where and how it is performed.
Without the encumbrance of desiring the approbation of the larger society, Americans
today largely make up their own rules, laws, and moral codes. Only 13% believe in all ten
o
commandments, and only 40% believe in even five out of ten. "For most people, religion plays
virtually no role in shaping their opinions on [many issues] . . . Most people do not even know
their churches' position on [those] issues."^
The only conclusion to draw from this transition to the individual as the determiner of is
or her own morality is that the church has failed at the task ofmaking disciples. It has neglected
its duty to articulate convincingly its own vision of who we are, why we do what we do, and how
we can change what we do, capitulating de facto to the narrative of psychology, with the result
that much of American Christianity is only nominal, as commitment to the local church and to
biblical Christianity is on the decline. '� If such people are in church regularly at all, they do not
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find its teachings relevant to their lives in any significant way, and they do not feel any
compunction about holding unorthodox positions on what constitutes the good and the right. Is it
any wonder, then, that only 34% of Americans read a Bible outside of church services in any
given week?'
' The culture has become more formative for their ethics than the church, which
has been reduced to a mere social club. The result is a fragmented "taste culture" that boasts an
infinite variety of styles, hmited only by the imagination of its inhabitants,'^ and the postmodern
age becomes the one shaped by the loss of a vision of humans as moral beings.'^
Such an ethics focuses on acceptance and overlooking shortcomings in others. Since we
are all in a process of overcoming our own personal limitations and psychological "issues,"
claims the culture-forming myth asserted by postmodems, everyone should simply recognize and
celebrate the differences that accentuate our society, giving nearly any behavior the benefit of the
doubt and a moral pass. The prevailing moral consensus, as we noted above, is a stance of
"tolerance," which no longer means putting up with or enduring what one finds disagreeable, but
rather finding nothing disagreeable.
Of course, such an ethical stance mns counter to the teachings of most religions, which
do not unite with each other precisely because they do find each other disagreeable. But such
convictions are no longer acceptable in a postmodern milieu, and many postmodems seek ways
to escape the negative emotions connected with previous experiences of religious "intolerance."
Because spiritual growth in postmodemity is considered to be tied to the psychological concept
of self-actualization, therapeutic language, drawn from the psychological cultural narrative of
well-being, is used to supplant the fear, anxiety, guilt, and shame associated with traditional
religious teachings and practices. Self-worth and self-esteem are the top priorities in this
endeavor.'" In this way, personality has become more important than character in determining
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an individual's worth or attracdveness'' because we are left without any mutual means of
evaluating character.
One example of this phenomenon was the cultural reacdon to the Clinton-Lewinsky
scandal. One contingent of the country judged the president's actions to be those of a soulless,
rudderless appetite incarnated, with no moral awareness or attempt at decorum or modesty, in
accordance with a modernist notion of ethics. This group evaluated his character according to an
objective, predetermined standard of right and wrong behavior. A second section of society
found his sexual activity with an intern distasteful�abhorrent even�but irrelevant to the job of
presidency and his attempt at a cover-up understandable, given the circumstances, in line with
the postmodem freedom to find one's own source of personal fulfillment. This group still
evaluated his character positively based on the policies that he advocated and what they judged
to be the overall positive impact of his presidency on the country. With these two
incommensurable appraisals of the character of the Clinton presidency, it was ultimately his
charismatic personality that counted with the third slice of citizens, who really did not think in
terms of character at all.
Postmodem America has accepted the notion ofmorality as an entirely social constmct,
rather than a reflection of some higher reality, such as the divine character. Therefore, if the
larger society�or even one's subgroup�has agreed on new and different conventions, it simply
means that a new definition for morality has been forged; these social relationships are the only
way we have to identify what is and is not moral. Morality changes according to time, place,
and dominant attitudes. Thus, morality is a fluid concept, free to take on new shapes and
appearances if demanded by a new cultural climate. "No responsibility is felt for the nurture of
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social continuities or multi-generational moral tradition" because it does not matter if a culture's
conception of ethics remains constant or not.'^
Additionally, the fact that the culture recognizes itself to have "seen through" the artifice
ofmorality means that our particular cultural climate is one that is comfortable with a wide
latitude of acceptable variation and personalization. As a result, the dominant, culture-wide
consensus is that an individual is free to construct a workable system of morality that achieves
one's own particular spiritual goals of personal fulfillment, hi the end, it is not the specific
moral choice that is important but the choosing itself; if the individual has freely chosen, the
1 8
specific choice is almost irrelevant.
This privatized, self-oriented ethics is the result of carrying the logic of individualism and
egalitarianism to the extreme; our culture has now pursued happiness so far that it has arrived at
a dead end, wrapped up in an unsatisfying preoccupation with the self.'^ This heightened
emphasis on a psychological spirituality and ethics has resulted in a "no-fault society." As
personal responsibility loses ground to environmental and physiological factors, a never-ending
circle of blame strikes everywhere and nowhere."" In contrast to President Truman, our culture
cries, "I never even saw the buck. The buck never got here." Instead, responsibility for one's
psychological shortcomings falls to one's parents, teachers, community, and biochemical
composition. Though postmodern people know deep down that there is something unsatisfying
about constantiy shifting blame and abrogating responsibility, they lack any means of fixing the
problem or of replacing their outlook with another,^' so they are doomed to wallow in a bog of
blameworthiness, radiating out from the self, indiscriminately cast on anything with which it has
had contact.
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One of the telhng signs of this transition has been an intensification and amphficadon of
the language of human rights. As we noted above, individualism was certainly a concem of the
modem period, as politically demonstrated by the Bill of Rights in the United States
Constitution, which sought to protect the rights of individuals against the extension of
govemmental power. However, as the importance of the individual has been elevated even
higher in the postmodem period, the corresponding claims for individual rights have risen
accordingly. Americans now claim the right to financial security, access to health care,
prescription dmgs, and legalized homosexual marriage. The defining attitude of American
culture has moved beyond, "Everyone else is doing it; why shouldn't I?" to "She is doing it, and
why shouldn't she?" Choice and freedom, again, in the context of the pursuit of happiness, the
concept of which differs from individual to individual, have become the hallmarks of the
American spirit.
Any mode of behavior that holds the potential for overcoming the perceived suffering of
the postmodern life is open to investigation. This suffering of today is characterized by a
perceived lack of meaning; the only meaning that does exist is artificially constmcted through
popular culture (see chapter five). Life is seen to be hollow, while a preponderance of debts
from previous generations compounds daily, debts such as the ravages of the sexual revolution,
the nadonal debt, and a high divorce rate. Such problems are accentuated by a profound sadness
home from a series of wider major cultural problems and failures, such as AIDS, domestic abuse,
poor education, teen suicide, the various disappointments concerning respected institutions and
figures, environmental problems, dmgs, violence and crime, and on and on. In a few words, this
suffering is the result of not possessing viable solutions for the problems of the world that have
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materialized in this postmodem age."" Thus, the search for some of these solutions, any
solutions, is the spiritual joumey of the postmodern, and ethics the road the joumey takes.
II. A Postmodern Ethical Appraisal of Bibhcal Christianity
One of the most serious challenges of the postmodem period are the criticisms that
postmodems have leveled against the church in the arena of ethics. For most people within the
church, it may come as a surprise that Christianity could be challenged on ethical grounds. After
all, where have Westem ethics largely come from, if not from the Bible and the teachings of the
church? But with the advent of a spirit of anti-institutionalism, combined with a proclivity
toward skepticism, the church is suddenly open to much criticism and negative evaluation in the
postmodem age.
Among other things, Christianity has been denounced as inherently racist, sexist,
imperialist, intolerant, anti-pleasure, anti-freedom, anti-human rights, anti-environmental, and
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hypocritical. Some of these criticisms have become almost cliche in describing nearly any
aspect of traditional Westem culture, but to note that fact does not dismiss Christianity (or
Western culture) of such charges. The salient fact about the postmodem critique is that it is an
ethical disagreement with Christianity�it asserts that Christianity prevents the attainment of
personal satisfaction, the one common good of the culture. The charge is that Christian ethics is
itself unethical; consequently. Christian ethics has become a tremendous liability in the culture.
In fact, it is hardly ever Christian theology anymore that receives the bmnt of postmodem
antipathy, but Christian ethics. "It is not so much what Christians say about God that non-
Christians question as what Christians say about sex."'"* Part of the assertive stance that
characterizes postmodemism is the assumption of one's role as judge of religious institutions,
practices, and beUefs, dismissing any aspect that fails to conform to one's predilections,
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impulses, or predetermined nodons. As a result of this trend, "The religious scene is undergoing
fundamental changes of seismic proportions. Like almost everything in our culture today, there
is nothing sacred anymore, even in the realm of the sacred. . . taboos have been discarded in favor
of a wholesale re-evaluation.""'
One of the most common complaints about the church is its hypocrisy. Nietzsche
claimed that issues of value and power had been disguised by the metaphorical language of
religion as issues of truth. For adherents, he claimed that Christianity reinforced their selfish
preoccupation with their own advantage.
Christianity owes its triumph to this miserable flattery of personal vanity: it was precisely
all the failures, all the rebellious-minded, all the less favored, the whole scum and refuse
of humanity who were thus won over to it. The 'salvation of the soul'�in plain
language: 'the world revolves around me.'
But for those in power, the motivation was much more sinister. "Supreme principle: 'God
forgives those who repent'�in plain language: those who submit to the priest.""^
Despite the ferocity of this criticism, it nevertheless allows us as a church to see with new
eyes ways in which we perhaps have not lived up to our own standards, historically. Faults to
which we were blind in the past because they accorded with the spirit of the age can now be seen
for what they are�a failure to follow God with unswerving purity, hi fact, it is my contention
that the postmodem ethical cridque of Chrisdanity is ironically one of the most fmitful aspects of
postmodemism for the church.
III. Christian Postmodernism�An Ethics of the Other
One of the tasks of the church in the postmodern age is to own up to the fact that she has
not bequeathed a blameless legacy, that she has often in her history been party to violence
against the innocent, manipulation and exploitation of the powerless and defenseless, and
defamation and marginalization of women and many ethnic and religious groups�in other
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words, that Nietzsche and other detractors are sadly not very wide of the mark. The church has
sided with the rich for political gain and has sought worldly power to make itself more
comfortable. It has forced compliance with its commands of behavior and even belief, under
threat of imprisonment, torture, and death, all in the name of God.
History testifies against the church, telling a story of Constantinian corruption; papal
plottings; marauding, murderous Crusade mobs; infamous Inquisitions; rapacious religious wars;
scandalous slavery; the subjugation of "savages," executed under the banners of The White
Man's Burden and Manifest Destiny; the denial of democracy to women and minorities; the
compliance and collusion with capitalism and consumerism; the disregard and disrespect for the
protection and preservation of our planet; and the hypocritical hatred of homosexuals. It is a sad
and shameful tale, a woeful collection of episodes that in concert create a pattem of self-
aggrandizement and arrogance around the very ones who claim the blessing and approval of
God.
The church must take the blame for its shortcomings, must accept responsibility for the
atrocities it has wrought on those it should have protected and cared for. This story, furthermore,
should not be hidden from the view of its members. The children of Israel were not so proud that
they masked their greatest fadures, and neither should the church be. For better or worse, our
story is what it is, but the story, pockmarked as it may be, still contains the possibility and hope
ofmaturity and even redemption. In this postmodern age, so concerned with the limitations of
perspective, when we now have the opportunity to see how our perspective has often been
tyrannical, the church must seize the opportunity to recover an ethics of the "other."
The calls of postmodemism for tolerance and diversity, grounded in a guiding principle
of relativism, do not issue out of a secret desire for anarchical chaos (though some with a
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libertine agenda have co-opted the language of postmodemism for such a purpose). Rather, the
subjectivism and relativism stem from a caution necessitated by the realization that others, who
differ from ourselves in belief and behavior, may nevertheless have arrived at their beliefs and
behaviors in a reasonable way, just as we have. Reason does not inevitably lead to only one
conclusion, one "correct" way of being and doing. Furthermore, the comprehension that reason
is never dispassionate or disinterested means that postmodems must be wary of making final
judgments and must adopt a posture of humility with respect to the ways of others. The fact that
every relationship and every attempt at describing reality involves issues of power and that
power is a cormpting force means that everyone is cormpt at some level and that no one is pure;
with different descriptions of reality vying for positions of power, there is not even a mechanism
for determining what cormpt and pure are. Thus, postmodems are driven to try to understand
the motivations of others and the logic that is veded behind actions that are patently illogical�at
least from one perspective.
But these concems of the culture do not seem to have begun to permeate the
consciousness of much of the evangelical church. The tendency of conservatives is to reduce
religious tmth to propositions that serve as devices for our possession of tmth, but in fact these
propositions are themselves only the conclusions we have made from the actual revelation�in
other words, they are "the traditions of men" (Mk. 7:8). Once we become the ones who "have
the tmth," it is easy to excuse ourselves for dominating others, chiding them for their sins, or in
some other way manipulating or browbeating them. This realist metaphysics, explam
Middleton and Walsh, is "a metaphysics of violence... the direct result of seeking to grasp the
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infinite, irreducible complexities of the world as a unified and homogenous totality." The
organized system purchases its order at the price of repressing the voices that do not fit into the
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favored account of reality. This "violent closure of human thought. . . denies all heterogeneous
difference or dissolves it into a homogeneous unity, effectively co-opting, dominating, or
eliminadng that which is perceived as 'other. The evangelisdc strategy of "tum or bum" that
often results from such an idea of tmth depends on a manipulative strategy for its success. As
Dietrich Bonhoeffer observes, people who adopt such a tactic "set themselves to drive people to
inward despair and then the game is in their hands. . . And whom does it touch? A small number
of people who regard themselves as the most important thing in the world, and who therefore
like to busy themselves with themselves."^'
In contrast, a view of tmth that incorporates the hermeneutics of Gadamer and Ricoeur,
as suggested in chapters two and three, looks at tmth as the outcome of conversation with those
of other perspectives within the context of a narrative. This tmth is not amenable to possession,
only to being shared and enacted. Others may not be abused with it, only invited to join it. It is
strictly understood in holistic unity, never divided into categories, subsections, and line-item
propositions. In other words, it is a conception of tmth that entails an ethical orientation outside
of oneself, an ethics of the "other."
This ethics of the other is not a foreign concept to Christianity at all. Thiselton describes
the definition of agape, the Greek word most often used of Christian love in the New Testament,
as "creative regard for the Other; it is a love prompted by will, not by prior 'like-mindedness.'"''"
Agape-\o\e is the decision to overcome differences (without ignoring or minimizing them) by
deliberately engaging in non-manipulative service of the other with no hope of or investment in
benefit to the self The incamation of Jesus and his submission to cmcifixion serve as models of
the rejection of manipulative power in the church (Php. 2:5-8; Eph. 5:1-2). Christ repeatedly
urged his followers to surrender their bent toward self-interest in favor of service to God and to
104
others (Mt. 5:10-11; 22:37-40; Mk. 9:35; Lk. 6:27-38). Paul insisted on his sufferings as proof
for his authority as an apostle (2Co. 10-12). This is an ethics of the other that prefers others to
ourselves, that values their benefit more than our own (Ro. 12:10, 14-20; Php. 2:3).
With the basic structure for an ethics of the other in place, we will now turn to specific
examples of Christian behavior that might be modified by such an ethics, with a particular eye
toward evangelism. Before focusing on the implications of an ethics of the other for evangelism,
however, I will first briefly suggest directions of thought regarding its contribution to an
understanding of other races and other religions.
A. Other Races
Race in America is one of the most complicated and passion-filled problems we face
domestically today. Reminders are constant, whether it be the protests and resultant curfews in
Cincinnati following the police shooting of a young black man, or the election of George W.
Bush as president, for whom only 9% of non-whites voted.'
" The core of the race problem is the
unassailable reality that blacks and whites interpret life in America radically differently. From
the very beginning in the days of slavery through emancipation and civil rights, to the Watts
riots, Rodney King, and O.J. Simpson, the vast majority of blacks have experienced life in
America as oppressive, repressive, demeaning, and depersonalizing. Whites, for the most part,
have not understood these feelings of resentment, tmsting in their own magnanimity and notions
of universal well-being, hi this process of bifurcation, blacks and whites have developed ways
of speaking about "them," when safely in the company of one's own group, further reinforcing
the racial divide.^"*
An ethics of the other seeks to understand the perspective of the other rather than to be
understood. A white Christian,^' for example, should not participate in conversations about
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blacks that support stereotypes of laziness, poverty, drug use, violence, or promiscuity. No
assumptions should be made about the life experiences of another simply because of race.
Beyond these rather obvious observations, however, an ethics of the other demands that whites
should seek blacks out and listen to their stories in a spirit of affirmation that gives dignity to the
feelings and thoughts of the other. They should endeavor to understand what blacks mean by
"institutional racism" and why they support Democrats in nearly unanimous numbers. They
should acquaint themselves with the heritage of black Americans and listen to why the specter of
slavery still has a profound impact on the black mindset today. They should imagine what it
would be like to be unable to trace one's family tree, to be unwillingly separated from one's
ancestral customs, or to negotiate one's way through a world that is largely controlled by whites.
An ethics of the other is deeply interested in the equality of all races, as all races possess
equally the divine image. It searches for ways it can learn from the cultures of other races the
shortcomings of one's own people and the advantages enjoyed by other peoples. Our natural
inclination is toward the glorification of our own group and unbridled faith in the virtue of our
cultural pattems, but an ethics of the other seeks ways we have failed the other and how we can
repair it, if possible. An ethics of the other cares for the other and not only desires but works for
the well being of the other in tangible ways.
B. Other Religions
Most conservatives happily tmmpet exclusivist texts of Scripture, such as John 14:6 ("I
am the way and the tmth and the life; no one comes to the Father, but by me.") or Acts 4: 12
("There is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by
which we must be saved.") and cite them as evidence for the cormption of other religions. The
church denies that it has anything to learn from Buddhists, Muslims, or New Agers because they
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do not have the truths of scripture or the example of Christ. Such an a priori dismissal of other
religions fads to be either suspicious enough of itself or generous enough to the reasonableness
of the sincerity of others.
An ethics of the other does not let the church off so easily. It insists that, while salvation
is not available through Buddha, Mohammed, or the Earth Mother, that fact does not preclude
other groups from speaking correctly on some or many issues. Furthermore, the presence of true
revelation of the Bible does not mean that the church has necessarily interpreted that revelation
correctly or truly put into action the teaching of that revelation. In other words, even though
salvation is found only in Christ, in some circumstances, we might fmd that other religions are
right and Christianity (the religion) wrong. Christianity might find that it has much to leam
from other religions and even secularists�after all we have uncovered much of value from
secular postmodernists so far in this thesis!
Thus, rather than denouncing the legitimacy of other religions. Christians should spend
time engaging adherents of groups different than their own. Establishing a dialogue in which
one is eager to leam what the other has to offer creates an atmosphere in which an invitation to
the gospel comes not as a self-righteous declaration of superiority but a humble desire to share
the good news that one has found. It further affords the opportunity to grow in one's
understanding of others and perhaps to reformulate one's errant ideas. This means that
Christians should not assume they are automatically correct in an encounter with a non-Christian,
nor are they the spiritual experts. Instead, encounters should be approached as a possible
occasion for mutual leaming and benefit.
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C. Evangelizing the Other
In our discussion of a proper Chrisdan approach to other religions within the context of
an ethics of the other, we began to move into the arena of sharing our faith. I want to continue
that discussion because I think that this area serves as one of the most important and
misunderstood tasks of the church for both those within and those without it. Most Christians do
not understand the cultural climate of relativism and are thus hesitant to evangelize non-
Christians. They often assume that nonbelievers already have a set of beliefs that they are happy
with and do not want to amend, and/or that the unsaved have all understood the gospel message
and have rejected it as irrelevant to them. They look on the heathen as an unmitigated force of
cultural destruction, inflicting immorality and sin with reckless indiscriminateness. Non-
Christians, for their part, view the condemning messages of most Christians as interfering
attempts to control the lives of others with no understanding of new cultural realities that make
the old standards more difficult to accept than in the past. They also think that Christians are
monolithic regarding nearly all political and religious issues, and that they avoid independent
thought.^^
Because Christians tend to equate evangelism with the declaration of what they take to be
Christian morality, they focus on external behavior to the complete detriment of the state of the
heart. Such a stance seems to communicate to unbelievers a desire on the Christian's part to be
made to feel more comfortable rather than a genuine concern with the spiritual life of the non-
Christian. This confusion conceming how to relate to a culture that is unaware of the nature of
the gospel may fmd its solution in the example of Paul's address to the Athenians, recorded in
Acts 17. Like Paul, we are faced with a culture bursting with ignorance about the things of God,
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and it is imperative that we leam how to communicate His message to them in a way they can
hear. Paul adopts an evangelism strategy that accords with the ethics of the other.
First, we notice that Paul has simplified his message. Although only one speech is
recorded, we can discern that Paul's interaction with the Athenians was ongoing during his stay
there ("every day" v. 17). Every indication is that, in the framework of these dialogues, Paul has
constmcted a gospel (Gk. euangelizd v. 18) specifically for his Athenian audience. In contrast to
his previous speech pattems in Acts where he offers a fuller orbed presentation of his theology,
here Paul pares down the gospel to an introduction to a God the Athenians admittedly do not
know (vv. 23-25), a description of this God's providence (vv. 26-28), and a call to repentance
(vv. 29-31). This reveals Paul's consideration of the spiritual situation of his hearers, taking into
account what they will be able to understand.
Second, despite the ignorance of the Athenians, Paul establishes significant points of
contact; the ignorance is not of such a degree that it renders communication of the gospel
impossible for Paul. One such point of contact is the decision to preach in the agora, the main
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public space of Athens, the economic, political, cultural, and religious heart of the city. By
choosing to speak to the people there, he continued in a tradition used by itinerant phdosophers
and preachers of various types since the time of Socrates,''^ presenting either a challenging or
confirming system of thinking with the hopes of procuring a following. Another point of contact
consists in his use of the recognized rhetorical patterns of Greco-Roman speech, being sure to
clothe the "new teaching" (v. 19) in a familiar form that would be easily apprehended by his
audience. This would have accomphshed two things: 1) it would have created rapport between
Paul and his audience, giving him a better chance of being heard because he used their cultural
forms; 2) it would have made his arguments more intelligible to his audience since they came in
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a genre the audience accepted. Finally, he has also tailored the content significantly to reflect the
views and values of his hearers. Whereas Paul in other situations cites Jewish Scripture as
justification for his preaching, here he quotes the Cretan poet Epimenides"*' and the Stoic poet
Aratus of Cilicia in Asia Minor,"*^ because the Law and the Prophets carry no weight for the
Athenians. Rather, he uses individuals whom they would recognize as authorities; by zeroing in
on the threads of both Epicurean and Stoic philosophy (cf. v. 18) that accord with the gospel he
wants to preach, Paul forces them logically to allow his argument. By alluding to Greek ideas
and quoting Greek thinkers, however, Paul is not intimating that he agrees with the pagan
worldview they espouse. Rather, in a proto-deconstructionist way, he uses the words and
concepts to fit with his Christian teaching.
Finally, Paul's message was firmly grounded in the Jewish scriptures and tradition,
ensuring its faithfulness to the word of God. Though Paul did not quote a single scripture to his
hearers, everything he said was firmly grounded in divine revelation. The issue of idol worship
was a chief concern for Jews, and Paul's outrage at the sight of the idols (v. 16) at the beginning
of the narradve places him squarely within the stream of Jewish thought (cf Dt. 4:28; Ps.
113:12; 134:25; Isa. 40:18; 44:9-20; Wis. 13:5, 10; 15:3-17).^ Additionally, Paul's address
contains many allusions to the Jewish Scriptures. Essentially, his speech is a shortened version
of the primeval history in Genesis 1-11. Though he does not expressly use language identifying
humanity as created in God's image, Paul affirms such a concept by emphasizing the connection
that exists between the human and the divine. The rhetorical play that the reader who is familiar
with Judaism wUl catch is that the image ofGod is the only legitimate image in a worid of
idolatry."*'
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Based on Paul's simplified message, establishment of points of contact, and faithfulness
to the scriptures, we may draw several conclusions about evangelism to the ignorant in the vein
of an ethics of the other.
> The church must familiarize itselfwith the culture. It is imperative to be familiar with
the culture if one is going to have any impact on it. This includes exposing oneself to
things he/she may find uncomfortable or even provocative (v. 16).
> The church must recognize the culture as a legitimate conversation partner in the
approach to God. Paul did not condemn "some of your poets" (v. 28), but he used
them to show where their seeking and groping after God (v. 27) leads, if successful.
> The church mustfmd points ofagreement with the culture. Music, movies, news,
sports, or almost any type of cultural phenomenon can illustrate Christian principles.
If Christians use these events�which already enjoy influential status in the culture�
in the proclamation of the gospel, rather than Bible verses, listeners will be more
likely to hear the message as an intelligible one.
The church must know the Bible. Though Paul did not quote Bible verses to the
Athenians, that does not entail that biblical understanding is unnecessary. In fact, the
better one understands the messages of Scripture, the easier it wdl be for that person
to find points of commonality in the culture and to reshape the message in a new
cultural form. Paul's knowledge of the scriptures freed him to communicate the
gospel without once referring to the Bible, though it was the very foundation of his
message.
> The church must not compromise the gospel. While it is irresponsible to offend one's
hearers unnecessarily, it is also illegitimate to omit essential components of one's
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message out of fear that they might offend. Paul closed his speech with a call to
repentance (v. 30), a complete change of mind and life, an invitadon to see the world
in a radically different way, which included the resurrection of dead people, a
revoldng idea to the Athenians.
"k Above all, the church not be complicated in its message. Paul's address does not
mention Christ's crucifixion, the atonement, or the second coming; nonetheless, the
speech sets forth some of the basic elements of the gospel with an invitation to leam
more."*^ It is not necessary to load one's presentation with many doctrines; the
important thing is to point the hearer toward a relationship with God.
Paul's message respected the dignity and independence of his hearers by presenting a
message suited for their spiritual, cultural, and intellectual location that was nevertheless faithful
to the story of scripture. The church's responsibility, her mandate, is to replicate that process in
the new setting of postmodern America. Respect for the other will gain a hearing for the gospel
in today's agora of ideas. It will legitimate the right of Christians to be heard in a much more
significant way than the current incessant cries for equal access. As Thiselton notes, the ethics of
the other is in itself a profound apologetic in postmodemity.
It is as if Bonhoeffer said to Nietzsche from his Nazi prison: 'But not all Christian are as
you suggest. For even if you are right about "religion" as a human constmct, authentic
Christian faith lies in identification with the Christ who neither sought power by
manipulation, nor was "weak" in the sense of being bland, conformist, or world-denying.
He was "the man for others.'"'*^
"Any hope of a hearing for a Christian message of healing rides on the shoulders of those who,
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like Bonhoeffer, resist the temptation to use God and others for our own advancement." In
actuality, it is "cheap grace" that Nietzsche and postmodemism protest�and righdy so�they,
without any faith in God have given the lie to the self-gratifying beliefs of many Christians who
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have diluted the words of scripture. "Grace is represented as the Church's inexhaustible
treasury, from which she showers blessings with generous hands, without asking questions or
fixing limits. Grace without price; grace without cost!"'*^ hi contrast to this abuse, Bonhoeffer
wams, "When Christ calls a man, he bids him come and die."'� There is a cost to the grace, and
one discovers that only those who surrender their lives for the sake of Christ will truly find their
life in the end (Mt. 10:39).
IV. Conclusion
Reinhold Niebuhr remarks that it is the natural tendency of people to "allow themselves
to be seduced into operating manipulative power-interests by deceiving themselves into
interpreting their own actions as altmistic concems for the sake of the corporate stmctures to
which they belong."'' Whether the enlargement of one's power comes via the chimera of
national interest, a corporation, or the church, the drive to self-interest in groups is much more
deeply hidden and disguised but no less powerful and destmctive than that wielded by an
individual. It simply requires more diligence and intentionality to discem and root out.'
Christians must agree with Foucault that "everything is dangerous" because anything�including
Christianity�can be (mis)used to perpetrate violence against the other.
"
However, because postmodernism is right about instances ofmanipulative power
disguised as tmth claims, it does not legitimate the universal cynicism that all tmth claims are
reducible to quests for power. The acceptance of our history of failure to live up to the call of
Christ for his church affirms the concerns of postmodernism that have shined a spodight on our
hypocrisy and sin. However, in this age of cynicism and suspicion, "the only tme, credible
witness will be flesh-and-blood, non-manipulative regard for the other."''' It is only in
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embracing the vision of agape-love that the church can overcome the damage it has inflicted on
its reputation.
The non-Christian world is incapable of coming to a realization of the necessity of agape-
love because they do not have the spirit of Christ to lead them. They believe in open tolerance
because all they can see is the limitedness of their own perspective, h is not the job of the
church to denigrate their morality and criticize their behavior; we are called to be Christ's
ambassadors, representing his love to them by showing and sharing the higher way�the ethics
of the other. We will now tum to consideration of a postmodem presentation of Christianity by
examining the potency of postmodem pop culture.
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Another well-noted feature of the postmodern period is the unparalleled power and
continual presence of pop culture. Any United States resident that participates in any significant
way with the broader culture can perceive that movies, television, advertising, music, radio, and
the like have become the primary vehicles for communicating what it means to be a man,
woman, or American today. They shape public perception of marginalized groups, such as the
poor, the elderly, the disabled, and various ethnic and religious minority groups. Additionally,
they define the norms, delineating what clothing is trendy, what behavior is acceptable, and what
attitudes are proscribed.
Now the pop culture machine has expanded even to include media for differentiated
groups of Americans. Under the umbrella of the larger pop culture, sub-cultures have formed
around such unifying themes as body piercing, skateboarding, comic books, gardening, cooking,
and a million other activities and hobbies. For whatever interest any American has, there is sure
to be a cable channel (or several), a magazine (or several dozen), and/or a web site (or several
hundred) centered around that subject matter, dispensing advice, gossip, tips, and all sorts of
other specified information, establishing customs tailor-made for that one area of interest.
But there is a much more specific aspect of American pop culture that is interesdng for
one studying the postmodern world than simply its ubiquity. For, in its powerful omnipresence,
it has become a key transmitter, perpetuator, and supporter of American postmodemism, and, in
tum, it has become an essential element in the postmodem experience of ordinary Americans. In
this chapter, we will explore this symbiotic relationship, also touching on some related issues
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with technology and communicadon, which have had a parallel impact on the culture because of
their intertwined alliance with pop culture.
1. The Rise of Pop Culture
Pop culture, or popular culture, has been around at least since the beginning of the
twentieth century; what is new is its power over the broader society to shape values, attitudes,
behaviors, and understanding of the world. The term first originated with a perceived difference
between "highbrow" and "lowbrow" culture. The former might include such acdvides as the
opera, the theater stage, literature, or the symphony (essendally the traditional arts), while the
latter would encompass the Vaudeville stage, jazz music, melodramas, and penny arcades (what
we would more often consider to be exclusively entertainment).' Originally, this distinction
broke down along socio-economic lines, but eventually these lines blurred, as the upper classes
began to participate in more of the "lowbrow" cultural activities, though the distinction between
high and low culture is still with us.
This distinction has come under heavy attack in recent years, as a holdover from a
hegemonic system based on the supposed superiority of the rich and powerful. Differences
between high and low culture, good and bad entertainment, sacred and profane art, are seen by
postmodems to have been merely an attempt to retain power for the upper classes�the rich (who
controlled the definidons and agenda) portrayed themselves and their endeavors as high, good,
and sacred and those of the poor as low, bad, and profane. Even more interestingly, at the dme
that this division emerged, the rich were largely Anglo-Saxon Protestants, while the poor were
often immigrant Catholics. So, the postmodem argues, the differendadon between high and low
culture is best understood as having its roots in a cultural clash between the socially entrenched
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and those who did not share their Victorian values, rather than in any actual meritorious features
of the expressions of art themselves."
Much of postmodemism consists of just such a breakdown of distinctions, which, it is
argued, have served to perpetuate the authority and power of a mling elite. As Michel Foucault
has said, each society has its own "regime of tmth," which establishes standards for normalcy
and decency, thus legitimating the domination over those on the margins�the "abnormal" and
"indecent."^ In the case of the division between "high culture" and "low culture," the argument
can easily be buttressed by simple observation. For example, the artistic power of the brilhant
cinematography in Out ofAfrica or the powerful storyline of Schindler's List is unassailable�
surely these works are not diminished by their mode of presentation! Or consider the role of the
stage in Westem history: during the time of Shakespeare, the bawdy humor and propinquity of
brothels that accompanied the theater led to widespread denunciation by the Puritans who
composed the majority of the House of Commons;'' yet today the stage enjoys a high standing
among the highbrow. Such examples demonstrate that the capacity is high for the divisions that
have emerged between "high culture" and "low culture" to be simply arbitrary.
In this milieu, then, pop cultural forms, such as television, movies, and popular fiction
have gained a standing equal to that of the traditional art forms, such as visual art, performance
art, and literature. A rock concert may be considered as artistic as the New York philharmonic.
In the academy, various pop culture genres, such as comic books and television, have become the
object of serious academic inquiry with the same fervor as that given to historically regarded
literature. In addition, it may no longer be supposed that the highbrow do not really enjoy the
opera or the stage, as if the imaginary superiority of the medium eliminated from it the
considerations of money and entertainment, so often used to denigrate the popular arts.
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In the new context of appreciation for the value of pop culture, the way became clear for
the ascent in the perceived and actual importance of pop culture, and, indeed, it is now of such
importance in the definition of American society that an America without it is virtually
unimaginable. Now that we have considered this brief sketch of the ascendancy of pop culture,
we tum to an examination into the manner of its impact on the culture at large.
II. The Power of Pop Culture
The strongest element of pop culture, defined as the most persuasive, the most
widespread, the most familiar, and the most dominant, is indisputably television. It is the
postmodem medium extraordinaire. We will therefore direct our discussion mostly to TV,
though other forms of pop culture transmission will enter our view as needed.
1946 was the first year of commercial television, and by 1949, one million sets had been
sold in the United States. In two short years, that number was up to 10 milhon and by the end of
that decade, over 50 million television sets were in use. By the early 1980s, over 800 million
televisions were in operation throughout the world. Today, the average TV in the United States
is on for seven hours a day.' The exponential growth of television consumption in the United
States and throughout the world is incontrovertible and unchallenged.
The screen is no longer for us merely an external object; we enter its world as much as it
enters ours. The realities it portrays become an extension of ourselves, and we of it. As Grenz
has said, the screen is "an embodied form of our psychic worlds,"^ meaning that it represents to
us the meaning we attribute to our own lives. On this note, it is worth quodng Wells at length:
More people pass through our lives today, more quickly, than ever before. We are
exposed to an almost endless number of new people, new opportunities. With some of
our technologies the encounters are superficial and we are engaged little. Others,
however, intensify their relationships. This is tme of television, some of whose
characters become more real to us than the people next door, for our contact with the
person whose image we see is far more sustained, and perhaps far more pleasant, than the
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real people around the corner. This can certainly be the case in cyberspace. . . And it is
true of many a teenager's identity with a rock band, known only through their music and
videos, but which becomes more intense than many other personal relationships.^
Because of this habit of postmodems to appropriate the world of the television, the movie, or the
video, for the real world, they have come to thrive on narratives and stories. Such a medium is a
recognizable invitation to postmodems to insert themselves into the story, beyond simply
identifying with the characters but even imagining what the world of the narrative would be like
if they were a character in it.^ Conversely, an entire mode of conversation has emerged as
common in which the experiences of one's real life are compared to different movies and TV
shows; the screen has become a hermeneutical tool for interpreting life.
The power of the screen to produce an ontology in its viewers has had other effects as
well. Because television produces constant stimulation, it locates viewers in a continual
orientation to the now of the screen; as they become accustomed to having problems solved for
them through the course of the show, life becomes a passive activity. Television, thus,
discourages viewers from reflecting on the past�whether their own past or their culture's past�
or from planning for the future. Even shows that take place in a different temporal orientation
invite the viewer into the dramatic problems and situations of only that show. Thus, there is a
breakdown in the continuity between the past, present, and future, and a barrier is erected,
locating the viewer in "a perpetual present."^ Middleton and Walsh assess television's
orientation to the present as perfect for the postmodem self.
A constantiy reconstmctible self with no stable core requires a world of fleeting images
to provide material for its reconstmction. Having no substance in itself, the saturated self
must be constantly fed with images that it can take up, mimic, be entertained by and then
discard.'"
Such characteristics inherent to television have caused it to be considered a necessarily
postmodem genre. But in recent years, television has become even more of a force for
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postmodemism through developments in the industry itself. For example, the old standard was
for shows to have a linear plot, a single hero, and a single, unified ending, but this formula has
been replaced in the majority of shows, particularly dramas. In shows like ER and Boston
Public, one finds many characters (none of whom could be called a main character), many
interspersed plots with little relation to each other, and only occasional endings. The viewer
must be aware of simultaneous plots in which the characters are involved in order to understand
what he or she sees. As another example, let us compare the murder mystery genre. Shows such
as Perry Mason, Dragnet, Columbo, Murder, She Wrote, and Matlock dealt almost exclusively
with the events of the crime and the inevitable solution that came at the end, deduced through
copious attention to the facts, evidence, and details of the crime. Postmodern crime shows, such
as Law & Order, NYPD Blue, and LA Law, spend significant time exploring the internal feelings,
processes, and reactions of the characters to the events of the story, and nabbing the bad guy will
often take a back seat to the personal lives (often involving sexual exploits) of the characters.
Lastly, we should not permit this discussion of the new style of television to pass before
commendng on the rise of so-called reality television shows (which, in reality, are so remote
from the average person's experience of reality that the title feels like a marketing tactic). These
real-life soap operas are constmcted as quasi-game shows, where the "contestants" kick each
other out of the "game" until the most popular (or most cunning) is left. But the game is really
secondary; the most interesdng aspects of the show to the viewers are the conflicts that arise
among the contestants and the revelation of their private thoughts in on-camera interviews that
the other players cannot hear. The shows are driven by these conflicts, which carry on from
week to week without resolution, until the game is over.
123
This "infusion of the inchoate into the popular culture" finds its acme in MTV, whose
surreal videos signal a full breakdown of a rationally coherent universe.
' ' MTV dispenses
moods and emodons in non-narrative form, cutting right to the viewer's feelings and bypassing
the mind direcdy. As Middleton and Walsh comment, "The postmodem subject does not need a
coherent world; MTV makes sure that he or she does not get one."'^ The multitude of images
found there are easily detached from whatever reference to reality they may have originally had,
and the viewer is encouraged to supply whatever meaning he or she enjoys. I was once listening
to an interview with the rock star Sdng, who was describing the making of his hit song, "If I
Ever Lose My Faith in You." The interviewer asked him who the song was written to, and the
artist replied that it was not actually written to anyone. He went on to declare that that ambiguity
was the great part about that song; the listeners could appropriate the lyrics and apply them to
God, their lovers, their friends, even themselves! This is the quintessential postmodem
sentiment�the song itself has no stable meaning, adjusting according to the interpretations
assigned to it by the hearers. In this manner, the images in the postmodern pop culture circulate
and interact in a ceaseless, centerless flow.
We have observed how entertainment television, consisting of fiction, reality game
shows, and music videos, have had an impact on the culture, but information television, made up
of the news and news magazine shows, is within our purview as well.''' In many respects, the
mass media have become the arbiters of reality, deciding for the country what is important and
even what is real. "Anything not submitted to the 'ontological test' of being aired on television
is relegated to the periphery of hfe in contemporary society."" One sad example of this
phenomenon played itself out after the school shooting this year in San Diego, California, at
Santee High School. Many of the media-savvy pupds at that school, when they heard there had
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been a shooting, quickly rushed home to change their clothes and fix their hair for the impending
television cameras. When the media arrived, these children waved their arms and ran up to
them, claiming to know the alleged shooter and details about his family life. They knew that this
might be their only opportunity to be important, that is, to be seen on TV.
III. Pop Culture as Ontology
So we see that pop culture has now become a major meaning-making system for
contemporary American society.'^ This is due to the fact that it has replaced the community as
the determiner of role, identity, and being. The small, cohesive, united community, which was
formerly located in a place, provided an expectation for the individual concerning his or her
position(s), privileges, and responsibilities within that community. Membership in the
community had requirements and provided structure, but due to the mobility of the contemporary
era and the postmodem ethos that declares every decision as valid and as acceptable as any other,
the community no longer holds sway in the postmodem era. Postmodems derive their identity
and learn their manner of being from the pop culture, which is everywhere and nowhere, and
which places no arduous burdens on them.
The population group least oriented to a community and most postmodem in outlook is
the young. Expectedly, they are also the most common participants in pop culture. For
Generation X, the pop culture has become the locus for their lived theology; they use the pop
culture themes of anti-institutionalism, emotional experience, suffering, and ambiguity in
religious ways, finding in them a way to connect to the human condition throughout time.'^
But the pop culture is not specific; it emits the same signals to people in Appalachia as it
does to those in Beverly Hills and Des Moines. It does not know the people to whom it
transmits, and it has no insights into their special talents or potential. Thus, when the public
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world rises in importance and cuts des to place, community, and family, it is incapable of
fulfilling all the functions that those des once did. The postmodem is left characterisdcally alone
and aimless in a homogenized world of mass culture.'^ Middleton and Walsh identify the
postmodern condition as one of "homelessness," in which "the notion of a settled home or a
stable world is, after all, an illusory modem (and premodem) constmction that can no longer be
believed."'^ There are no longer any points of departure or arrival, just an endless whirl of
games, shows, and imaginary identides.
This sense of unreality, being adrift, and lost connections is symptomatic of a highly
urbanized, technological world. Technology, as the legitimating myth of the society with
nearly unanimously unquestioned allegiance, "presents itself with religious force, combining
seemingly inevitable developments in the social infrastmcture with belief in the unassailable
sanctity of these developments.""' But technology is no longer a religion that promises
deliverance, as it did in the modem era; the postmodem version of the religion of technology no
longer accepts any hope for release from the limitations of subjectivity and self-interest.
Postmodems know that technology will not bring peace or even an improved life, but it will
bring a faster life and a life ofmore experiences, thus rendering life more fulfilling to
postmodems. Though it no longer holds promise for the achievement of paradise, for the tasks
of blurring boundaries, creating unlimited choices, and uncovering infinite potential experiences,
it is efficiendy perfect�not a philosophy or an ideology that must be maintained, but simply an
accepted fact of contemporary life. Like the medieval Church or the First Amendment, it
organizes and influences virtually every aspect of society, commanding vast resources and
affecting the power of nations in the intemational arena.^^ As technology becomes increasingly
faster, cheaper, smaller, and better, it propels the American fascination with the modo, the most
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recent thing, as an unparalleled virtue."^ As a result, creadvity, imaginadon, skill, meaning,
excellence, and beauty are all traded for novelty. The more outrageous something is, the more
"creative" it is considered to be?''
Technology has also led to the unequaled disseminadon of information that characterizes
our postmodem era; information has replaced the manufacture of goods as the key industry in the
country. With our information society functioning as an efficient, organized, global
communication network, we can gain information from anywhere on earth instantaneously. This
information often manifests the cultural diversity throughout the earth; in fact, the multiplicity of
messages and perspectives is at times overwhelming. This whole process further advances the
postmodem bent toward pluralism, diversity, and eclecticism, encouraging those inundated by
the barrage of information to forgo trying to evaluate it (which is a hopeless challenge, anyway),
and instead to simply incorporate it piecemeal into one's life joumey. This juxtaposition of
diverse, mostly unrelated pieces of information blurs for the postmodem into a fragmented
jumble of puzzle pieces, which are constantly exchanged but never connected to each other.
Gergen graphically describes this process:
We fmd technology and life-style operating in a state of symbiodc interdependence. The
technology opens opportunities, and as these opportunities are realized, the person
becomes increasingly dependent on the technology. The technologies engender a
multiplicitous and polymorphic being who thrives on incoherence, and this being grows
increasingly enraptured by the means by which this protean capacity is experienced. We
enter the age of techno-personal systems."
This experience of technology and communication is both helpful for and helped by the
universality of pop culture. Pop culture is increasingly technology- and informadon-driven, as
the media themselves require progressively faster technology to contend with their competitors,
and pop culture consumers seek higher definition, resolution, and clarity in their stereos and
televisions. There is also an insatiable drive for more and more information; because
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information is useful in a specific field, there is a competition for who can acquire the most
massive trove of information. The more information one can acquire in a specific area, the more
strategic that person can be in positioning one's company, one's product, or oneself in the
marketplace. The demand for technology and information increases unendingly, and pop
culture, the ever-present cultural authority, ensures that they will be delivered.
IV. Christian Postmodernism�A Theology of Images
A. Examining Images
The dominance of pop culture in America is undeniable; America has become a nation
oriented around the screen and, to a lesser extent, the stereo. The omnipresence of such powerful
society-forming forces, which are concentrated around the production of images, suggest for the
church the need to develop a thoughtful analysis of the role of images in the establishment of
culture, behavior, and worldviews. Whether the dissemination of images holds promise or peril
(or both), it is the church's task to submit it to the examination of scripture so we can determine
our proper stance toward it.
The images of pop culture, while not always occurring within a narrative, per se�as in
the case of MTV�still always occur within a context, hi addition to the contexts generated by
the familiarity of the genres in which they occur, images also appear within the specific contexts
created by the words and sounds that surround them, hi other words, the pop culture does not
broadcast indiscriminate images without reference to a storyline, a lyric, a conversation, or some
other accompanying language. The images of pop culture, then, serve to enhance and to be
enhanced by the word-context in which they arise, a situation quite parallel to images, motifs,
and "word pictures" used in literature.
In reading scripture in its totality, we find that it is filled with images that serve as
metaphors for various components of life, most of these occurring within the context of
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narrative. Creation, rest, covenant, promise, community, sacrifice, servanthood�each of these is
essential to understanding God and our relationship with him. They are images located in
scripture that draw parallels between our relationships with other humans and our relationship
with our God. Furthermore, we fmd that scripture builds on these images progressively, adding
new facets to our understanding of each as God's reveladon unfolds. Thus scripture exists as a
centuries-long conversation of the biblical writers, who engaged in a process of refining,
retooling, recoloring, and reforming old images and establishing new images that together served
as the formative components of the people of God. They weaved these images together,
inspiring and challenging their readers to aspire to the pictures of right living, painted by their
symbolic words.
The language of scripture then, is largely metaphorical, image-laden language. Allan
Coppedge asserts that, in fact, this is inevitable in the communication process between an infinite
God and a fmite creation.
Human language is necessarily all confined to the world of creation. Recognizing our
dilemma (particularly the finiteness of our perception), God has condescended to use
language from the created world to describe His own transcendent being. Working with
Oft
terms from creation and personal relations, God tells us what He is like."
Significandy, this sounds rather like Derrida, who made the claim conceming all human
language that since it was interminably intertwined with finite perspective, it was also
necessarily incapable of achieving the standards of tmth demanded by the correspondence
theory. Words themselves are always incomplete, never arriving at any singular or definitive
meaning, according to Derrida. This use of analogy means that all messages of language,
including the images of scripture, are both like and w/ilike the reality they attempt to describe.
We understand the concept of power because of our partial experience with it in this world, so
when the Bible describes God as "powerful," we know that it is similar to each of our individual
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ideas of power. But because it is analogical language, we know that God's power is stiU
somehow different than our conceptions.^^
As we have already leamed, many postmodemists, such as Lyotard and Derrida, in
perceiving the inability of humans to reach the standards of the correspondence theory of tmth,
claim we cannot grasp reality or present tmth at all. Theology has more at stake in this loss of
belief in tmth than probably any other branch of leaming because it alone among the disciplines
seeks to establish critically informed tmst, while radical postmodemism is grounded on
suspicion. Not only does theology claim to salvage tmth out of the swamp of self-interest, self-
aggrandizement, and manipulation, it also claims that at its heart is the paradigm of non-
manipulative love, "namely the theology of the cross and the free gift of resurrection."^^ The
skepticism of postmodemism has proven to be a much more viable threat to the tmth-claims of
Christianity than the materialistic, naturalistic attacks of modemity ever were."*"
But fortunately, the hermeneutics of Ricoeur and Gadamer once again assist us in at once
acknowledging the seriousness of the postmodern assessment and not allowing ourselves to be
dragged down into the nihilism of despair. A narratival and conversational conception of tmth is
3 1
particularly amenable to the use of image and metaphor. Narratives and conversations
constantly explore relationships between different, often disparate, elements, probing how things
may be like or unlike other things. Such a process helps us to place these things in their proper
context and establishes their position viz. ourselves and other participants in the narrative or
dialogue.
The main caution that should be noted in the use of images, which is to say the
shortcoming of all language, is incompletion. Because images approach a subject from only one
perspective and are both like and unWkt the thing described, no one image must be permitted to
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dominate other images. A biblical, and therefore Chrisdan, use of images will avail itself of as
many images as possible so that the presentation of God and his interaction with the world that is
set forward by the church is as balanced and representative of the whole of Christian revelation
as we can make it.''^ Additionally, individual models of such central and wide-ranging concepts
as salvation, atonement, and sin should be accompanied by disclaimers and caveats; such
qualification will prevent the concepts from being skewed by domination of one biblical image
over another."
" If we have an incomplete picture of what God wants or who God is, we will not
connect with him in the manner he plans for us to.
One of the reasons for God's revealing Himself in multiple roles is that if we are to
properly relate to Him, we must have the whole picture of what He is like. . . A much
more holistic understanding of God's character is necessary if one is to properly relate to
Him as He desires. . . The roles of Judge and King must be balanced with the pictures of
God's immanence, which we find in His roles as Father and Shepherd.^'^
To summarize our exploration to this point, we noted the importance of images in pop
culture and therefore for the production of postmodem notions of identity and selfhood. We then
encountered a parallel situation in the examination of scripture's approach to images. It stands to
reason, then, that the church should be eager to employ images, metaphors, and pictures in its
transmission of God's message to postmodems. This means a reversal of the modern church's
tendency to preference the didactic portions of scripture, such as the epistles�which are
amenable to abstraction, analysis, and propositional formulations�at the expense of the gospels
and much of the Old Testament. Now we tum to an investigation into what such an image-
controlled theology might look like.
B. Appropriating Images
1. The Image of Home
As we observed in our explication of pop culture, the postmodem person is a being
without a home; there is no spot in his or her experience that serves as a center or a point of
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orientation. The postmodem's is a joumey without a destination. The Simon and Garfunkel
song, "Homeward Bound," while on one level a description of the life of the traveling musician,
is at the same dme a descripdon of the postmodem life, which is never homeward bound.
I'm sittin' in the railway station.
Got a ticket for my destination, mmm
On a tour of one-night stands.
My suitcase and guitar in hand.
And every stop is neatly planned
For a poet and a one-man band.
Homeward bound.
I wish I was
Homeward bound.
Home, where my thought's escapin'
Home, where my music's playin'
Home, where my love lies waiting
Silently for me
Every day's an endless stream
Of cigarettes and magazines
And each town looks the same to me
The movies and the factories
And every stranger's face I see
Reminds me that I long to be
Homeward bound.
Tonight I'll sing my songs again.
I'll play the game and pretend.
But all my words come back to me
In shades of mediocrity.
Like emptiness in harmony�
I need someone to comfort me.
Homeward bound.
I wish I was
35
Homeward bound.
This song, as a picture of postmodern life, illuminates the constmcted nature of our interactions
with each other. Every encounter with another is "neatly planned," never genuine, never
revelatory of our tme feelings or thoughts. The artifice of this "game" is constantly present to us
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as we hear the mediocrity of our own words and their tepid, half-truth inadequacy that makes
them palatable to others but never to ourselves. We long for a place where we can be true to
ourselves, our thoughts, our hearts, yet where we will still be loved and comforted�a home. We
wish there were such a place that served as an orientation to our world, but, sadly, every place
looks the same�there is no differentiation. We are always "guitar in hand," ever on the move,
continually emerging, never arriving, and so, in postmodemity, we are road-weary.
Homelessness is a kind of disorientation, a sensation of being out of balance or out of
kilter, easily lost, turned around, and mixed up. Places, customs, and language are all unfamiliar.
Home functions as a (more than merely physical) point of orientation around which our
world is rendered meaningful. There is a geography of home which consists of more than
the lay of the land. Our unique topography involves more than merely our topos as a
point on a map, important as that is. Home is an axis mundi?^
This desire to come home, to be rooted, to find security, to be aware of one's axis mundi, is "an
apparently common longing of the human soul," and in God's providence, he has provided a
home for the homeless. For every desire, there seems to be a satisfaction for it: for hunger, there
is food, for thirst, hquid, and for the yearning for home of the "resdess nomad"' of
postmodemism, there is a home.
On one level, this world is our home, for that is the purpose for which it was created.
And God blessed them, and God said to them, 'Be fmitful and multiply, and fill the earth
and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the birds of the air and
over every living thing that moves upon the earth.' And God said, 'Behold, I have given
you every plant yielding seed which is upon the face of all the earth, and every tree with
seed in its fmit; you shall have them for food (Gen. 1:28-29 RSV).
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The creation, as a gift from God, implies an identity for us as grateful caretakers, homo gratus.
But because of sin, the world became disorienting to us in a way that it was never intended to be,
so its capacity to serve as our home is limited. This is the discovery of postmodernism in its
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repudiation ofmodem opdmism, but that tmth does not eliminate the role of creation as our
home entirely.
On a second level, God has established the community of the people of God as a home
for humanity. With God the Father giving leadership and guidance, the brothers and sisters in
Christ have a role as supporters, encouragers, exhorters, and helpers to each other in discovering
identity, purpose, and value for each member of the family. The family of God means that
Christians must live in community, not as independent, isolated, autonomous individuals. We
have both a responsibility for the assistance of others and an obligation to mutual submission, as
modeled by the firstbom, Jesus. This partaking in our home community forms us through
repeated participation, instmction, and fellowship.
While residents require only 'cash and a map,' inhabitants 'bear the marks of their
places,' and when uprooted, they get homesick. . . For the inhabitant, there is a place of
dwelling in which one finds identity and from which one derives meaning and apart from
which one feels a bit lost and lonely.'^*^
Despite these provisions of home here on earth, however, our supreme home is not yet
part of our experience. The creation is fallen, the church fails to live up to its promise, and so the
world longs for redemption (Ro. 8:22). Uldmately, our home is in heaven, where we will enjoy
tme fellowship, where we will no longer feel the ravages of sin's disorientadon. Thus, the
message of the church is one of affirmation of the postmodem's sensadon of homelessness. The
invitation to Christ is an invitation to join the community of the homeless who nevertheless
know where home is. To join the church is not to arrive fully at home, but it is to be "homeward
bound" (cf. Jn.-14:2).
2. The Image of Incorporation
Perhaps the paradigmatic example of a modem expression of evangelicalism would be
the tradition of dispensadonalism, which intends to divide human history into various epochs, or
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dispensations, which serve as barriers, demarcating the manner of God's activity respecting his
created order. In the current dispensation, for example, according to most dispensadonalists, the
canon is closed, and the Holy Spirit no longer gives revelation for the church as he did in past
dispensations. Dispensationalism dwells in the land of singularity, organization, classification,
finality, rationality, totality, and systematization�the perfect representative of modern
sympathies. However, the system of dispensationalism fails to contend with a strain of
incorporation (rather than division) that runs throughout scripture. From the call of Abraham to
the close of Revelation, there is a consistent agenda to establish the continuity of the community
of God's people.
Throughout the Old Testament, God identifies himself as the God of Israel's ancestors,
Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. He affirms his trustworthiness on the basis of the mighty works
accomplished during the Exodus and in creation. He condnually reaffirms the promises that he
swore to the patriarchs and makes new promises to Israel. He consistently recalls the covenant
he made with Abraham and the one established at Mt. Horeb. Through the rite of circumcision,
each newborn Jew is incorporated into the community of those who follow the one true God.
God's standards for his community remain constant�faithfulness to the covenant, compassion
for the powerless, purity in worship.
The condnuity of the Old Testament is apparent to most and needs htde argumentadon,
even for dispensationalists. However, the New Testament too is predicated on its conformity to
the story of Israel, a surprising claim to most post-Reformation Protestants, who often perceive
division and antipathy between the covenants. Certainly, we see the claims of fulfilled prophecy
in the Gospels and Jesus' explicit support for many of the Ten Commandments, in addition to the
declaration of the greatest commandments. But the two testaments are linked by more than these
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separated threads; they are woven intimately by a shared vision of the world and a common story
of the community of God's people.
Jesus declares that those who follow him are the true descendents of Abraham (Jn. 8:39-
59), a claim echoed by Paul (Ro. 4). Jesus' message, then, is one concerning the identity of
Israel; among these competing claims, whose way of being Israel�the Pharisees', the
Sadducees', the Essenes', the Zealots', Jesus'�is the right way? The narrative of the Gospels
shows that Jesus' teaching was authenticated by his resurrection and ascension, the indubitable
sign of God's approbation. The inclusion of the Gentiles into the community of God's people,
then (Ac. 15; Gal.; Eph. 2: 1 1-22), signals an incorporation into the people of Israel, establishing
a line of continuity from Abraham to Christians today.
At an even deeper level, when we put faith in the saving work of Christ, we are
mysteriously and mystically united with him in that work. Paul, in Ephesians, reminds his
readers that Christ was raised from the dead and seated at God's right hand in the heavenly
realms (1:20). "As for you," he continues, "you were dead" as wed (2:1), "but God... made us
ahve with (Gk. syn) Christ... And God raised us up with (Gk. syn) Christ and seated us with (Gk.
syn) him in the heavenly realms" (2:5-6, NFV; my italics; note the past tense).''^ Paul uses
similar language in Colossians and in Romans as well. The incorporation motif gives further
power to the programmatic Pauline formula "in Christ," for we can see that in a real way Paul
considers Christians to have participated in the death, resurrection, and ascension performed by
Jesus. This incorporation is not a strictly Pauline doctrine, however. Peter too, in writing to
believers who "have not seen him" (1:8), urges them to "rejoice that you participate in the
sufferings of Christ" (4:13).
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Jesus claimed to be the fulfillment of the scriptures, and, because of the presence of the
Holy Spirit on him throughout his ministry (Lk. 4:18), he even acted as the replacement of the
Temple (Mt. 12:6; cf. Ac. 3-4; ICo. 3:16-17), the symbol of God's presence in the midst of his
community. If we are incorporated into his life, death, resurrection, and glorification, in some
sense, we have participated in each one of these aspects of his ministry as well. With the aid of
the image of incorporation, we might be able to understand in a new way the biblical portrait of
the church as the body of Christ�now more connected to him than we ever imagined before.
With the incorporation of our lives into Christ's, the church is (or ought to be) the presence of
God in the world, the locus of the Holy Spirit, the inheritors of the story of Israel.
C. Using Images
Adopting a theology of images in contrast to abstract, cerebral theologies, founded on
propositions, extracted from the narratives in which they emerged, yields a Christianity with the
potential for being more concrete and incamational. The ease with which one can grasp a picture
makes the vision of the kingdom transmittable to young children, mentally delayed or
handicapped people, and new Christians or pre-Christians, who are not yet well-versed in the
theological language of church-speak. The ideas are then more likely to be applied in the lives of
believers because they are more readily grasped. The use of images also leads to a more
experiential theology because the images create a reality that must be lived out to be realized. A
theological declaration about the preexistence of Christ has little to do with one's ordinary life,
but the paradigm of Christ as an example for non-manipulative love as evidenced through the
Incarnation has myriad applications in nearly every situation in one's life.
Therefore, the church must initiate a concerted effort to promulgate image-laden
messages that connect with the cultural realities of postmodem America. Songs, prayers, and
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sermons that cull the images of the Bible should be used for public worship. New analogies and
metaphors that relate to the uniqueness of the postmodem experience should be discovered and
shared with a world of lost people. The use of poetry, dance, and art should be reintroduced to
the liturgy and allowed to communicate on their own terms the profundity of the Christian life
without the distraction of an "official" interpretation. The omnipresence of the pop culture
should be exploited and "secular" movies, television shows, and songs deconstmcted and
reinterpreted in light of the narrative of scripture.
The potential for a spiritual revival resides in the recovery of biblical imagery, hi it rests
the possibility of widespread understanding and acceptance of the tme cost of discipleship
because, for the story of following Christ to be believable, it must accord with the experiences of
life. It will therefore be told in its entirety, never yielding to the neat systematization of cheap
grace. Images of peace and liberation hold the promise of a Christendom with a burning desire
for social justice around the world. Images of compassion and concern for the widow, the alien,
and the fatherless give hope for a church that shows empathy to the disenfranchised, the
voiceless, and the marginahzed in our society�the addicts, the homeless, the single mothers.
Images of community and hospitality promise a church that supports and encourages one
another, that values the diverse benefits that each gives, that offers open arms to outsiders who
wish to join. In sum, images allow the demolition of the fragmented life; biblical images give to
postmodems the tools they need to hve a holistic Christian life that is incorporated in every part
of their day. No longer must Christians live in a public, secular world and retreat to a private,
spiritual world. The two are brought together by images that determine the course, tenor, and
pitch of all of life.
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Images are the basis for the attraction we have to life. We do not love life because it is
analyzable, understandable, and definable. We love life because it is poetic, unpredictable,
touching, and mysterious. Images dwell in the very foundations of our thoughts, and they are
present in every word we utter. They hold tremendous power, and the church neglects them at
its peril.
V. Conclusion
American pop culture is the location for the creation of a new national identity in the
United States. Driven by global capitalism and international trade, American pop culture is even
being carried all over the world, establishing the first vestiges of a one-world culture. It speaks
above languages in the transmission of pictures, creating moods and feelings through its
powerful images. Biblical writers knew long before the invention of the camera the power of
pictures for the creation and alteration of reality. Jesus' homey stories of fish, bread, water,
vineyards, and soil confirm it�the images that arise from stories form the foundation for one's
understanding of the world, much more than sterile logic and scientific empiricism. The church
must acquaint itself with the images of scripture if it hopes to be relevant to an image-oriented
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Though our examination of the potential relationship between postmodemism and the
evangelical church is far from complete�we have not given sufficient attention to such central
issues as worship, pastoral care, the role of mystery for the church, and other concerns�it
nevertheless establishes a trajectory with the possibility for further exploration as well as a
manner of thinking into which can be placed the particularities of any individual church's local
context. As this proposal is adapted to specific local contexts, however, as I hope it will be, there
is the possibility for an openness to postmodernism and an enthusiasm about postmodemism that
forgets to evaluate what it appropriates, resulting in a mwappropriation of postmodemism. So
before I conclude this thesis, I am compelled to express this final cautionary note.
It can hardly be denied that postmodemism is in vogue. It sometimes seems as if every
aspect of American culture has yielded to the irresistible label.' To be postmodem is to be sexy,
enigmatic, current, and sophisticated. It is the topic of discussions in all disciplines; having moved
beyond architecture, art, and linguistics, scholars are now pumping out voluminous amounts of
material explaining what it is to do postmodem history, postmodem theology, and postmodem
science. If something seems new or innovative in any way, it is automatically placed in the
category of the postmodem. The church should not be straining toward postmodemism simply to
be popular and trendy, lest its fate mirror that of liberalism after its capitulation to secular
modemism, and its lifeblood drain slowly from it. Rather, its motivation should spring from a
genuine commitment to share the love ofGod, to care for needs, and to provide opportunities for
worship in a way that is most readily received by postmodem persons. Therefore, a consideration
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ofmisappropriations is necessary to avoid errors in thinking and acting that might await those who
reach out to embrace postmodemism too readUy.
I. Possibilities for Misappropriation
A. Denigration of the Past
The mystique of postmodemism, I believe, lies in its self-characterization to have moved
beyond the naivete of all earlier periods in history. This chronological arrogance affords it an
alluring sensation of sophistication that relegates all abstainers to the realm of the simple, the artless,
and the hopelessly bypassed, unworthy of serious consideration, fronically, this attitude is but one
of many characteristics that it shares with die modem period, that stretch of time that postmodemists
claim to be "post." hi fact, such a temporal superciliousness is the basis for modemity' s name.
Derived from the Latin, modo, meaning "the lately" or "the just now," modemity was founded on
the discoveries of the Enlightenment, which name of course implies that previous times were
comparatively M/ienlightened. But now, in striking parallelism, the modo is to be post-moJo; in
partial objection to the term, postmodemism, Jean-Frangois Lyotard protested:
Now this idea of a linear chronology [implied in the prefix post-] is itself perfectly
'modem.' It is at once part ofChristianity, Cartesianism, and Jacobinism. Since we are
inaugurating something completely new, the hands of the clock should be put back to zero.
The very idea ofmodemity is closely correlated with the principle that it is both possible
and necessary to break with tradition and institute absolutely new ways of living and
thinking. We now suspect that this 'mpture' is in fact a way of forgetting or repressing the
past.'^
A Christian version of postmodernism, while identifying and rejecting the errors and sins
of the past, must never assume that because it can enumerate the shortcomings of its ancestors it
is therefore in a position of superiority with respect to them. To do so is to fail to treat the past
as an "other," as mandated by our ethics, oudined in chapter four. The theologians and
Christians of the past approached the scriptures from their own perspective, and our
responsibility is to listen intendy to their message for our day and to engage in conversation with
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them, as mandated by our dialogical hermeneutics, outlined in chapter two. This does not always
mean that we will accept the position expressed by those in the past, but it does mean that we
will approach the encounter with the other in an attitude of respect and with the expectation that
we will leam as a result of it.
Additionally, we must never consider ourselves to have arrived. Because we are now
aware of our own limited perspective, we are forced to adopt the humility commanded by
scripture. We must assume that there are unseen failures of our own that will be corrected
(hopefully) by future generations. We probably even participate in new failures that would not
have occurred in the churches of the past but to which we are blind today. In other words, we are
in no position to remove the speck from the eyes of past Christians because of our own planks
around which we try to see.
B. Denial ofAuthority
As Lyotard has so famously pointed out, postmodemism is characterized by an "incredulity
towards metanarratives,"" i.e., postmodemism prohibits subscription to a prevailing theory against
whose norms single events of judging might themselves be judged and either validated or
invalidated. Considered oppressive, authoritarian, and restrictive of individual creativity,
postmodem theorists consider these claims to authority false and illegitimate. Postmodemism gets
its name, of course, from its ostensible antipathy with modemism, and, accordingly, Lyotard rejects
what he sees to be the primary characteristic ofmodemism, namely, the promulgation of these
grand narratives. Whether it is the Enlightenment story of the gradual but steady progress of reason
and freedom, Hegel's dialectic of Spirit coming to know itself, orMarx's drama of the forward
march of human productive capacities via class conflict culminating in proletarian revolution, these
metanarratives instantiate an unsound and unfounded approach to the problem of legitimation.^
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They themselves are unproven and improvable and therefore specious grounds for the evaluation of
truth claims. All such narratives, where the veil is hfted and truth arrives unbesmirched, are
distressingly biblical to many postmodernists.^
While Christians undoubtedly need to be more suspicious of authority and power in general,
and especially their own use of it, they must still preserve some legitimation of power, modeled
after the other-focused power of God as manifested in his Son, Jesus Christ. There is an inherent
power structure present in the church flowing from God to the church leadership to the laity.
Simply for the sake of effectiveness and efficiency, the church needs committees with responsibility
and authority to carry out their tasks. Teaching is a main function of the church, the transmission of
the faith from one generation to the next, but the position of teacher is necessarily a position of
authority and power (Jas. 3:1). Power exists in the commingling of the old and the young�no
relationship is absent the influence of power.
That is why postmodemists have not completely supplanted notions of authority, despite
some claims to the contrary. To an extent equal to their modem predecessors, postmodemists have
simply supplanted the authority of a previous era and substituted it with their own. It is impossible
to enjoin others to reject authority without any authority oneself That is, if a potential convert is
exposed to the idea, "Reject Authority" (whether in Lyotard, Foucault, or the rear bumper of a
Volkswagen van), it is always appropriate for him or her to respond, "By what authority am I being
asked to reject authority?" Similarly, the postmodem account of the rejection of the grand
narratives has, to some extent, become its own grand narrative.^ It is surprising the extent to which
so many postmodem philosophers, now freed from the shackles of the stifling modem age, have
arrived at precisely the same conclusions in this era of rejecting authority.
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Consequently, Christians should not be anxious about the existence of authorities, even in a
postmodem reality. The church should not accept any interpretation of scripture as a good
interpretation; it should not democratize its ethical teachings; it should not abdicate its right to
instmct, admonish, rebuke, or lead. Instead, it must submit itself to the narrative of scripture and to
the conversation of the church throughout time, checking to make sure that it does not stray from
the tme faith, handed down for countless generations. Further, it must repeatedly evaluate its own
use of power to make sure that as much as possible its modves have been pure and directed toward
the benefit and edification of the other, rather than one's own self-aggrandizement.
C. Departure from Orthodoxy
The potential exists for the church to become so enamored with the devices of
postmodemism that they replace the gospel as what is foundational for us. Once that happens, we
have excused ourselves from the table of dialogue and have launched into a sea of our own
solipsistic navigation of faith. Stephen D. Moore, in his book, Poststructuralism and the New
Testament: Derrida and Foucault at the Foot of the Cross, models a case only too graphically of
biblical scholarship that has purchased an appropriation of postmodemism at the cost of its
orthodoxy. After a quick orientation to the philosophies of stmcturalism and poststmcturalism,
Moore leads the reader through two case studies of poststmcturalist hermeneutics. The first
examines the Johannine story of the woman at the Samaritan well, using the style employed by
Derrida. Through an examination of water throughout the book of John as well as a
reinterpretation of the ambiguous discussion between the woman and Jesus previously uncovered
by several leading feminist scholars, Moore deconstmcts the text, concluding that the woman is
in fact the superior conversationalist.
What remains unquestioned in these [feminist] readings, however, is Jesus' superiority to
the Samaritan woman. He retains his privileged role as the dispenser of knowledge�
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'the subject presumed to know,' as Jacques Lacan would say. . . . But what if the
Samaritan woman were found to be the more enlightened partner in the dialogue from the
outset? What if her insight were found to exceed that of Jesus all along? Impossible?
Not at all.^
In Part II, Moore examines the passages in Paul referring to the cross through the lens of
Foucault' s Discipline and Punish. By analyzing the sadsfacdon theory of the atonement, Moore
picks at the weak parts of the theory, asking questions that would be disturbing, no doubt, for
Anselm, such as why God's wrath must be satisfied through cruelty and suffering. Through the
use of such questions, Moore concludes that, for Paul, God is a symbol of absolute power and, as
such, is a useful tool for gaining power for himself as well as the whole class of clergy who
would follow. This pastoral power is manifested by the role of the priest to scold and to
discipline the flock and became so ubiquitous that it spread throughout the European society,
supported by nearly every other medieval institution. And this power has been a source of
repression. "Power is at its most insidious and efficient, for Foucault, precisely when its
workings are effaced�when its brow is furrowed with humanitarian concern, when its voice is
warm with Christian compassion, when its menace is masked even, or especially, from itself."^
Moore's unconcern for orthodox Christianity stands as a suggestive example of what can
happen if the practices of postmodemity are applied to biblical studies in the same manner that
the secular postmodemists apply them to other texts. His work tmly represents what Derrida or
Foucault might write on the passages in question. The evangelical must remember that, while
the criticisms that postmodemity levels against human behavior can be incorporated in
accordance with a biblical faith, surrender to the conclusions that most postmodemists make
regarding these criticisms is a surrender of one's faith. I have endeavored to demonstrate in this
thesis that the arguments of postmodemism do not necessarily lead to the conclusions of the
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radical, secular postmodemists; there are other, viable altematives, that fall vi'ithin the boundaries
of orthodox faith.
D. Denunciation ofDeep Thought
While none of the postmodem writers themselves encourages a mental vacation (most
border on the impregnably complicated), some Chrisdans, in a desire to appeal to a postmodem
culture, have adopted a strategy that circumvents the mind and aims straight for the emotions.
These apologists give up all claims to any kind of tmth at all and simply call unbelievers to the faith
on the basis of its usefulness or satisfaction-inducing qualities. Douglas Groothius paraphrases such
an evangelistic approach in the style of Paul's address to the Athenians in Acts 17.
People of Postmodemity, I can see you speak in many language games and are
interested in diverse spiritualities. I have observed your pluralistic religious discourse and
the fact that you use many final vocabularies. ... We affirm the Christian community, which
professes that God is the strand that unites our web of belief We have our own manner of
interpreting the world and using language that we call you to adopt for yourself. . . . We are
not interested in metaphysics but in discipleship.
For us, Jesus is Lord. That is how we speak. We act that way, too; it's important to
us. . . We believe that God is in control of our narrative. We ask you to join our language
game. Please. ... We simply declare this to be our tmth. It can become your tmth as well,
if you join up.'�
An apologetic based solely on an emotional plea offers no reasons for the hope we have
(IPe. 3: 15) and makes no attempt to "contend for the faith" (Jude 3), thus failing the test of scripture
as a viable apologetic. While a biblically-oriented postmodem apologedc addresses the seeker as a
holisdc entity and may include an emotional component, that component cannot compose the whole
of the apologetic strategy. It must be buttressed by compelling challenges to the non-Christian's
way of conceiving the world, which necessitates an intellectual appraisal of the deficiencies of the
worldview in question. In other words, we must call the seeker to think about the prospect of
joining the church and exchanging "language games." To do otherwise is, again, to fail to treat the
pre-Christian as an "other"; creating a mood through the management ofwords, sounds, lighting.
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etc., IS simply a manipulation of the seeker's emotions. Conversions wrought through such
circumstances are illegitimate until they result in a metanoia, a reorientation of the whole person,
including the mind.
Additionally, to present a vision of the faith to the saints that does not require their
continued intellectual development is a disservice to the church, an insult to God, and a desertion of
the responsibility of stewardship. Among the talents given to us as humans, formed in the image of
God, are our minds, and to ignore them and to downplay the importance of their development is to
bury them in the ground, never using them for anything profitable (Mt. 25: 14-30). The theology of
images proposed in the last chapter should not be understood as a departure from an intellectually
rigorous theology. The task for the theologian in postmodemity is the apprehension of images that
hold potential for connecting to the postmodem situation, fleshing them out by applying them to the
key elements of the faith, and communicating the challenging vision produced through the
development of the image. Such a task requires creativity, insight, understanding, and familiarity
with the world of scripture. We still need linguists, archaeologists, and cultural historians to tell us
what it is impossible for a text to mean by virtue of its cultural situation and to explore what the
messianic images used by Jesus to describe himselfwould have meant to the first hearers.
Christians must be intellectual in their approach to faith�it is part of a holistic Christian life.
E. Deference to Relativism
hi surveying the cultural landscape, many observant culture-watchers have noted the
widespread disbelief in absolute tmth that permeates the society. Numerous Americans have
followed the atheistic reasoning of Derrida, Foucault, Rorty, and Lyotard and believe that, because
we cannot see reality in any absolute way, we are therefore doomed to an interminable relativism. I
have tmth that makes sense to me, you have tmth that makes sense to you, but nobody's tmth is
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really accurate in the sense of corresponding to what is really "out there." Any claims to
apprehending the features of the actual world that could function as independent norms for
epistemology are in fact just a human constmction, buttressed by convention. Even more sinister,
they are further the means by which we attempt to legitimate our self-serving bids for power. Under
such a schema, the assumption is that what one believes is irrelevant, along with the search for tmth
itself
Sadly, too many Christians have adopted such a stance with regard to tmth,
''
accepting the
correspondence theory of tmth and denying the tmth-telling capacity of the Bible or the church
since we humans fail to attain the fullness of tmth by that standard, hi the Enlightenment, the bar
for what can be considered as accurate knowledge was set too high, but we are not forced to accept
the Enlightenment's definitions. As we observed in chapter two, the Bible offers at least one other
way to constme the nature of tmth, which has nothing to do with the correspondence theory. A
proper Christian understanding of tmth in postmodemity does not deny that tmth exists; instead, it
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accepts that tmth is different than we previously thought.
II. Conclusion
In every age, the church must walk the thin line that divides separation from the culture and
capitulation to the culture. On one side of the line, the church is too distant from the culture and
refuses to embrace the tmth that exists in it; she denounces the evils of society and demonstrates the
difference demanded by adherence to the gospel message. On the otiier side of the line, the church
has lost her identity; in affirming everything that the culture does and says, she is only a mirror that
reflects back what the culture projects. In such a case, the church has nothing unique to offer to the
culture, no message that is not already present, and it becomes simply one more voice reinforcing
the status quo.
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Not everything postmodem is an attack of Satan; neither is it all a movement of God. Like
everything else in the world, it is a mixture of tmth and he, good and evil, right and wrong. But for
the church, the item of importance is that postmodemism is a new development and as such
demands a response from the church. In a period of cultural transition, when the multitudes are
searching for what cannot be found in humanity, when there is unprecedented openness to questions
about spirituality and about God, when societal relationships are being reevaluated and reformed,
the church stands at the threshold of a great opportunity to rise up and become a significant force for
the kingdom of God. But that can only happen if the church models non-manipulative love,
acknowledges its finite limitations, and communicates the message of the gospel in ways that are
readily understandable by postmodems. Neither a rigid adherence to modemism or an embrace of
postmodemism that compromises the gospel is acceptable. To be God's church in this place and at
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